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INDIA  
AND  
THE DURBAR



# INDIA AND THE DURBAR

A Reprint of the Indian Articles  
in the 'Empire Day' Edition of  
THE TIMES, May 24th, 1911.

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*Presented by*  
**Mrs. Bela Chakravarty.**

## PREFATORY NOTE.

The articles here reprinted formed part of the 1911 Empire Day Edition of *The Times*. The series was designed with special reference to the visit of their Majesties the King-Emperor and Queen-Empress to India. It does not profess to give a complete conspectus of Indian problems, but explains, in a manner not too technical, certain present aspects of Indian politics and conditions.

The articles are issued in book form in the hope that they will be of interest and value, not only to visitors to the Delhi Durbar, but also to the far greater public which will watch that unprecedented event from afar. It should be understood that they do not necessarily express the editorial policy of *The Times*, with the exception of the first chapter, which was originally published as a leading article.

Several of the articles were curtailed in the Empire Day Edition owing to lack of space, but are here restored to their original form. All have undergone slight revision where necessary, to bring them up to date.



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## CHAPTER I.

### THE TWO EMPIRES.

Two distinct traditions, of equal greatness, have made the framework of the British Empire that we know. One is the tradition of self-government, grown and tended first on English soil, but now sown broadcast on three other continents, and gathering strength with every year. The other is a tradition of trusteeship for subject-peoples of darker race, whose interests we have taken by gradual steps into our charge. The recent history of the Empire, culminating in the Conference on Imperial Defence which met two years ago, has focussed attention more closely upon the growth of the self-governing nations and their relations each with each than on the changing problem of the Dependencies. The political instinct which has caused this movement of thought was the natural product of the events of the period; and few will question that it was sound. The national Governments of the Empire have, without doubt, to develop within the next few years some better mechanism of co-operation, if the natural processes of individual expansion are not to cause them to drift apart. With that problem more than any other the Conference which recently sat in London was concerned. It was a Conference of Governments, equal in *status*, assembled of

their own motion, and competent to speak for all the free peoples which owe allegiance to the British Crown. The Conference was concerned, in the proper course of things, mainly with the direct responsibilities of the Ministers attending it to their own electorates; its most pressing problem was to establish the basis of a joint foreign policy satisfactory to all and of what would be impossible on other terms, a joint system of defence. And yet the self-governing peoples of the Empire cannot, if their co-operation is to be lasting and complete, forget their joint responsibility to that other Empire, whose peoples owe the same allegiance and share the influence of the same political ideals but do not, and for the present cannot, govern themselves.

India  
and Imperial  
Defence.

The Indian Empire is only one of many vast Dependencies, but it is the vastest and most complex of all. Upon the roll of those who have served it are many of Great Britain's greatest names; and in its administration we need not hesitate to claim one of the most striking achievements of our race. Striking it is indeed, for the Government of India was not built up, and could not have been built up, by the efforts of great soldiers and administrators alone. It has been founded upon the labour and devotion of all its Services, manned as they have been by wave after wave of young recruits with that administrative instinct which is the peculiar quality of British stock. This great succession of not great but capable men has kept for us what has justly been described as the only portion of the British Empire which is an Empire in the true sense of the term. The time, however, has passed when the maintenance of British power in India should be regarded as an interest of Great Britain alone. India stands right across the greatest highway in the world; it is the centre of the East. Through its possession we secured our great predominance in Eastern trade, and from its shores

we extended our interests to Australasia, the Malay Peninsula, the Pacific Islands, and the Chinese coast. The Power which holds India must of necessity command the sea. Supreme sea-power would be as difficult to maintain without control of India as control of India without supreme sea-power. It is, therefore, in a special and peculiar sense the centre of Imperial defence. Were India lost to us, the security of three great Dominions—the Union, the Commonwealth, and the Dominion of New Zealand—would inevitably be threatened by the Power which took our place. We should, moreover, be compelled at once to abandon all efforts to affect the balance of forces in the Pacific and should diminish thereby, to an extent hardly calculable as yet, the security of the whole Pacific Coast of the American Continent. Had we, indeed, no Indian tradition, and no responsibility to the peoples of India for the fulfilment of the great trusteeship which we have undertaken on their behalf, we should still be compelled to recognise, in the maintenance of the British Raj, a paramount condition in the defence of that other British tradition of self-government which our own political systems enshrine.

There is yet another reason why India should be much in our minds in this Coronation year. It stands in a somewhat different relation than the self-governing Dominions, and in some ways a more ancient relation, to the Crown. Over its peoples the Sovereign wields an influence of a special kind. To us, of his own race, he is the symbol of the national ideals; to his Indian subjects he is the personal embodiment of power. The millions who look with reverence and awe to his coming amongst them in the latter part of this year have no capacity for grasping what we so greatly treasure—the constitutional idea. The Government which watches over their destinies is, to them, the servant of his beneficent will; it can wander from beneficence only by departing from his commands. The impersonal authority with which

we invest the State has no significance for them, nor could the State maintain for a month the power which it exercises by their tacit consent were it not supported in their minds by the vast, although invisible, authority of the Throne.

So great is this authority that to many  
**A Royal** students of Indian conditions it has  
**Regent.** seemed that the King-Emperor should  
be represented in India by a member of

his own Family, who would associate more closely in the mind of the Indian masses respect for Government with allegiance to the Crown. We do not altogether share the confidence of some authorities in the feasibility of such a change, though we recognise the great weight of many of the arguments employed in its behalf. It is, however, a suggestion which should be pondered by all who have the interests of India at heart, and we are glad to include in this work a chapter of great authority in which its merits are advanced. The constitutional aspect of the idea, as the writer of the chapter says, involves no difficulty which could not be easily solved. The Prince Regent of India could not exercise the executive functions of the Viceroy, but they would pass to a Prime Minister, appointed as Viceroys are appointed now, for a term of five years, and responsible, like the Viceroy, to the British Cabinet. There are, however, other difficulties which might prove great, and there is above all the need for preserving intact the conditions which make the Crown the most potent symbol of unity which the different political systems of the Empire at present possess. The question is one in which every part of the Empire should feel itself concerned. There is nothing in our political systems which stands for our common citizenship, with its necessary differences of *status* and its widely dissimilar points of view, but our common allegiance to the Crown. Beneath whichever of the two political traditions which

inspire the Empire's being the life of the King-Emperor's subjects may be cast, they are all one in loyalty to his person and his Throne, and they must all maintain with equal jealousy the unity of his sway.

In the swiftly changing relations between East and West the British Empire has a special part to play. There is no people which has come so close as ours to the problems of Asia or made so profound an impression on its life. Asia, as the writer of a particularly valuable chapter makes very plain, is neither changeless nor asleep. Her peoples are quickening into a new life, and her resources in all the factors which go to build up wealth are still almost unused. Her time is coming soon, and on British policy before all others must depend the manner of its coming and its effect upon the West. We are the guardians of a great tradition, but the conditions are changing and with them the forms of guardianship must also change. As we associate the Indian peoples more closely with the mechanism of rule, so must we give more and more consideration to their sentiments and views in the policy of rule. Their growing desire for industrial development, and with it a measure of fiscal autonomy sufficient to its needs, will test as nothing else can test the morality of our power. The touchstone of the Empire is there. Our mark upon history, and history's verdict upon us, will be shaped in great degree by the course which we now take in Indian affairs.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE KING AND HIS INDIAN PEOPLES.

Those who know India and are acquainted with the stupendous change which has been wrought in the administration of that vast continent during the last five years will admit that it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of the King's decision to visit Delhi in the very year of his Coronation. The strain involved by the ceremonials in Great Britain, and the heavy work and responsibilities which fall on the Sovereign even in normal years, might well have excused King George from this most strenuous mission, or might have, at any rate, justified a postponement to a later year. But these considerations have no weight with the King when he sees duty and opportunity before him ; and, knowing what has passed during the last five fateful years in India, we hold that there is a great duty awaiting the King-Emperor in his Indian Empire and a glorious opportunity to his hand for bringing rest and peace to that unrestful land.

This mission is of profound interest, not only to those who have first-hand knowledge of India, but to all the subjects of his Majesty at home or overseas, and for these latter it is necessary to explain briefly the magnitude and the character of the Indian Empire. The huge continent shut off from the world by the sea and the Himalayas is as large as Europe if we exclude Russia. Three hundred and fifteen millions of people occupy this

continent, split up into groups of inherent diversities, so dissimilar and incongruous in race, language, and religion that Europe by comparison seems to be almost homogeneous. The imagination of the ordinary man reels when it is confronted by an Empire that contains nearly 2,380 castes and tribes and 147 languages of extraordinary variety. But these are mere details as compared with the differences of religions and philosophies which sharply divide the Indians from one another and all Indians from the Western nations. The five years which have just passed have revealed much to an astonished world, but the revelations have been in vain if Indian statesmen have not realized that the trouble which has swept through India of late is spiritual and not mundane. We have lightly talked of political unrest, and have applied political panaceas of London origin, forgetting the eternal fact that East is East. In the East the idea is everything; it is concrete and a part of life. With us it is an incident—an abstraction. The West is scientific; the East is religious. We regard Nature as an external object, while the Indian feels himself as part of Nature, and recognizes no external world. The Indians cannot separate politics or any other aspect of experience from religion, and when our home-staying statesmen or philosophers give them new ideas these too often become the forces of fanaticism. Conceptions that are the playthings of the Western mind become the weapons of partisan warfare in the East.

It has been well said by one whose recent loss has deprived India of a true and kindly interpreter that "the mixture of religion with politics has always produced a highly explosive compound, especially in Asia," and those in authority who forget the essential difference in the mentality of the East and West are raising a whirlwind which neither they nor their Indian mentors can ride. It is perhaps possible for an

The Indian  
Mind.



adroit Englishman to get into an Indian's skin, but it requires unusual qualities and a lifelong experience to get into an Indian's mind. And who shall say what the better mind of India is or where it is to be found? For India is a mere phrase and "Indians" a mere label of convenience. When we deal with "races as different from each other as the Esquimaux is from the Spaniard or the Irishman from the Turk, with creeds that range between the extreme points of the basest animalism on the one hand and the most exalted metaphysics on the other, and with standards of life that cover the whole space between barbarism and civilization"; when we know that in India there are 50 millions of "untouchables," and when we know the conditions of education and, most important of all, the *status* and life of the women of India, we may well hesitate to talk of "equality of citizenship," or to dream of these heterogeneous masses becoming a self-conscious unity, working for its own ends and fighting for its own existence.

What, then, has given cohesion to the masses and has rendered the British Administration possible? First, there is the *Pax Britannica*, bringing justice to the people and protection to the Princes of India. Government and justice have given some cohesion to the masses, and it is the proud boast of the Administration and the cherished possession of the most lowly that he has access to the King's Viceroy, just as in old days he could stand in the throng in the audience hall of the Mogul Emperor. Other threads run through the loose tissue of the Indian system. The Brahman touches Hindu life at all points. English education has brought about strange and startling combinations; religious reformers have founded societies, diverse and elastic in their objects and very diverse in their methods. Railway travel and the huge cities which have grown up under the ægis of the British trader have to some extent modified

caste scruples, and generally the civilization, limited and scanty as it is, which we have introduced from the West has tended to create a class separate and apart from the great masses of the people. All these threads run through the curious jungle of design, but the golden thread which brightens the whole tissue and gives hope of union and continuity is the intense and beautiful devotion of all classes to the King-Emperor of India.

We have endeavoured to show how ideas are part of an Indian's life, how seriously he takes them, and how dangerous it is to suggest to him new ideas.

**Idea of  
Kingship.**

But this idea of Kingship is as old as India is. It is their main idea, and those who have been groping about for ideals to offer to an awakening people might have saved themselves much pains, and the Empire some danger, if they had realized this simple fact. Those who have worked in India know the intense difference between the respect paid to a Viceroy by the people of India and the whole-hearted devotion that is offered to one of India's Princes. They know, too, the extraordinary homage and intimate affection that characterized the reception of their Royal Highnesses the Prince and Princess of Wales when they visited India in 1905-6.

This devotion to an idea is so real and pervading that proximity is not necessary. During the long reign of Queen Victoria. Queen Victoria she, who had never seen India, was part and parcel of Indian life and Indian thought. The Great White Queen was always thinking of them, she was learning their language, sympathizing in their sorrows, and enthusing her Viceroys and officials with kindness and pity. And so it came to pass that when she died all India mourned. In Calcutta the people thronged out to the great Park and sat silent all the long sad day, each one wearing some mark of mourning. And all through the Continent, in

villages remote from railway and civilization, the poorest and the most ignorant showed their sorrow and their sympathy. No one who saw the crowds in Calcutta marching in silence through the streets to the Park will ever forget that spontaneous and unrehearsed procession. Soon after a great meeting of all classes was gathered in the Town Hall. There were men of all shades of thought, men of the old fashion and the new fashion. They met to express their sorrow, and the last of the 15 Governors-General who had served Queen Victoria—Lord Curzon—presided. In the course of his speech he said :—" We all feel the same about her whether we are Europeans or Indians, and our hearts are swelling with gratitude that we were fortunate enough to live under such a Sovereign, with an answering love for the great love that she bore to all of us alike and with eagerness to preserve her memory imperishable for all time." Very simple words ; but on that night, February 6, 1901, there met at an important newspaper office the leaders of advanced Indian thinkers, and they revelled in the thought that they and their rulers were comrades and brothers in a common idea. Alas ! that this comradeship, seemingly so obvious and easy, is so difficult to attain. Without it our rule cannot last. But it can be attained and maintained if only we grasp the Indian standpoint and assimilate the Indian idea.

Queen Victoria knew it by intuition. In laying the foundation-stone of the All-India Memorial to Queen Victoria her grandson spoke of her as one who, " though never privileged to see her Indian subjects in their own countries, seemed to have the peculiar power of being in touch and in sympathy with all classes of this Continent." " To us this wonderful expression of gratitude brings natural pride and warm hopes. The Taj, which has delighted and fascinated us by its beauty and its story, can never be rivalled in its grace. But in generations to come this memorial to a great Queen, whose sympathy

conquered distance and space, may present to the historian reflections as hallowed as those which are inspired by the Taj Mahal." What did this great Queen stand for? By her Proclamation she stood for the rights of the Indian Princes and the prosperity and social advancement of her own subjects. So far as may be, her subjects were to be admitted to offices in her service, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability, and integrity duly to discharge. She stood for religious tolerance and mercy; and it was her desire to stimulate the peaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utility and improvement, and to administer the government for the benefit of all her subjects resident therein.

During the long years which followed the Proclamation her Viceroys laboured **The Queen's** steadfastly to carry out her behests. **Proclamation.** She stimulated and encouraged them by letters written in her own hand—letters full of "wise counsel and of tender sympathy for the people whom she had charged them to rule." And all her Viceroys knew, for they lived and worked in India, that their power for good was power reflected from the Queen-Empress whom India honoured and loved. They laboured for efficiency in the administration and for the promotion of works of public utility and improvement. They fought corruption and cruelty, they kept the frontiers safe, and they battled with famine and pestilence. The future historian of India will look back on the Victorian era from 1858 as the age of quiet progress and improvement, of equal justice, and of strenuous and successful endeavour "to administer the government for the benefit of *all* our subjects resident therein." It was, above all, an age of loyal continuity unruffled by the ebb and flow of British party politics. King Edward had visited India in 1875, and knew and loved the land. He stood, like his great mother, for the dignities and rights

of his feudatories and subjects, for their advancement and welfare, for the increasing prosperity of his Indian Empire, and for the greater happiness of its people.

His Coronation was celebrated in Delhi on January 1, 1903, with a splendour and impressiveness unequalled in the history of similar ceremonies. That day may be regarded as the zenith of the old *régime* of efficiency and material advancement. The old *régime* had its merits. It was free from internal alarms, from overt sedition, and from outrages. Western ideas had been suggested, but not enforced, and all subjects knew that they had their very efficient and forceful representative in the district officer. India had passed through the evil days of the Boer War steady and stanch. Her garrisons were depleted by demands for South Africa and China, but at no time in history was India more loyal and more helpful to the Imperial cause.

In 1905-06 King George visited India and found a people happy and contented. He spoke subsequently at the Guildhall of the enthusiasm and affection with which he and the Princess of Wales had been received, and he testified to unmistakable proofs of genuine devotion and personal attachment to the King-Emperor. He alluded to the "wonderful Administration of India." He could not help thinking "that the task of governing India will be made the easier if we on our part infuse into it a wider element of sympathy." Not sentimental sympathy, but the real sympathy which makes men put themselves in other's places.

The new *régime* was ushered in by King Edward's Proclamation of November, 1908. The labours of the past half-century were surveyed with "clear gaze and good conscience," and the note was struck of the obliteration of race distinction as the test for access

to posts of public authority and power, and of the satisfaction of claims for equality of citizenship and a greater share in legislation and government. These measures, it was said, "would mark a notable stage in the beneficent progress of Indian affairs." It was added that "these sincere feelings of active sympathy and hope for India on the part of my Royal House and Line only represent, and they do most truly represent, the deep and united will and purpose of the people of this Kingdom." In so far as the will and purpose of the Royal House were placed in the forefront, this struck the right and true note ; but, as a matter of fact, the people of this Kingdom trouble themselves very little with the affairs of India. On the other hand, the peoples of India are greatly perplexed and concerned as to what the united will and purpose of the British democracy portend. India has had some experience of the purpose of democracy in Greater Britain—a painful experience—and if the feelings of active sympathy expressed and most genuinely felt by the Royal House could only find some echo in the British Dominions, one of the greatest difficulties now besetting our Indian administration would be removed. India is essentially a continent of peoples deeply imbued with the aristocratic principle. Caste pervades the whole of Indian life, and while India will accept a mandate from the Royal House with implicit confidence, it will always remain suspicious of the purpose of the British people. An Indian newspaper of wide circulation has been considering an academic discussion recently started as to the real constitutional relations of the Viceroy of India and the Secretary of State for India. India has been somewhat agitated by the pronouncement that the Viceroy was a mere agent of the Home Government. The Indian newspaper, a great influence among the Indians, remarked :—"What do we care whether we are ruled by the Viceroy and his officials, or by the Secretary

of State and democracy? We look to the Queen's Proclamation, and we claim to be ruled by the Crown." This may sound unreasonable, even embarrassing; but Indian reason is not English reason, and the fact remains that whatever may be the written law of the Constitution, the spirit which breathes through the British connexion in India is the spirit of universal acceptance of and devotion to the Royal House. Thus it is that the approaching visit of the King-Emperor to Delhi is of vital importance to the British Empire, and the Empire, if it could only realize the potentialities of India in trade and in man-power, would be grateful for the happy and statesmanlike intuition which has led King George Eastwards at so early a period of his reign.

Most generous effect has been given  
King George's to the main principles of King Edward's  
Visit. Proclamation, and a notable stage has

indeed been reached in the progress of Indian affairs. It is no exaggeration to say that within the last five years a new India has been created, and most ample scope has been given to the intellect of India. The Indian point of view will in future make itself felt in the Administration of that motley continent, and it will tax the brains of statesmen to know when it is the view of India or the desire of some particular caste, society, or club. But the Viceroy and his officials, aided by the intellect of India, will grapple with such difficulties; and one of the most hopeful signs in the great and profound change which "the people of this Kingdom" have introduced into the Administration is the loyal readiness with which the Civil Service of India is adapting itself to strange and new conditions. Some who have recently studied the situation in India are of opinion that the Indian point of view will assert itself in fiscal and financial matters; and it seems likely that fiscal change unanimously called for by the Indian representatives can hardly be refused by the people

of this Kingdom. Similarly, the Government of India might find it very difficult to refuse assent to a measure of one of the Provincial Governments, if it were supported by a majority of Indian representatives. For good or for evil the Indian point of view is to prevail, and bureaucracy is a thing of the past. And whatever opinions men may hold as to the wisdom of the change, all must agree that the influence and power of the Central and Provincial Governments have been profoundly modified if not weakened. It is necessary to find some counterpoise—and we believe that the counterpoise is to be found in the Royal House. The visit of King George will hearten all classes of India, and there will be a truce to the regrettable incidents which have temporarily deprived India of her pristine reputation for gentleness and dignity.

But the well-wishers of India hope for more than this. They trust that the Citizens of the Dominions will note their King's appreciation of India, and that the statesmen of the Overseas Empire will profit by the Royal example. How it would lighten the burden and the dread responsibilities of the Viceroy and his officials if the Dominions could in this year of good will and Imperial stocktaking recognize the sterling qualities of their fellow-subjects in the East—their bravery, loyalty, patience, and temperance. No one would claim for the whole 315 millions of people any material concessions from the Dominions, but is it too much to ask as a beginning that men who have served the State in any capacity, who have done civic work, or have earned titles and distinctions, should be regarded as Citizens of the Empire and be made free of the Overseas Dominions, as they are now of the Kingdom? This bar, this racial stigma cuts like a lash and destroys that feeling of brotherhood and comradeship without which our tenure in India is difficult and precarious.

But though the visit of the King-Emperor will be the signal for rejoicing and good feeling in India, its



splendid effect will pass away unless it really ushers in a new era and leads to a change which Indians of all conditions greatly desire. We have gone on plodding and working, and it is a dull and dreary India which we have made of it. The reforms based on representation and Parliaments of men have certainly opened the fascinating field of politics to the few, but there is not room for all the youth of India in politics. If we are to moderate the dislike and impatience of our system which characterize certain sections of Indian society we must offer some ideals to the youth of India.

Many think that the field of industry will attract the rising generation, and already there are signs of hopeful developments in this direction. Technical education may achieve great and healthy results, but the old-fashioned prejudices, anachronisms like the Stores Department of the India Office and other heritages from "John Company" must disappear, and every encouragement should be given by the new *régime* to private enterprise. Indians should be associated with the railways, and in every district there should be a National Bank managed by Indians, fostering Indian industries, and financing the co-operative associations. Irrigation schemes, so necessary to India, and so lucrative to their promoters, should be thrown open to Indian capitalists, and the new Department of Industry and Commerce, under its new and unprejudiced Minister, should justify its existence by pointing to Indians the straight road to wealth. If the Government of India really wishes to foster industry, and to bring out the fabulous hoards of gold, it must stand aside and make way for the Indian capitalist. What wonder is it that India, hope-bestirred by recent changes, should look askance at the huge fortunes which are being amassed by Asiatics who are foreigners? Happily there is still time, and the Indians have an enormous advantage.

They can use the experience so dearly and so laboriously acquired by their European predecessors. They have this experience at their doors, and there is no need for exile in Europe. We all know the deteriorating influence which residence in England has upon young Indians. It would indeed be an act of wisdom and precaution, not to say of humanity, if Government established schools and colleges in India which would obviate the cruel necessity of Indian youth being forced to visit England in order to qualify for the Indian Civil Service, and the other services in India. This is an obvious complement of the recent reforms.

But though industry and the acquisition of wealth and power may attract the youth of India and divert it from the sterile and disappointing pursuit of politics in latitudes where politics cannot live, and though industry may bring about that most essential comradeship between the English and the Indians, there still remains the social side of the question. It is admitted by all who know the facts that the Viceroy has a load which is too heavy for one man. Decentralization is a comfortable word, but the Viceroy is held responsible by Great Britain and by the world, and his load cannot be lightened.

What the Indians greatly desire is that one of the Royal House should be appointed as Prince Regent of India. He would have no political functions, and the Viceroy, as Prime Minister of India, appointed for five years, would be responsible to the British Cabinet. In this departure we must not repeat the mistake which was made in education—the mistake which caused the present trouble in India. We must not be content with a cheap and soulless instrument, but must secure the highest and most noble of agencies. This is to be found in a Prince Regent of the Royal House. He would be the head of society, and would discharge all

the social and ceremonial duties which now trench so heavily on the Viceroy's time. Space will not allow of the scheme being developed here, but it may be said in passing that there is no constitutional difficulty involved. The aspirations of Indians are social rather than political, and at present we have no one to lead in social matters. There is a great gulf between the rulers and the ruled. With the best will in the world the Viceroy and his overworked officials have no time for things social, and the work which will be added by the reforms will give them still less leisure for social activities. And there is such a glorious field for the leader of Indian society !

In the discussion of Indian affairs it is usual to omit the most important factor in Indian life. We sometimes marvel at the small impression we have made on Indian customs and manners, but we forget that we have never canvassed nor sought the good will of the most powerful influence in Indian society—the woman. None of the peoples in India can rise in the scale of nations until their women are educated and enfranchised, and the prevailing state of things—for which India holds us responsible—the highly educated man *vis-d-vis* of the uneducated woman—is unnatural and dangerous. In the last few years some of the leading Indian ladies have taken the initiative, and are emerging from the seclusion to which their men and old traditions bound them. Clubs have sprung up, where European and Indian ladies meet, and already there is a camaraderie, which, save in official circles, is unknown among the men. How this would grow if a Prince Regent and his consort were in India ! The wealth of individuals is enormous, and the rising generation is not content with the style and mode of life of the preceding generations. There is no healthy outlet, no decent holiday ground nor pleasure places for this large and increasing

section of Indian society, and in despair they must leave their beloved country for the more attractive cities of the West. There are many places on the sea or on the hills to which Indian society would flock, if guidance were given, if the fashion were set. If we want to placate the educated and wealthy classes of India, and that is the object of the Reform Scheme—if we want to “save face” and to give India a social *status* in the world, if we want to see India bound by golden chains to the British Empire, we must have a Prince Regent as the social leader and arbiter, the fount of honour, and the symbol of continuity, to foster and guide India into the comity of civilized nations.

Further, we must make India attractive to the Indians of the new fashion. We have discarded the old *régime*, so staid and steady, and we must adapt ourselves to modern conditions. We must modernize India. One great section of India, perhaps the most important section at the present moment, the Princes of India, would hail this change with delight. With a member of the Royal House as head of society in India, they would feel sure of the most punctilious regard for their privileges and traditions, and there would be some continuity of policy. No young chief of 19 years, without experience and proved character, would be suddenly given ruling powers, but all, following the European example, would serve for two years in the Cadet Corps or the Army before assuming the grave responsibility of ruling an Indian State. Under the watchful eye and inspiring example of the Prince Regent, slothful indulgence and dereliction of duty would become unfashionable, and honest, healthy endeavour and loyalty to trust would be in vogue. It has been well said that “racial dislike is a dislike not of political domination but of racial domination.” If we may substitute “social” for “racial,” we get to the root of the matter. There is only one agency under heaven that can arrest

this social dislike, and turn it into happy and honourable fellowship, and that is the agency of a Prince Regent. The officials have done their best, but an official remains an official in Indian eyes. It is a high thing to ask of the Royal House, but the interests at stake are so vital to the existence of the Empire that it must be asked, and the Biblical blessing invoked upon the King

Instead of thy fathers shall be thy children  
Whom thou shalt make princes in all the Earth.

## CHAPTER III.

### THE PRINCES OF INDIA.

The character and extent of British rule in India is often misunderstood, not only in the Dominions, but in Great Britain also. The King-Emperor is supreme over-lord of the whole Indian Empire, and the ultimate control of every part of the Indian Empire is in the hands of the Government of India, who in turn are subject to the supervision of the British Government. But ultimate control is a very different thing from direct administrative control, and one-third of the area of the Indian Empire and one-fifth of the population are not subject to the administrative control of the British. The area in question is in the hands of Indian princes and chiefs, who exercise large though varying independent powers. // They are not independent Sovereigns, for they cannot wage war, or form alliances, or maintain foreign relations, but they direct the internal government of their States, and some have the power of life and death over their own subjects. An Indian born in a Native State is not legally a British subject, though he is entitled to British protection, and in practice is admitted to the public service without regard to his domicile. Chiefs are deposed by the Government of India for systematic misrule or other grave offences, so that in fact the British are, when they consider intervention necessary, the arbiters of their fate. // But when speaking of British rule in India it is important to remember that over

70,000,000 of the people do not come directly under the British administration.

Many persons who have quite a clear conception of the present position of the Native States in the Indian system of governance retain very hazy ideas about their original character. A common though quite erroneous belief is that some of these States are of great antiquity, that the British sovereignty implies a violent deprivation of ancient rights, and that the representatives of British authority are very much like dominant upstarts in the midst of a collection of venerable kingdoms.

The real case is almost the exact opposite. Some of the Rajput States have an history extending over many centuries, notably Udaipur, also known as Mewar, whose ruler enjoys the deepest veneration among Hindus on account of his long descent. Certain other States, such as Travancore, can claim great age, though they have suffered frequent eclipses, and sometimes for long periods were feudatory to their neighbours. The great majority of Native States, however, do not date back earlier than the 15th century, and many are far more modern. Some of them actually owe their existence to the operations of the British, and [it may be said of nearly all the Native States of India to-day that their maintenance in their present form is due to the extension of British rule over the whole peninsula.] Far from being the destroyers of indigenous control, the British have really been the saviours of the native States. The statement needs qualification, of course. In the 18th and the first half of the 19th century a number of States and large tracts of territory governed by the representatives of the Moguls passed under British control. For more than 50 years, however, the Native States which remain have been relieved from the fear of annexation; and there are 676 of them, great and small.

It must further be emphasized that many of the Native States are, like British rule itself, the product of conquest. In some cases they were formed by the satraps of distant Emperors, who waxed strong in the provinces placed in their charge, and either threw off their allegiance or only nominally preserved it. Sometimes they were the work of soldiers of fortune who, rising from obscurity, carved their way with the sword to local dominion. Occasionally their creation was directly due to British intervention, local governors being confirmed as semi-independent rulers in territories found under their control. In contrast with the ancient ancestry of the Maharanas of Udaipur, several of the greatest princes in India to-day find their lineage lost in humble obscurity in comparatively recent times. The older English nobles can boast of a descent far exceeding that of most of the powerful Maharajahs, save only the Rajputs. The founder of the house of Scindia was slipper-bearer to the Peishwas, who in their turn were originally the ministers of the successors of the Mahratta chieftain Sivaji. The house of Holkar was founded by a general in the employ of the Peishwas. The Maharajah of Kolhapur is widely esteemed as the head of the Mahratta princes, because he is a lineal descendant of Sivaji; but his famous forbear was the son of a successful soldier who flourished two centuries ago. He has, however, Rajput blood in his veins. The word "Gaekwar" means herdsman, and sufficiently explains the origin of a ruling house which has only existed for two hundred years.

Again, some of the princes of India are almost as alien to the territories The British  
 they control as the British. as Preservers.  
 The fore-  
 most prince of India, the Nizam of Haidarabad, is a survival of the days of Mogul domination. His Highness and his nobles are Musulmans wielding authority over a great population



of Hindus. The Haidarabad troops are foreign mercenaries. The word "Nizam" means Viceroy, the original Nizam was simply a representative of the Delhi Emperors, and the house of Haidarabad had not been founded forty years when Clive fought the battle of Plassey. The rulers of Baroda, Gwalior, and Indore have no ties of blood with their people, who are not Mahrattas. The Maharajah of Kashmir represents a Hindu conquest of a race which has long been Mahomedan, though it has been truly said of the Kashmiris that they remain Hindus at heart. That the British were often the real preservers of the native States is proved by the case of the Rajputana States, which they saved from the menace of the Mahrattas; by the Punjab States, which would certainly have been destroyed by Ranjit Singh; and by Mysore, which was actually captured from Mahomedan adventurers and restored to the Hindu family to which it belonged.

These considerations, of which many more examples might be quoted, do not affect the present position of the princes and chiefs of India. That some of the ruling dynasties are, according to our standards, of recent and comparatively lowly origin does not now concern us. That some are practically alien rulers, and that in numerous instances princely families now in secure possession would have been stripped of their appanages without our help, is a matter of purely historical interest. The Crown has pledged itself "to respect the rights, dignity, and honour of native princes as our own," and the undertaking has long been faithfully observed. But in rendering ample recognition to the princes of India we need not disregard the plain facts of history. When we are asked to conceive the British in India as captors by force of the rights and privileges of the indigenous rulers it is well to preserve some sense of perspective and proportion. A little familiarity with past records and present condition; instantly dispels

the vague impression that the English in India have been buccaneering despots intent upon upsetting rulers with immemorial claims. They found India in wild disorder, they gave it stable rule, and they conferred upon hundreds of Indian princes and chiefs a security which even the Emperors had never long enjoyed.

The characteristics of the princes of India are as varied as their States, but they have one quality in common. They are all intensely loyal to the Crown. The sentiment of attachment to the Royal Family of Great Britain is general among them, and they recognize that in proffering personal devotion to the Monarch of one-fourth of the human race, whose position is far more exalted than their own, and whose descent is far more ancient and illustrious than most of them can claim, they do not derogate from their own dignity.

Some Typical  
Princes.

Some of the princes prefer to live and rule in accordance with old-world traditions, others are modern and progressive in their methods. So long as they govern with reasonable efficiency, they can make their own choice. The most conspicuous example of a capable and successful administrator, thoroughly imbued with the spirit of advancement, is the Maharajah Scindia of Gwalior, who is his own Prime Minister. He supervises every detail of the administration of his State, is overflowing with energy, and has many remarkable qualities. Not only is he a great builder of railways, but he is able, at a pinch, to drive his own trains. The Nizam of Haidarabad is a more orthodox ruler, and chiefly exercises control through Ministers. He is a prince of high personal character, and it is the proud tradition of his race that they have always been faithful to their words and pledges. The Gaekwar of Baroda is a notable student of the scientific side of administration. He makes frequent experiments, and has introduced so many innovations that Baroda is in some respects the most advanced

State in India. The young Maharajah of Mysore had the advantage of succeeding to an inheritance which had already been wisely and prudently developed. He is specially interested in questions of education, like most Hindus of the south. The Maharajah of Jaipur is prominent as an ardent supporter of orthodox Hinduism, but he combines strict orthodoxy with the most liberal principles of government. Among the princes who are essentially warriors first and rulers afterwards, the Maharajah-Regent of Jodhpur is the most famous. He is better known as Sir Pratap Singh, and his knightly figure has been conspicuous at more than one great public solemnity in London. Another prince, who combines much military ardour with a keen interest in administrative work, is the Maharajah of Bikaner, whose capital in the Indian Desert is one of the most remarkable cities of India.

The Raja of Nabha, in the Punjab, may be cited as foremost among rulers of the older type. Simple in his mode of life, a pillar of the Sikh religion, his dominating characteristic is a burning loyalty to the Throne. One of his greatest griefs has always been that the late King Edward was unable to attend the last Delhi Durbar in person. Another prince who is averse from change, but nevertheless rules with much success on traditional lines, is the Maharana of Udaipur, who enjoys a unique position among Indian princes. The esteem in which he is held is a striking proof, not only of his meritorious personal qualities, but of that respect which every Indian feels for the representative of a race of real antiquity. He is the embodiment of some of the oldest and best traditions of the Rajputs. No one has a more remarkable place in the roll of Indian princes than the Aga Khan. A descendant of the Royal House of Persia, he is deeply venerated throughout the whole world of Islam as the only living person in whose veins, according to Musulman traditions, there flows the blood of Mahomet. Though

not an Indian by descent, he possesses an influence deeper and wider than any Indian prince can claim. He is not the titular ruler of a single scrap of territory, yet he holds his princely title from the British Crown, and is the acknowledged temporal leader of 60,000,000 of Indian Mahomedans. Some millions of Moslems in all parts of the East regard him as their spiritual leader also. He rules nowhere, but he guides, and his guidance is not only shrewd and conciliatory, but instinct with devotion to the British Empire.

The individual personality of the Indian princes is a tempting topic, but only a few typical instances can be cited. The

The Tie which unites them to the Empire has often been discussed. Sir William Lee-Warner, in his authoritative work upon the subject, has argued that the tie is not international, because the States cannot form alliances or declare war; it is not, he holds, feudal, and he dissents from the use of the word "feudatory" as dangerous to the rights of the protected princes; and it is not, he contends, constitutional, as Professor Westlake and Sir Lewis Tupper have held. [He defines the Indian States as semi-sovereignties, or types of limited sovereignty.] The question is of technical interest, but if any endeavour is made to associate the princes of India more closely with the control of the Indian Empire it may have much practical importance. It cannot be discussed within contracted limits. All that can be noted here is that probably very few Indian princes—though some of them possess acute intellects—ever trouble themselves about the nice definitions of international law. Their view is summed up in their attitude of personal devotion to the Crown. They frequently maintain close friendship with a Viceroy, and sometimes their relations with the head of the Government are even marked by affection. They generally desire to be on good terms with the Government of India,

whose authority they respect, but hardly love. Does any one ever love a Government ?

The loyalty to the Crown cherished by the Indian princes is a factor of immense importance in the preservation of British rule. It cannot be too strongly urged that their conception of the link usually begins and ends with the Crown. Treaties and agreements, Governments and Cabinets, are subsidiary details in comparison with the supreme personal ruler. They are not specifically loyal to British rule or to England. They are not very consciously loyal to the Empire, though that spirit may come if it is wisely fostered. The Crown is the sole object of their allegiance. Yet in whatever form their adhesion to the existing system may be expressed, its results are of vital moment to the British in India. The loyal co-operation of the princes is an essential condition of the maintenance of British control. If it was withdrawn, the security of our rule would at once be greatly impaired. It is not withdrawn, because both princes and British have gradually come to perceive that their interests are far more nearly identical than was originally believed. Sometimes we are told that the princes of India think longingly of the time when a Mahatajah might ride forth to conquest at the head of his retainers. The new order prescribes inaction and discourages adventure; but the wise prince, who balances gains and losses, knows full well that it guarantees security, and that the advantages preponderate. There are few native rulers now who do not realize that immunity from attack, and the peaceful possession of their territories, are worth some sacrifice of the attributes of sovereignty. The changes which have swept through India in recent years fill them with apprehension. They know that the spirit of revolt, where it is manifested, is not so much due to antagonism to British rule as to dislike of all constituted authority. They are well aware that,

though it is the turn of British India to-day, it may be theirs to-morrow. Even the perfectly legitimate, although unwisely extreme, aspirations of the Indian political leaders are looked at askance by most of the princes. They realize that in a system of governance, modelled as advanced Indian politicians desire, there would be no room for the personal, direct, and sometimes archaic systems found in Native States. Thus their sympathies are all with the British in their efforts to stem the current of revolution, because if the flood rises they, too, may be overwhelmed. The rapid developments in India in recent years have given the Native States an increased importance which is still only imperfectly discerned. To the British administration they have become breakwaters in the midst of the occasional storms of hostility. While among the British the desire for annexation has vanished for ever, it has been replaced by a growing consciousness that the princes are valuable allies; not so much for the help they are able to give, but because their support carries great weight. It is hardly necessary to add that their support is only forthcoming so long as British rule is strong and self-reliant, and that it would rapidly diminish if the Imperial Government became weak and ineffective.

In the long history of the relations between the Government of India and the Native States many modifications of policy may be traced. The position of the British Residents at Native Courts has undergone many changes. The character of the duties performed has always depended very largely upon the idiosyncrasies of particular Residents. Some have been fussy or intrusive, or imperious; others have been far too passive. Sometimes the Government of India have been disposed to encourage constant intervention by Residents; at other times they have advised almost complete abstention from interference. On the

Changes  
of Policy.

whole, it may be said that the general tendency has, perhaps, most frequently been to exercise an unduly paternal supervision. Where, as has sometimes happened, the intermediary between the Government and a particular prince has been tactless and domineering, the consequences have been occasionally unfortunate. The contention that the Native States have often not been left sufficiently alone does not apply to any particular Administration. If the criticism is warranted, it applies at intervals over a long period of years. On the other hand, it is just and right to add that many Native States owe their present stability and prosperity to the administration of British Residents during the long minority of the ruler, or for other causes. Mysore, Indore, Bhavnagar, Bahawalpur, and other States are notable examples of the results of temporary British control. A British officer has, with the consent of the Nizam, recently reorganized the finances of Haidarabad.

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**Present  
Tendencies.**

as far as possible from interference in the internal administration of Native States has become more marked. In this matter policy and necessity have combined. At a time when Great Britain has been enlarging with some ostentation the liberties of the peoples of British India it became imperative to lessen the checks upon the freedom of internal control enjoyed by the princes in their own States. It may be gently added that the princes themselves are no longer quite so willing as their forefathers to submit to restraints which sometimes, though well-meant, have perhaps been unduly severe. They, too, expect larger liberty of action, and when their States are reasonably well governed it is not easy to refuse. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that when we institute reforms in British India, the point of view of the princes should always be taken into account. Their support

cannot be forfeited, and they have an awkward habit of clinging to opinions which would dismay 'sentimental Radicals in the House of Commons.' They have not the smallest intention of abandoning their present privileges and powers, and every fresh reform in British India adds to their embarrassment. Even in the most advanced States such changes as have been instituted have rarely shorn the ruling Maharajah of any of his personal powers. The simple suggestion that they must "keep pace with us" does not meet the situation. They flatly refuse to do so, they are within their rights in refusing, and it behoves Great Britain to take care that their support is not alienated by hasty reforms of which they may disapprove. In all the wild talk of "self-government on colonial lines" for British India the position of the Native States is never once considered. The princes will take no place in a popularly-elected Assembly; and the Bengali retort that "they must remain outside" is clearly a foolish evasion.

When the time comes—as come it assuredly will—for a further extension of the principles implied in the recent reforms in British India, the problem presented by the Native States will contain aspects likely to cause both anxiety and perplexity. We cannot for ever continue to settle their larger destinies without even the pretence of consulting them. Such an episode as the placid extinction of the revenue from opium enjoyed by several States, without even the courtesy of a previous notification, will, if it is repeated, create grave trouble. While the lawyers and merchants and schoolmasters of British India are permitted to exert an increasing influence upon the greater issues of Indian policy, the princes and chiefs, who rule one-fifth of the population, and are often directly concerned, continue to be deliberately excluded. We gladly accept the assistance of their troops in time of war, but

Problem of  
the Future.



we give them no chance of having a voice in the general affairs of India.

The problem is by no means simple, but its greatest difficulty is not yet fully perceived, even by the Government of India. The project of an Imperial Advisory Council of ruling chiefs and territorial magnates, which formed part of the original reform proposals of the Government of India, was incontinently dropped because it was seen that it would prove unworkable and would become a sham. The Special Correspondent of *The Times* has urged the establishment of "some machinery which would secure for the future a more sustained and intimate co-operation" between the princes and the Government. The fault of both these proposals is that they do not recognize the real attitude of the chiefs, which is exceedingly complex, and somewhat difficult to define. On the one hand, they are inclined to dislike the growing divergence of the Government of India from their own somewhat patriarchal methods. They further resent the occasional consequences of their own isolation, as in the case of the opium traffic. On the other hand, they are extremely suspicious of every scheme which proposes to bring them into closer association with the Government of India. One or two princes are known to favour greater intimacy with the controllers of high policy. The Gaekwar of Baroda, for instance, has more than once advocated a scheme resembling an Indian House of Lords. But the vast majority of the princes and chiefs, while entirely loyal, actually prize their aloofness, while objecting to its penalties. They are not attracted by the prospect of association and co-operation, because they fear that it may eventually lead to greater subordination. How to reconcile this dual attitude is an issue of the utmost delicacy,\* but it must some day be faced.

It will be seen that the reluctance of the princes and chiefs to co-operate, if traced to its source, is founded in

lack of confidence, or, if the word is preferred, in suspicion. For their suspicions the native rulers cannot be blamed. They know by experience that while Viceroy and Secretaries of State lay down exalted principles for guidance, their application eventually falls into the hands of sub-ordinates, and after long years the original guiding principles are sometimes forgotten. The question is too complicated for discussion here, but the moral is obvious, At whatever cost, and even to their own disadvantage, the first and most imperative duty of the Government of India is to keep faith with the native princes. When agreements with Native States get into the hands of lawyers and departmental officials, that primary obligation, on which the whole of our relations with the Native States ought to rest, is not always remembered as it should be. Yet it must ever remain one of the strongest foundations of British rule in India.

## CHAPTER IV.

### PREVIOUS DURBARS.

The King-Emperor's visit, and his Majesty's intention to hold a great Durbar on the plain outside Delhi, have aroused general interest in the whole question of Indian Durbars. The Durbar is a very ancient Indian institution. The word is usually translated as meaning the Court of a King or Chief, but it also includes a levée or audience held or given by any person in high executive authority. It is further used, in some parts of India, to designate the Government of a Native State; and in the Province of Kathiawar it is frequently customary to address a chief as "Durbar." Sir Thomas Roe, the British Ambassador to the Court of the Great Mogul, is quoted by Yule as defining the Durbar as "the place where the Mogul sits out daily, to entertain strangers, to receive petitions and presents, to give commands, to see and to be seen." The Sikhs call the Golden Temple at Amritsar, the central shrine of their religion, "the Durbar Sahib." The feudatories of a chief are sometimes styled "Durbaris," and the word "Durbar" has even been attached to Courts of Justice and to police officers.

There can be no doubt, however, that it is chiefly associated with assemblages held by Royalty, or the representatives of Royalty, and, as the seat of government of the predecessors of the English, Delhi has long been regarded in India as the appropriate place for Imperial

**Durbars.** When the control of India passed from the Company to the Crown in 1858, Lord Canning, the first Viceroy, was at Allahabad. The famous Proclamation of Queen Victoria, which has since been the text of innumerable speeches, was read by Lord Canning at that city on November 1. Sir Henry Cunningham, Lord Canning's biographer, states that it was read "with proper ceremonial splendour"; but the gathering hardly seems to have been a Durbar in the accepted sense of the term. A platform was erected near the Fort, from which Lord Canning read the Proclamation, in the presence of the troops and leading civil officials; but there were comparatively few Indians present. In the evening there was a banquet at the Fort. Sir William Howard Russell, who was present, described the ceremony as "cold and spiritless," and its real significance does not seem to have been generally appreciated.

When the late King Edward, as Prince of Wales, made his tour in India in 1875-76 he arrived in Delhi on January 11 and stayed there seven days. In view of the recent discussion as to whether the King-Emperor should make his State entry into Delhi riding on a horse or on an elephant, it is interesting to note that his father entered Delhi on horseback. The route followed was practically the same as that adopted by Lord Curzon in 1902. On leaving the railway station the Prince rode along Lothian-road, skirting the Fort, and passing before the Jumma Musjid, where a vast multitude had gathered. He traversed the famous Chandni Chauk, the principal thoroughfare of Delhi, and on emerging from the city rode over the Ridge to his camp beneath the Flagstaff Tower. The present King-Emperor's camp will be on very nearly the same site. The Prince wore a Field-Marshal's uniform, and Sir H. Davies, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, rode on his left, and Lord Napier of Magdala, Commander-

in-Chief in India, on his right. He was escorted by a battery of Artillery, a squadron of the 10th Hussars, and a troop of the 4th Bengal Cavalry. The route was five miles long, and was lined with troops throughout.

The Prince held no formal Durbar on his arrival, but was presented with an address of welcome from the Delhi Municipality, after which there was a levée. The next day there was a review, followed by a ball and a State supper in the Fort. On the 13th he visited the Kutab Minar and Humayun's Tomb, and in the evening the city was illuminated. On the two following days there were military manœuvres, Sunday, the 16th, was observed as a day of rest, and on Monday there was a special field day for cavalry. The Prince left for Lahore at midnight.

The first great Imperial Assemblage under British auspices at Delhi was held by Lord Lytton on January 1, 1877, to announce the assumption by her Majesty Queen Victoria of the title of Empress of India. Lord Lytton was a master of stage effect, and was fully conscious of the importance of a proper setting for so unprecedented a solemnity. Under his careful guidance the Assemblage was a brilliant success; but it is quite a mistake to suppose that he appraised its spectacular aspects at more than their due value. In a letter to Lord Beaconsfield, written three months before the gathering, he said:—

I am afraid I may have seemed fussy or frivolous about the decorative details of the Delhi Assemblage. . . . The decorative details of an Indian pageant are like those parts of an animal which are no use at all for butchers' meat, and are even unfit for scientific dissection, but from which augurs draw the omens that move armies and influence princes.

The size of the Delhi gathering was deemed remarkable in those days, though it was destined to be greatly ex-

ceeded 26 years later. There were about 68,000 people at the Assemblage, which lasted 14 days. They included 77 ruling princes and chiefs, and 300 prominent Indian noblemen and gentlemen. The troops present numbered over 15,000 British and Indian. A large proportion of the throng was made up, as at all these pageants, by the retinues of the princes, who are accustomed on State occasions to be surrounded by great numbers of "followers." Lord Lytton arrived at Delhi on December 23, and was met at the station by the leading princes and other notabilities. The Viceroy entered Delhi on an elephant, accompanied by Lady Lytton, and his two little daughters followed on another elephant; but the procession appears to have been limited in size. The route followed was practically the same as that adopted by the Prince of Wales earlier in the year, and the camp was pitched on the spot which has now become historic. The troops which lined the streets of Delhi were partly drawn from the Regular Forces of India and partly from the armies of the princes.

Sunday, the 24th, and Christmas Day were days of rest, but on the 26th and 27th and 28th the whole time was spent in receiving and returning visits from the princes and chiefs. That is a ceremony which the King-Emperor will at any rate in part be spared, since his Majesty will receive visits, but will not return them. Lord Curzon was criticized in 1903 for not returning the visits of the princes, but it was, among other things, because he had the advantage of knowing how crushing the task was found by Lord Lytton, that he sought to waive the formality. Lord Lytton held levées on the nights of the 27th and 28th. On the 29th he received Indian noblemen and others not possessing ruling powers, and the Governors and Lieutenant-Governors. The 30th was spent in miscellaneous visits and receptions, and in administrative work, and on the

31st the inevitable visit was paid to the Kutab Minar, where the Viceroy picnicked amid the ruins.

The public Durbar was held on New Year's Day, on the site on the open plain afterwards chosen by Lord Curzon, which has again been selected for the King-Emperor's Durbar. The arrangement of the Durbar was not free from mistakes, and has not been adopted on subsequent occasions. In the centre was a hexagonal dais, about 8ft. or 10ft. high, painted light blue, and surmounted by a canopy which is described as cone-shaped, supported by silver pillars. The cone was surmounted by a representation of the Imperial Crown, which rested on a gilded cushion, and the records declare that the Crown looked too large for the cushion. The dais and other structures were designed by the late Mr. Lockwood Kipling, but he was not responsible for the cushion, or for the ropes with far too gaudy pennons which quite superfluously supported the pillars. Upon the dais was the Viceregal Throne, shining with gold and silver. Facing the dais was a semi-circular amphitheatre, in which were seated the princes and the principal officials. Behind the dais were blocks of seats reserved for visitors and guests, who seem to have had a rather indifferent view of the proceedings. The whole Durbar was enveloped by troops.

The Proclamation was read by the Chief Herald, Major Barnes, whose voice was heard by every one. Mr. Thornton, the Foreign Secretary, who followed with an Urdu translation, was not so audible. The flourish on the silver trumpets, which succeeded, was pronounced ineffective, and the salvoes of artillery were not a success, because the guns were too small. The *feu de joie* fired by the troops was more impressive, though it stampeded the elephants. Lord Lytton's speech could not be heard by many, but he had taken the precaution to have printed copies distributed beforehand. The speech was a disappointment,

because it contained no announcement of any striking boon, as had been expected. Its principal feature was that it disclosed the creation of a new Order, the Order of the Indian Empire, in commemoration of the Assemblage. The reasons assigned for the institution of the Order are worth recalling, because they have long been either forgotten or disregarded. It was principally meant to give an opportunity of "recognizing the claims of the British portion of the community," and was to be "specially open to the non-official classes." It was speedily absorbed, to a far greater extent than was ever intended, by officials, and for a good many years past hardly any non-official Englishmen have been appointed knights of the Order. After the Viceroy had resumed his seat, several princes spoke, but "owing to the noise and confusion were heard only by persons in their immediate neighbourhood."

It is well known that Lord Lytton wished to signalize the Assemblage by establishing an Indian Privy Council, restricted to the great princes, a proposal which was afterwards resurrected in Lord Minto's scheme for an Imperial Advisory Council. Lord Lytton also suggested the creation of a native peerage for India and the establishment of a Heralds' College at Calcutta, but all these projects were negatived by the home authorities. A number of the princes were designated "Councillors of the Empress," a distinction which remained meaningless, and they were presented with handsome banners, which were welcomed for their beauty, but not otherwise valued. Nearly 16,000 prisoners were released on Proclamation Day. Lord Lytton gave a State banquet in the evening. On January 2 he attended "the Imperial races," and on the 3rd there were games for the soldiers, and a display of fireworks witnessed by an enormous crowd. The 4th was devoted to receiving farewell visits from the princes. On the 5th there was a great

Forgotten  
Projects.



review, and Lord Lytton lost his gold medal while "cantering home." The same evening Lord Lytton left Delhi, and the Imperial Assemblage was over. There can be no doubt now that the assumption of the Imperial title was a wise and salutary step, that the criticism levelled against it was wholly misdirected, that Lord Lytton's Durbar made a deep impression upon the people of India, and that the objects it was intended to serve were amply attained.

Probably no gathering held in the East has ever exceeded in ordered magnificence the vast Coronation Assemblage at Delhi in 1903, arranged to proclaim the accession of King Edward VII. It marked the end of a great and picturesque era, rather than the beginning of a new period. India has changed greatly in the last ten years. In 1903 the motor-car was still an object of some curiosity, and there were very few of them at Delhi. The princes brought with them swarms of retainers in medieval garb, and it was no uncommon experience to encounter a troop of warriors in chain armour, with casques and nodding plumes. The great array of elephants dominated the entire spectacle. The elephant was the symbol of the last Durbar; the taxi-cab seems likely to be the keynote of the next. It was felt and said at the time that there could never be another Durbar like that of 1903, because "the old order passeth." Medieval India still lingers in the more secluded native States, but the Maharajahs no longer delight to ride in golden howdahs on stately elephants.

The astonishing success, the blinding vividness, of the pageantry, at the last Assemblage was due not only to the conditions under which it was held. It also owed much to the abounding energy and unceasing toil of Lord Curzon, who conceived and personally superintended many of the details, and visited Delhi four times to inspect the preparations. Yet, like Lord Lytton, Lord Curzon never failed to realize that the setting of the Durbar was not

the main point, and that the Assemblée implied far more than mere externals. In a subsequent speech to his Council he confessed that he never read the accounts of the splendours of the Durbar without a pang, for all the while he had been "thinking about something else." The Durbar to him "meant not a panorama or a procession; it was a landmark in the history of the people and a chapter in the ritual of the State." The protest he then uttered against the idea that "the Durbar was intended only to show the magnificence of the Empire and the trappings of the East" deserves to be remembered now. The gathering to greet the King-Emperor at Delhi will have failed in its purpose if those who record it tell the rest of the Empire about the glory of the jewels of the Maharajahs and omit the message and the lesson which lie behind the resplendent display.

The 1903 Durbar was notable for the enormous area covered by the camps. The Durbar  
The distances were vast, and many princes Camp.  
had to pitch their camps on the road to the Kutab Minar, far to the south of Delhi. Fifty miles of special roads were made, as well as a "Durbar Light Railway," which was afterwards utilized elsewhere. The lighting and water arrangements involved prodigious labour. A special residence was built for the Viceroy, but it was afterwards made into a "Circuit House" for the Punjab Government. There was a great Exhibition of Indian Art, and a polo ground which attracted the best teams in India. About 40,000 troops assembled at Delhi, gradually converging on the city after preliminary manœuvres which lasted many days. The influx of visitors was great; rents of houses in Delhi rose to an incredible height, and the railways were almost unable to cope with the congested traffic. The difficulty of reaching Delhi at all at the last moment was exceeded by the far greater difficulty of getting away after the ceremonies. Of less important memories, perhaps that which remains most

deeply imprinted in the minds of those present is the recollection of the intense cold at night. The English visitors seemed to feel the cold more than the Anglo-Indians. Life in tents in Northern India in the cold weather is a semi-Arctic experience to those unaccustomed to it. On informal occasions many people dined in their overcoats, but the big marquees in which the State banquets were held were in some way miraculously warmed. Sometimes even the overcoats were not available, for there was a plague of white ants whose principal diet appeared to be clothing. Many tents were provided with fireplaces or heated by lamp stoves, but it is not easy to keep the cold out of a large tent.

The incomparable feature of the 1903 Elephant Durbar, the feature that can never be reproduced again, was the State entry into Delhi. It was the elephant procession that made it so unique. Lord Curzon elected, like Lord Lytton, to enter the Imperial city upon a gigantic elephant, and all the princes of India, similarly mounted, followed in his train. The King-Emperor has decided to enter on horseback, and the only princes who will attend him are his personal aides-de-camp. The decision cannot be questioned, but it will deprive the coming Durbar of a most impressive spectacle. Lord Curzon arrived at Delhi on December 29, 1902, and entered the city about noon. The procession was led by the 4th Dragoon Guards, the "H" Battery of Royal Horse Artillery, the Viceroy's Bodyguard, and the Imperial Cadet Corps, the last named all mounted on black chargers and wearing uniforms of white and the light Star of India blue. Then came the Viceroy and Lady Curzon, on an elephant bearing a howdah covered with silver inlaid with gold. The huge saddle-cloth or *jhol* was stiff with heavy gold embroidery. The elephant was surrounded by spearmen and by *chobdars* carrying maces and staves. The Duke and

Duchess of Connaught, who represented the Royal Family, followed on an elephant equally gorgeously caparisoned. Then came the retinue of Princes, whose share in the pageant was thus described at the time :—

Princes bearing the greatest names in the Golden Book of India defiled before our dazzled vision. The whole road, right away to the walls of the Fort, was flashing with precious metals aflame in the sunlight. Not a howdah that was not covered with gold and silver. Not a *jhool* that was not decked in gleaming gold embroidery. Not an elephant that was not closely surrounded by gaudy spearmen, and driven by a *mahout* in rainbow colours. The very foreheads of the elephants were daubed with bright pigments. And the princes that they bore, who shall recount the splendour of their attire, the indescribable array of silks and satins and velvets, their glittering jewels, their ropes of pearls and necklaces of diamonds and rubies and emeralds, the splendid aigrettes in their turbans ? It was a barbaric display, if you will, but it epitomized the wealth and magnificence of the immemorial East. On they came, till one almost fancied that the heavy tramp of the elephants shook the ground. The bells hanging from the howdahs clanged like cathedral chimes. Clouds of dust arose—water avails little on Delhi roads—and the uniforms of the patient troops grew soiled. But still the march went on, and the people cheered with wild enthusiasm as they passed.

There were over 200 elephants in the procession, including those ridden by the retainers of the Princes. The Grand Duke of Hesse, the Governors of Bombay and Madras, and a host of minor dignitaries drove in carriages, followed by the wild chieftains of the frontier on horseback and a regiment of Indian Cavalry. Lord Kitchener had a prominent place in the cavalcade, riding alone, but he had only just arrived in India and was hardly recognized by the crowd.

Though the State entry was the most unique example of Oriental display in 1903, there was general agreement that the Durbar itself was the finest scene of the whole assemblage. It was said afterwards that “it contained more truly dramatic moments, it was conceived upon a vaster scale, than any other function.” The

The Great  
Day.

amphitheatre in which it was held was a mighty structure shaped like a horseshoe, set in the midst of the bare and dusty plain. It contained tier after tier of seats and was estimated to hold ten thousand people, every one of whom had a good view of the proceedings. The Viceregal dais was right opposite the opening of the horseshoe and jutted out into the great arena, being covered by a separate canopy in white and gold. It bore the thrones of the Viceroy and the Duke of Connaught. The amphitheatre had a light roof, a necessary protection from the sun, though it threw the spectators into shadow and thus deprived the scene of some of its rich colouring. Before the arrival of the Viceroy and the Duke and Duchess the selected veterans of the Mutiny, British and Indian, numbering 240, marched into the arena. By common consent their advent to martial music, followed by "Auld Lang Syne," was the most moving sight of the whole fortnight, and the vast audience rose to their feet to do them honour, cheering as if moved by one spontaneous impulse.

After the Viceroy had taken his seat the massed bands sounded a summons to the Herald, and from the plain came the sound of silver trumpets. Then the Herald, Major Maxwell, appeared at the entrance to the arena, looking almost gigantic on his huge black charger. He was followed by 12 trumpeters, and when he turned before the dais and read the Proclamation announcing the Coronation of King Edward the Seventh his voice resounded through the amphitheatre. There was a flourish of trumpets, the great Royal Standard was unfurled, the guard of honour presented arms, the massed bands played the National Anthem, and the entire audience stood. The guns without fired a salute of 101 guns, and the 40,000 troops encircling the Durbar fired a *feu de joie*. Lord Curzon's speech, which included the reading of a gracious message from the King-Emperor, could be distinctly

heard by every one, but there was a feeling of disappointment that it contained no announcement of the "boon" which, in accordance with Oriental traditions, had been expected. The Herald and his trumpeters again entered the arena, this time at a quick trot, and silver trumpets once more sounded. Then the Herald, swiftly turning and facing the audience, raised himself in his stirrups, waved his helmet aloft, and shouted in stentorian tones, "Three cheers for the King-Emperor!" The effect was magical, and the cheers of the ten thousand spectators were echoed by the troops on the plain outside. The Durbar closed with the presentation of the ruling chiefs to the Viceroy and the Duke of Connaught, and with a spontaneous and quite unpremeditated ovation to the Duke and Duchess after the Viceroy had departed first, according to precedence.

The other principal ceremonies of the Assemblage were held on later days in the Delhi Fort, in the Diwan-i-Am, or Hall of Public Audience, and the Diwan-i-Khas, or Hall of Private Audience, magnificent structures built by the Moguls, which were temporarily doubled in size. On January 4 there was a grand Chapter of the two great Indian Orders in the Diwan-i-Am, when the new recipients of honours were duly invested. The ceremony was solemn and impressive, but far too long, and it is a relief to know that it will not be repeated, except on a very limited scale. The State Ball, on January 7, was a brilliant scene. There were about 5,000 guests, and it was amusing to note the intense interest displayed in the unwonted appearance of Lord Kitchener in the State lancers. He emerged from the ordeal with infinite credit. A remarkable feature of the Assemblage, second only to the State entry in its unique and picturesque character, was the review of chiefs' retinues. It was the India of a century ago reproduced in living reality; and it came as a revelation even to those

Other  
Ceremonies.

familiar with the country. That, again, was an amazing spectacle which is not to be repeated, owing to lack of time and the difficulty of organizing it. The last event of the Durbar was a grand military review, at which the popularity of the Gurkha regiments was very marked.

The King and Queen, when Prince and Princess of Wales, visited Delhi on December 12, 1905, and remained four days.

**The King's  
Last Visit.**

They drove through the city by the regulation route, and halted at the clock tower to receive an address from the municipality. They were lodged in the Circuit House, built for the 1903 Durbar. Later in the day they drove to the Kashmir Gate and inspected the buildings in the Fort. Next day they examined the scenes of memorable incidents in the siege, and on the third day they visited the Kutab Minar and the sites of the older Delhis, far to the south of the present city. The fourth day was chiefly spent in visiting the site of the 1903 Durbar, including the great Amphitheatre, the earthworks of which still remained. His Majesty is thus quite familiar with the scene of the coming Assemblage; but when next he visits Delhi it will be as the central figure of a gathering unprecedented in the long history of Asia.

## CHAPTER V.

### IMPERIAL DELHI.

The City of Delhi is so modern that it was only being built when Charles I. died at Whitehall ; but the plain in which it stands is covered with the dust of dead empires. No one knows how often great capitals have arisen on the banks of the Jumna, in the heart of the richest and most fertile region of Hindostan. The first authentic record of a city in the neighbourhood of Delhi dates back to the 11th century, yet it is possible that far older sites lie buried beneath the soil. The early history of India is a sequence of blotted pages, and no systematic attempt has ever been made to trace the remains of the original ruling races.

No fewer than six cities are known to have been constructed south of the present Delhi, and as the visitor leaves the Ajmere Gate he wanders over ground where dynasty after dynasty has risen and fought and built and ruled and died. Each new ruling family wanted a new capital, and when the older cities were torn up, the shrines and tombs were sometimes reverently left. Thus it is that vestiges of the earlier Delhis are still visible in the stately sepulchres embowered in trees, which astonish and delight the wayfarer. Miles away, down a long and dusty road, stands the Kutab Minar, the most wondrous tower in the world, the abiding monument of the Moslem conquest of India. Beyond, and far too rarely seen by travellers, is the city of Tughlakabad, relic of a dream



never destined to be fulfilled. Its Cyclopean masonry has withstood the ravages of time. Within its mighty walls one wanders through the ruined and deserted streets of a capital built but never occupied. Tughlakabad is one of the minor wonders of the world, yet few regard it now, though it is far more worth seeing than most places within a morning's drive of Delhi. At its gate stands, grim, four-square, more like a miniature fortress than a mausoleum, the tomb of its stern founder, Tughlak Shah.

See, then, the older Delhis first, and ponder awhile upon the long pageant of history their remnants recall. The whole future of India has been decided again and again within a day's ride of their mouldering ruins. Thrice on the field of Panipat, north of Delhi, conflicts have been fought which are counted among the decisive battles of the world. Then turn next to the famous Ridge, beyond the northern walls, and see where the fate of British rule in India hung trembling in the balance for long weeks in 1857. It was no idle chance which led the heroes of the Mutiny to cling to those rocky heights, though they were often more besieged than besieging. They knew that Delhi spelt dominion, that the fall of Delhi would mean the eventual collapse of the revolt, that while the British flag flew on that bare slope victory was still within their grasp. The Ridge of Delhi is ground as hallowed as Waterloo, yet the first impression is always one of disappointment. It has bulked so large in history that it is something of a shock to discover it to be only 60ft. high.

The plain to the south of Delhi for memorials of Mogul rule in India; the plain to the north for relics of the historic episodes of British domination—that is the simple division which may be made. Just beneath the Flagstaff Tower, on the site of the old cantonment sacked by the mutineers, stands the Circuit House where the King-Emperor originally

meant to reside during his visit. The camp of the Court will be on the very spot where the British troops camped during the siege. The amphitheatre, a couple of miles away across the plain, is to be reconstructed at the exact point where Queen Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India, and where King Edward's Accession was announced. The northern walls of the city still bear the marks of the siege. The breaches can be traced; the Kashmir Gate is scarred and battered; the narrow lane where John Nicholson fell remains almost unaltered; his modest tomb is in the cemetery near by. If Delhi is full of memories of the older rulers of India, it is sacred soil for the British also. Lake rode in triumph through its streets; at its gates the destiny of the British in India was decided; its walls echoed the salute proclaiming the assumption of the Imperial title by Queen Victoria; it heard the guns announce the Accession of the first British Emperor of all India; and in its precincts the princes of India will gather to render fealty to the first British Monarch who has ever gone in person to his Asiatic dominions. No city in the Empire has more poignant or more glorious associations for Englishmen.

The pride of Delhi, the structure which invests it with visible grandeur, is the vast Fort, whose rose-pink battlemented walls confront across a tree-clad pleasure the mighty Jumma Musjid, the Cathedral Mosque of India. The Fort was the Imperial Palace of Shah Jahan, and is a great enclosure containing gardens and several beautiful buildings. No Imperial residence in the world possesses a more majestic portal. The lofty gateway leads into an entrance hall like the nave of a cathedral. The courtyard beyond is as spacious as a London square. Though some of the structures within the Fort have long been used, somewhat carelessly, for military purposes, there yet remain gems of architecture which are almost unspoilt. The Diwan-i-Am, or Hall of

The Fort.

Public Audience, is a magnificent arcade with red stone pillars and engrailed arches, where the Emperors showed themselves to their followers. In a high marble recess, whose sides are now robbed of their original incrustation of precious stones, stood the famous Peacock Throne, which Nadir Shah carried off to Persia when he left Delhi shattered and desolate. It may save much disputation to say at once that Lord Curzon, during his visit to Teheran, satisfied himself that the Peacock Throne no longer exists. The ultimate marvel of the Fort is the Dewan-i-Khas, or Hall of Private Audience, a pavilion with an open portico, surmounted at the corners by domes on slender pillars. It is a dream in white marble, a vision of arches and pillars adorned with gold and inlay work, of delicate pierced tracery, of cool shady retreats. The jewels have been torn from its walls, but the impression it conveys is abiding. It was meant for use, not in the chilly atmosphere of a Punjab cold weather, but in the fierce heat of May and June, when within earshot of plashing fountains the Emperor dallied with his women. Its essential beauty is unspoilt, and no one who has seen it marvels at the spirit of ecstasy in which its creator inscribed upon it the words :—" If a Paradise be on the face of the earth, it is this, it is this, it is this ! "

The Private and Public Halls of Audience will be so transformed and temporarily enlarged for the visit of the King-Emperor, that strangers will not see them in their natural state. Within them will be held more than one great gathering. One of the minor wonders of official achievement is that these halls can be made the nucleus of large temporary structures without an offence to taste, or the slightest injury to the fabrics ; but it was done with success in 1903, and will be done again. Everything in and around Delhi is a little abnormal and unreal when a great Imperial Assemblage is toward. The Chandni Chauk, the great thoroughfare of the city, swarms with animated crowds, and becomes towards

evening radiant with vivid garments and headgear. The greatest marvel of Delhi at such a time is not the organized spectacles, but the wondrous variety of people within its gates. Yet the real modern tendency of Delhi, as in its early prime, is towards industrial development. Its ultimate destiny is to become the chief manufacturing centre of Northern India, but the smoke of its spinning and weaving mills can never entirely veil its romance.

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE BRITISH CONTROL OF INDIA.

It is a common and no doubt a justifiable criticism of British rule in India that its aims are not very clear. That is to say, the British Government and the British public have never yet sat down and decided exactly what they want to do in and with India. On the other hand, they have in some respects indicated pretty plainly and emphatically what they do not mean to do. There is probably, for instance, an overwhelming predominance of feeling in England, among those who have thought about the subject at all, against any yielding to the claim of a limited number of Nationalists for "self-government on Colonial lines." Instinctively it is felt that such an experiment would be unsuited alike to the past traditions and the present condition of India. Lord Morley said in the House of Lords in 1908 :—"If my existence, either officially or corporeally, were prolonged twenty times longer than either of them is likely to be, a Parliamentary system in India is not at all the goal to which I would for one moment aspire." The absence of clear-cut and rigidly defined aims has not been without its advantages. The system of British control has thereby been rendered more flexible. It has adapted itself to changing circumstances and aspirations. If it had fallen to the lot of British administrators in India in the late sixties to have laid down a definite and comprehensive policy for the guidance of their successors, most of their

conclusions would almost inevitably have been abandoned during the succeeding decades. Even the ideals of Lord Curzon's eventful Viceroyalty are not in all respects the ideals of to-day. The one thing which the British public ought to cherish as an absolute and unswerving conviction is that under no circumstances will British rule in India be abandoned or weakened. There is far too much speculation about its probable fate, far too much loose talk about its possible decline. "If," said Seeley, "the government of India from a remote island seems a thing which can never be permanent, we know that it once seemed a thing which never could take place, until it did take place."

One reason why British aims in India have never been reduced to precise formulæ is that they were involuntary in their inception and very gradual in their growth. No one who has studied history will dream of contending for a moment that the British went to India intent upon the moral and material regeneration of its inhabitants. The pioneers were not even inflamed by the proselytizing zeal which formed one-half of the dual motives of the Portuguese. They slowly assumed the task of administration because they found it imperative to do so for the development and stability of their trade. They drove out their European competitors, they upset inefficient indigenous administrations, they made and unmade dynasties, from the same compelling reason. They extended their rule because every fresh conquest confronted them with new difficulties and new menaces upon their frontiers. Nothing was more unmethodical, nor more automatic and inevitable, than the British conquest of India. The newcomers laid the foundations of a system of education, not because they conceived it to be their duty to educate subject races, but rather because they needed educated Indian help in their administration. They trained a host of minor

**The British  
Conquest.**

executive officers, not because they sought to teach Indians how to govern themselves, but because without Indian aid they could not develop their own rule. They instructed Indians in the art of fighting in Western fashion, not that they might learn self-defence, but rather that they might be used to uphold British control. They established the covenanted Civil Service, not so much in the hope that it might be the great moral instrument it has since become, but rather in order to prevent corruption among their own countrymen.

Yet, though there is little substantial evidence of high initial moral purpose of a far-reaching kind, there can be no doubt that it existed in varying and often obscure forms almost from the very beginning. In a race with the traditions and the ideals held by the English it was bound to be early manifested, and to impart some infusion of unselfish beneficence into their acts. The time came at last when it grew very rapidly, until in the end it became a dominating consideration. The annexation of Oudh would never have been undertaken if Oudh had been humanely governed. The conquest of the Punjab would never have been entered upon if the death of Ranjit Singh had not plunged the province into a welter of dismal strife. The character of the English counted for more in the long run than the material purpose which first took them to India, and they committed themselves, almost without realizing it, to a task the full magnitude of which is only now perceived. Yet the process of evolution has been long at work, and is distinguished by two great landmarks. One is the foundation of the Civil Service system in its present form, which was completed by Lord Cornwallis in 1793. The other is the transfer of the control of India from the Company to the Crown, which was made in 1858. From the transfer dates the systematic attempt of Great Britain to grapple with its vast undertaking. But the

national purpose had already changed so completely that 25 years earlier the Company had been deprived of the right to trade. Though the extent and value of Indian trade still accounts for much of the interest taken by Great Britain in India, the representatives of British authority have long ceased to have any direct concern therein.

Even after the substitution of the Crown for the Company, the general character of British control remained for a long period very different from the conditions now existent. The broad structural outline was still incomplete. The administration was placid, and "hastened slowly." The district officer was still the father of his people, and talked to the peasantry from his seat beneath the shade of a spreading tree. There were happy districts where the civilian in charge thought himself rather worried if he received a letter from his official superiors once a fortnight. The thick cloud of reports and minutes and returns which now intervenes between the officer and the people had not then descended. The pen had not replaced the more facile medium of personal intercourse, which was understood and preferred by the Orient. The change has, however proceeded apace in recent years, and though by regulation the district officer is still obliged to tour for several months every year, he now trails after him an incubus of paper. The pleasant ride in the early morning across the plain to another nest of villages is being replaced in many districts by a hasty scurry in a motor-car. Even in the great secretariats, once a longed-for haven of leisured ease, men are more often overworked than not. For the languid transaction of business during exiguous hours one has to look now, not to Simla or Calcutta, but to London. The civilian of to-day, if he does his work conscientiously, is not only overworked, but, considering the risks and the climate and the innumerable drawbacks,

Changing  
Conditions.



rather underpaid. Yet the change had to come, and the life was bound to grow harder and more formal. India has outgrown the patriarchal ideal, and the closer approximation to Western standards meant an increasing resort to pen and ink. How many Englishmen at home see no other visible sign of authority than an occasional policeman ? The regrets about the diminution of personal contact are natural, but the Indian civilian could not for ever take the affable squire as his only prototype. The old system was best for the times in which it was practised, and it was a pity that it had to be modified ; but the recent changes are bringing new channels of intercourse, and in the reformed councils officials and the leaders of Indian opinion are mingling with an intimacy and upon an equality which they never knew before.

The actual and concrete accomplishments of British rule in India, so far as **Results of British Rule.** they have been of direct benefit to the people, are not difficult to discern. First and foremost is the priceless blessing of peace, which was conferred, however, not so much for their benefit as for our own. No advantage is less valued by the people of India than the security in which they live. The present generation has known no other condition, and is wont to hold the gift lightly. The memories of the bitter oppression and the exactions of the past have been effaced, and the history of the eighteenth century is very little regarded. The more efficient administration of justice must be pronounced a doubtful though a necessary boon. When we bestowed a complicated system of Courts and Codes upon India we did not foresee to what lengths the litigious proclivities of the people would lead them. Nor did we realize that the very efficiency of our judicial arrangements would have grave effects upon the land system in more than one province. It has led to the wholesale expropriation of land, whereas in the old days the exac-

tions of usury would have been tempered by the simple device of occasionally slaying a too exorbitant money-lender. Our police system has on the whole made for good, despite the frequent criticism to which it is subjected. It is not popular, as is only natural in a country where crime has been treated for centuries with habitual laxity alternating with spasms of ferocious severity. Not the least of our services to India has been our repression of the crime of *thagi*, coupled with our diminution of the practice of female infanticide and the suppression of *sati*; yet no one who knows India intimately doubts that if we were to withdraw widow-burning would at once recommence. We have taken in hand the education of the people, and though we have done far too little, and not always worked on the right lines, perhaps that is a phase of our activities which, behind all the controversy it induces, is really appreciated.

The magnificent public works of India, which form one of the great monuments of British rule, have been created for the most part in the last sixty years. The immense impetus given to public works of all descriptions was one of the direct results of the transfer of India to the Crown. Sir George Chesney has said that in their earlier days the Court of Directors regarded the construction of a road or a canal as "an unavoidable evil, to be undertaken only when it could not be postponed any longer." They "did not recognize the prosecution of public works as a necessary part of their policy," at any rate until the advent of Lord Dalhousie. The huge and growing system of railways, though by no means adequate to the present requirements of India, has been the real cause of much of the existing prosperity of the country. The complex system of irrigation, still being steadily developed, exceeds in its beneficial results any such system in the world. The British Administration has done much for the improvement of agriculture, and its efforts in this direction have even aroused some gratitude. Its labours

in coping with the recurring danger of famines have been placed upon a well-organized basis, and in their thoroughness compare vividly with the aimless neglect of their Indian predecessors. It has not been so successful in dealing with plague, not through lack of endeavour or of expenditure, but rather because the disease is still imperfectly understood; though in recent years there has been room for criticism. The enormous expansion of Indian trade is an acknowledged result of British rule. The growth of manufacturing and mining industries has been greatly stimulated, and the hoards of Indian capital have at last been unlocked in their support. To the question whether the people of India are better and happier as a consequence of British control the rulers can await an answer with confidence, so far as material conditions are concerned. Despite the poverty and misery still found in the slums of British cities, and sometimes even in the villages, the working men and women of England are, as a whole, far better off than they were at the beginning of the 19th century. No unprejudiced inquirer, who compares the evidence of a century ago with the conditions existing to-day, can doubt that in the same period a far greater improvement has been effected in the life of the people in most of the provinces of India. To find a parallel we should rather turn to the condition of the *fellahin* of Lower Egypt under Mehemet Ali, as compared with their prosperity under Abbas Hilmi and his English advisers.

Unrest  
and its  
Meaning.

The tangible results of British rule constitute, as Seeley has said, "a somewhat cold daylight introduced into the midst of a warm gorgeous twilight."

The cost has not been excessive, and India has had full measure for the expenditure she has herself provided. Taxation is comparatively light, and the burden upon land is not heavy, though the incidence of land revenue assessment is rather

too unequal. The theory of "the drain to England" need find no further rebuttal here. It has been thrice slain already. Yet in spite of the manifest success of British control, unrest has in recent years reached dimensions which are unparalleled. The causes of unrest are manifold, and they have been exhaustively analysed in *The Times*. A material contributory cause has been the ravages produced by plague. Behind and beyond all the other reasons adduced in explanation lies the objection advanced in many quarters to our very presence in India, That is the ultimate and abiding origin of unrest, and it exists, not because British rule has failed, but in spite of its very success. The increasing prosperity of India may for a time even accentuate the feeling. The stalled ox waxes fat and kicks. Exactly the same phenomenon has been witnessed in Egypt. We need not, as Lord George Hamilton warned us long ago, expect any gratitude for our work, and we have probably no right to look for it. Yet difficult though the problem of unrest is, it would be fatal to conclude that it is insoluble. We must trust to the spread of enlightenment and education to induce increasing acceptance of a control which is lightly and fairly exercised. Meanwhile we have to persevere in a policy of wise and ordered development. England can at least continue to confer material benefits upon India; the rest lies in the hands of the people themselves. An enormous amount still remains to be done. We are only on the threshold of the possibilities of Indian development. The best panacea for the troubles of India lies in the widespread encouragement of manufacturing industries, not because increasing wealth will necessarily produce greater contentment, but rather because the creation of great industries tends to develop support of the existing order of government. The Presidency of Bombay contains a population far more inflammatory than that of Bengal, but it has remained comparatively quiet because its leaders know full well that rash political

disturbances interrupt prosperity and progress. The application of scientific research to agriculture is still in its infancy in India, and may bring about in course of time inestimable advantages to millions. Great irrigation schemes still await fulfilment, and the trunk railways need supplementing by many more branch lines. Upon these and similar enterprises England may be well content to concentrate her energies without caring much about the ultimate verdict.

**The  
Impending  
Issue.**

There can be little doubt, however, that we are on the eve of a greater agitation in India than any yet seen. It will not be less formidable because it will probably remain, for the most part, strictly constitutional in character. The spasmodic activities of Indian Anarchists constitute a separate issue, to be separately and severely dealt with. The agitation which now lies ahead will call, not for prosecutions, but for careful and not unsympathetic consideration. There are many signs that the political leaders of India intend to concentrate their efforts in the near future upon a demand for greater administrative autonomy. They realize quite clearly that the recent enlargement of the Councils represents the utmost concession of representation which Great Britain is at present disposed to grant. After the courteous Indian fashion, they have been extremely moderate in their speeches in the last 18 months. They were unwilling to begin a new agitation the moment the reforms were completed. They are still more unwilling to raise disturbing questions as the time approaches for the King's visit. The natural and very proper instinct of all moderate educated Indians, at such a juncture, is to refrain from creating embarrassing difficulties.

Yet of a certainty the movement is only postponed. It must come when fresh taxation is proposed, and in view of the early extinction of the opium revenue, and

the fresh expenditure which is in contemplation, only a miracle can save India from further heavy taxation in the near future. It will unquestionably be met by a demand for more administrative autonomy, for the right to decide questions of Indian expenditure more exclusively in India, and, above all, for some measure of fiscal autonomy. The ultimate outcome of such a movement must be to bring the political leaders into hostile contact, not with the Government of India, but with the autocratic financial control exercised from the India Office. Thus issues of the gravest moment will be raised, and they will not be readily adjusted. Greater liberty in the directions indicated can only be granted either to the representatives of the people or to the Government of India. For obvious reasons they are not likely to be granted to the elected representatives. Yet the conferment of larger powers upon the Government of India, as the custodians of the interests of the people of India, clears the way to possibilities hardly less awkward. A Government of India relieved to a great extent from the fetters which bind it to the India Office would not have to wait long to find itself confronted by a renewed demand for popular government. The Indian leaders are long-headed enough to foresee the position which would then be created. Once the home control is diminished, they would have a far better chance of obtaining sympathetic adherents in England in a fight against official control exercised in India. The problem is thus extremely complex, and is not made easier by the grave unwisdom of recent interventions on the part of the India Office. It cannot be airily dismissed, and the demand cannot be curtly refused, for the agitation is certain to grow. It will lie quite outside revolutionary aspirations, and will be in no sense in conflict with Indian loyalty to the Crown. When it arises, it will tax the ingenuity of statesmen

to find a solution, and it may call for the exercise of those altruistic sentiments towards India which the British public have in the past expressed with fervour but sometimes practised with reluctance.

It remains to say that the chief safeguard of Great Britain in India must, in this as in other problems, continue to lie in the character and ability of the

**The Civil  
Service.**

English Civil servants. By these are meant not only the "covenanted civilians," but also the engineers, the forest officers, the police officers, the judiciary, and all the other officials, few in number but great in power, who are collectively the real embodiment of the British Raj. The protection and support of the Covenanted Civil Service should, however, be our principal concern. In its hands lies the welfare and the maintenance of British rule in India. The Civil Service has of late years been subjected to a great deal of unmerited criticism. It has been the scapegoat of faults which were not of its own making, the object of ignorant attacks in Parliament against which it has not always found adequate and sincere defenders. The feeling of resentment at these attacks among members of the Service is not less strong because it rarely receives public expression. Perhaps they are sometimes over-sensitive when assailed, because in the environment in which they are placed the rougher side of public life is seldom seen and hardly understood. Be that as it may, the men in whose hands the destinies of the British in India are really placed are entitled to claim the unswerving confidence of their countrymen at home. We cannot impose upon them great responsibilities and then refuse to trust them. They depend for their success upon the support of their official superiors, which has not always been accorded as

it should have been ; but they depend far more upon the support of the public.

Yet the Civil Service is not without its defects, which are inherent in the character of the Service rather than in the quality of the men. It is not fair, and is probably not true, to say that the quality of the Service is declining. The same charge is brought, with equally little foundation, against the officers of the Army and Navy, and every branch of the public services. Some of the best men in the Indian Civil Service in recent years have been men of the newer strain ; and in character, probity, and capacity the men of the Service to-day will bear comparison with their predecessors of any decade in last century. What is far more true is that the nature of the work is changing, and in many respects no longer calls for the exercise of quite the same qualities. Given the old conditions, men of the older fashion would probably be evolved, just as they are evolved in the Sudan to-day. But the conditions have altered ; an Indian civilian is no longer an unfettered pioneer in an unknown land, and it is not quite clear that the Service has been adjusted to the change. India no longer requires so many administrators of the older type ready to turn their hands to anything. It rather needs more specialists, and the Civil Service does not readily accustom itself to specialization. Half the difficulties which arise are due to the sudden posting of an officer to a task for which he has no special fitness. Again, a marked defect of the Service is that there is no adequate means of weeding out men of proved incompetence. A man may pass his examinations in England with brilliant success, and yet after years of patient trial prove unfit for work under Indian conditions. It would be cheaper to get rid of such a man on a proportionate pension than to allow him to cumber all his life the work of administration. Sir George Campbell noted



the defect nearly sixty years ago, and suggested the remedy, but it has never been applied. Again, the system by which the Indian Civil Service and the staff of the India Office are, with a few special exceptions, kept in separate compartments, is wrong in principle and ought to be amended. Numbers of officers at the India Office are engaged in minuting and advising upon questions concerning a country which they have never seen and of which they have no adequate conception. There should be some system of interchanging posts, as was suggested in the case of the Colonial Office at the 1907 Colonial Conference.

The ultimate fault of British rule in India perhaps is that it aims too high. Do we Attempt India perhaps is that it aims too high. too much ? The fault is a noble one, and not to be condemned, but it does not alter the fact that we are somewhat liable to overstrain our system by attempting too much. The experience of history shows that all immense and hugely populous empires have to be content with a comparatively low standard of efficiency. In India the lessons of the past find reinforcement in the common attitude of the people. The East does not particularly want our drainpipes. Its ideals of comfort and cleanliness are not ours, and in its spiritual emotions it seeks refuge from our material cravings. We have never sufficiently divested ourselves of the Western tendency to measure our achievements in the Orient by the standards of another continent. We are all a little too prone to emulate the mental attitude of Sir Elijah Impey, who on his first advent into the Calcutta High Court wanted to clothe the bare feet of his perspiring litigors in thick woollen stockings. If we could only bring ourselves to realize that in India something less than thoroughness usually suffices, and generally satisfies, our task would be easier and our rule less irritating to the ruled ; but perhaps in the resultant slackness we should lose our spirit of high endeavour, and

even the strength of our control might ultimately vanish. To cease to strive for the highest might be to destroy that spirit which has taken the English race into the far unswept places of the world.

## CHAPTER VII.

### INDIA AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

The General Staff, in the memorandum it prepared for the Colonial Conference of 1907, declared that "the problem of the defence of India is one that must at all times concern the Empire as a whole." Mr. Balfour said some years ago that "the problem of the British Army is the defence of Afghanistan." Lord Curzon said in 1909 that "India has become the strategic centre of the defensive position of the British Empire." These *dicta* have never been disputed, and are accepted in greater or less degree by every professional authority, but they are systematically ignored when the problem of Imperial Defence is considered in connexion with the oversea Dominions. In the official report of the prolonged discussions upon naval and military defence at the 1907 Colonial Conference, the word "India" does not once occur.

In any scheme of Imperial Defence India must be considered both for its offensive value and for the responsibilities of defence which it entails. Few people will now be bold enough to deny that if necessity ever arose Great Britain and the Dominions should fight to the uttermost to retain India. After all, as Lord Morley once said, it is our only real Empire. It is the keystone of the Imperial arch which spans the world. We are committed within its borders to an experiment without precedent in history, which draws forth some of the

noblest and most exalted qualities of the British race ; for if the possession of India brings pride and glory, it also demands ceaseless effort and many sacrifices. We are also concerned to maintain our rule because India is our best customer. She buys over £50,000,000 worth of British exports every year, and she is beginning to buy considerably from the Dominions, particularly Australia. The loss of India would not only be an irretrievable blow to our prestige, but it would inflict irreparable damage upon our trade.

The retention of India is an essential part of our strategic scheme of Empire. If the Strategic Value peninsula passed to another Power, its of India. possessor might conceivably threaten South Africa on the one hand and Australia and New Zealand on the other. It cuts athwart the main route to the Far East. It commands the Persian Gulf. It links up our chain of naval stations around the world. The Power that holds India holds the balance of dominion in Southern Asia. Though its possession imposes a severe strain upon our military resources, and though the task of holding it is the primary preoccupation of the British Army, yet its value for purposes of Imperial Defence probably counterbalances the price we have to pay. If our Army is larger on account of India than it might otherwise be, India nevertheless defrays the cost of maintaining 75,000 of the flower of our troops. Our military position in India enables us to strike rapidly in many parts of the globe. When the Peking Legations were in danger, it was from India that we sent troops to the rescue. It was the Indian contingent that saved Natal, and thus determined the course of the South African War, while the Army Corps from England was still upon the seas. Dr. Miller Maguire has stated that the possibility of such a thing as immediate reinforcements from India "did not once occur" to the Boer leaders. Just as a famous statesman is reputed to have

"forgotten Goschen," so the Boers forgot the Army of India. The time may come when we may have to fight for India, but in the past it has been a source of strength to the Empire rather than weakness. Meanwhile it furnishes an admirable training ground for British troops, who gain in India special experience which afterwards stands them in good stead. Lord Wolseley once doubted whether Indian service was good for British soldiers, but the bulk of military opinion is opposed to him upon the point, and the prospect of serving in India certainly stimulates recruiting.

The Army of India has three distinct functions to perform. It has to preserve the internal peace of India; it has to defend the Indian Empire against external aggression; and it has to be prepared to send help to other parts of the British Empire, and under the direction of Parliament to wage war upon occasion in other portions of the globe. Considering the magnitude of its responsibilities, the Army of India is the smallest in the world. When we hear complaints of the growth of Indian military expenditure, that fact should be steadily remembered. The Indian forces have not undergone any substantial increase for a very long time, and their increased cost is chiefly due to the higher standard of efficiency which has become imperative. Against the higher charges must be set the great saving effected by the prolonged cessation of frontier expeditions, due mainly to a more prudent frontier policy. The Regular Army of India consists of about 235,000 men, of whom 75,400 are white troops, 2,400 are British officers and non-commissioned officers with the Native Army, and 159,400 are natives of India. To these must be added 35,500 Volunteers, mostly British, but including nearly 6,000 cadets; Indian Army reserves, 25,500; and Imperial Service troops (maintained by the Princes of India), 20,700. The total available forces are therefore

The Question  
of Internal  
Revolt.

under 319,000, excluding a few local corps and the military police under civil control, which are of limited value. This small army holds an area of 1,773,000 square miles, with a land and sea frontier of 6,000 miles, and a population of 315,000,000.

The real fact is, of course, that Great Britain has never held India solely by the sword, but also by the acquiescence, sometimes expressed, generally tacit, of the Indian peoples. If that acquiescence were ever withdrawn, the 75,000 white troops upon whom in the last emergency we must rely could not long uphold British rule unaided. They will suffice, however, to withstand anything short of a universal, prolonged, and implacable revolt, which is almost inconceivable in a congeries of widely differing races possessing few arms and no guns. For the purposes of this particular problem, the British troops in India may alone be taken into account. The limitation implies no reflection upon the fidelity of the Native Army. Without the help of Indian troops the revolt of 1857 might have overthrown British rule in India. There were more Indians than Englishmen within the walls of the Residency at Lucknow. The Native Army has steadfastly resisted all recent attempts to sap its loyalty, and enjoys the complete confidence of the Government of India. It has to be remembered, however, that the Sepoy of to-day is not quite the same material as the Sepoy of 50 years ago. He is better educated, of a more inquiring turn of mind, distinctly more intelligent, and possibly more ready to speculate about problems which never troubled his forbears. He reads the vernacular Press, and is rather inclined to think for himself. While he remains at present as trustworthy as ever, he, too, may in time be touched with the spirit of restlessness which has infected India.

It is best, therefore, to consider the military aspects of the question of internal revolt in India solely in relation to the British troops, remembering always that experi-

once teaches that the Native Army is made up of several different races who never act in complete unison. The possibility of a revolt is always present in the minds of the military authorities. Their belief, which is certainly justified, is that the British forces could hold their own against any form of internal outbreak without any help from overseas for many months. The conditions no longer resemble those of 50 years ago. India is covered with railways, and the principal centres are being somewhat tardily equipped with wireless telegraphy. The force that holds the main lines of railway and the principal cities will always dominate India. No living soldier has a greater experience of railways in warfare than Lord Kitchener. It is understood to have been his deliberate conviction at the time he left India that the British force at his disposal could keep the main lines of railway open in the event of internal complications, even if the native subordinate railway staff proved untrustworthy. Railways are practically indestructible, as the Boers, with unlimited supplies of dynamite, eventually found to their cost. There is little chance of any grave internal danger in India, unless it is associated with attack from without.

The moment the question of external aggression is approached, the possibility of internal revolt in India assumes, from the military point of view, a very different form. It is estimated that in the event of a great war on or beyond the Indian frontier 150,000 men would be sent to the front at once. Of these, probably 50,000 would be British troops. That would leave about 25,000 British troops and rather more than double the number of Indian troops, charged with the task of garrisoning India until reinforcements arrived. Whether reinforcements could be sent would depend upon the character of the war, but it may be taken for granted that no troops would start, either from Great Britain

or from the Dominions, unless the command of the sea was assured. It is for this reason, among others, that the present numerical strength of the British Army in India must always be regarded as a *minimum*.

The issue is complicated by the situation upon the North-West Frontier. Between the administrative frontier and the Afghan boundary lies the mountainous country of the Pathan tribes and their allies. At a moderate calculation, there are probably 200,000 of these tribesmen able to bear arms, and the number may be nearer 300,000. Owing to the illicit traffic in arms, which is now being checked, it is believed that they possess possibly 150,000 serviceable rifles and large stores of ammunition. In the event of an advance beyond the frontier they might prove a formidable menace if they harassed our lines of communication. One school of military opinion holds that we should go in and subjugate them, and build strategic roads and railways in their territory, while our hands are free. The objections to this course are that the cost would be prohibitive, that the operations might be as interminable as was the Russian conquest of the Caucasus, that the tribesmen are now comparatively quiet, and that such an advance would have a gravely disturbing effect upon India. It would also almost inevitably lead to hostilities with Afghanistan, because it would be supposed that the subjugation of the frontier tribes was only the prelude to an advance on Kabul.

The more the problem of the land defence of India is examined the more formidable it appears. After the possibility of internal revolt and the danger of hostility from the frontier tribes are left behind, there emerges Afghanistan. Our present relations with the Ameer of Afghanistan are friendly but somewhat chilly. If they were not, and if an advance on Kabul ever became necessary, the conditions would be wholly transformed



from those which confronted Lord Roberts in 1879. The Afghan Army may not be all that its ruler fondly believes, but there is an abundance of arms and ammunition in the country. Experts hold that an invasion of Afghanistan by the line of the Khaibar could not now be attempted with less than two divisions, with a third division to guard the communications. The three available roads, two in the pass and one behind its northern heights, would not suffice to keep two divisions supplied. A railway is necessary for the purpose, and its construction was commenced at the instance of Lord Kitchener, but was eventually stopped for political reasons. The reasons were no doubt sound, but the fact remains that until the line traverses the Khaibar range an advance into Afghanistan will be attended with dangerous risks.

Apart from the question of hostilities with Afghanistan, we are pledged by the **The Danger from Beyond.** Kabul Treaty of 1893, renewed in 1905, to defend Afghanistan against the unprovoked aggression of any foreign Power. The only foreign Power which can menace Afghanistan, except ourselves, is Russia. By the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 Russia recognized Afghanistan as outside her sphere of influence, and she has faithfully abided by her pledge. Conventions, however, are not eternal. This is not a consideration of political probabilities, but of the cold hard factors of a military problem, which we may hope will long remain academic. We shall be fortunate if it does, for there can be no doubt that if we were ever called upon to fulfil our pledges to the Ameer we should be in considerable difficulty. Unless there is a railway to Kabul, Russia could occupy the line of the Hindu Kush beyond the Afghan capital long before our troops reached there, and no one believes that the Ameer would be able to offer a successful resistance. There is not the slightest

likelihood that a railway will be made to Kabul, and so, as a matter of strategy, a conflict in Afghanistan is not inviting. It must be understood that a sudden invasion of India from the north-west is practically impossible, unless the Tsar and the Ameer joined forces. The Russian commander would therefore first have to conquer Afghanistan, which might take a year or two. It is in Afghanistan that Russia and Great Britain would have to determine the fate of India. The military authorities calculate that it would be necessary to concentrate half a million men, partly beyond Kabul, but mostly on the line of the River Helmund, within 18 months, in order to offer an effective resistance to a Russian advance. The statement may be recorded without comment. While it is perfectly true that Russia no longer appears to turn her eyes towards India, it is also true that her Central Asian communications have improved, and the Orenburg-Tashkent Railway gives her a valuable alternative line of advance.

So far we have been considering the Indian problem in its comparatively narrow and local aspects, but there are larger factors which materially modify the situation. The menace of invasion from without is governed by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which has just been renewed for another ten years. The present Alliance specifically relates, among other things, to India. If India is attacked by another Power or Powers, Japan undertakes to come to our assistance. This is not the place to discuss the merits or demerits of the Alliance, but it is too often forgotten that in its new form, as in its old, it constitutes a very solid additional assurance of our security in India. The statement has been made that, even before the Alliance was first renewed in 1905, Japan was willing to hold that an attack upon India made it necessary for her to assist us. During

the Russo-Japanese War there was a report, now known to have been unfounded, that Russia was concentrating masses of men in Central Asia preparatory to moving across the Oxus. Japan is alleged to have at once inquired at what point Japanese divisions should be landed in India. The story may or may not be true, but it makes it necessary to affirm that we cannot rely upon the direct assistance of any Ally in holding India. In no sense is this affirmation due to the fact that Japan is an Asiatic Power. The same contention would apply with equal force to an offer of assistance from France. If we are to maintain our prestige in India, any fighting within or beyond its frontiers must be undertaken solely by the soldiers of the King-Emperor. So far as India is concerned, the value of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance lies in Russia's knowledge that if she enters Afghanistan, Japan will immediately strike at her possessions in the Far East. That is a signal deterrent, and if it disappeared the whole question of the defence of India would revert to an exceedingly different form.

The re-establishment of Chinese influence in Tibet and along the Burmese border may for the present be disregarded, but one other form of possible menace to India remains to be noted. The idea seems to be growing, though it has not yet found much expression, that in the event of war the Triple Alliance may attempt to invade India, either from Trieste or by way of the Baghdad Railway. This is the logical conclusion of Admiral Mahan's recent observations upon the relative abandonment of the Mediterranean by the British Navy. The inference is that the way to India is left open. The possibility does not require detailed discussion. An enormous number of transports would be required to make an effective invasion. It would never be undertaken unless the invading Powers had first obtained command of the sea, and if that is lost by Great Britain, all is lost. The same

considerations apply to the suggested European invasion of Australia.

The recital of the responsibilities which India involves may have obscured its value in any scheme of Imperial Defence, but it should be recognized that if India creates dangers, it also confers great and manifest military advantages, which have already been outlined. It commands those portions of the British Empire which are in the southern hemisphere, so long as India itself is tranquil and so long as England commands the sea. Next to the Royal Navy, the Army of India forms the chief external guarantee against invasion possessed by South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, the Malay States, and Hong-kong, and it also helps to ensure the maintenance of our control over Egypt. The Indian Ocean is at the moment a British lake. The Army of India is a powerful fighting machine, always ready for service at short notice. Since its reorganization by Lord Kitchener, its efficiency is acknowledged, even by unfriendly critics, to be far higher than it ever was before. It has already been shown that the Indian Contingent saved Natal. Had it been possible to use the splendid Indian light cavalry, accustomed to operate in spacious areas, the duration of the South African War might have been appreciably shortened. The reasons stated by Mr. Balfour, which precluded the use of Indian troops, were unanswerable. It may be taken for granted, however, that no such objections would apply to the use of Indian troops against a foreign foe, and that in the event of invasion the forces of the Dominions would fight as readily by the side of Indian regiments as British and Indians fight in frontier expeditions. We are often told that the field for Indian recruiting is limited, and so it is while we take our recruits solely from the flower of the fighting races. It is difficult not to believe, however,

that amid the three hundred millions of the Indian peoples there exist untapped reserves of useful, though possibly not first-class, fighting material. The policy of the Dominions, as well as of the Mother Country, should be, so far as possible, to support all movements having for their object the quickening of a sense of membership of the British Empire among the peoples of India. An Empire which includes within its borders one-fourth of the whole human race should never have to complain of lack of men to defend itself. If it does, there is something wrong with its Imperial ideals.

The naval aspect of India's place in the scheme of Imperial Defence has still to be considered. No one now thinks of India

India and the  
Navy.

as a Naval Power, but time was when the ships of the old Indian Navy swept the Eastern seas. The Indian Navy was a useful and efficient force, and its abolition in 1862 is still regretted by many who remember it. It has since been replaced by the Royal Indian Marine, consisting of a number of fine vessels used for transport and survey work and for other Government purposes. The officers periodically undergo naval training, but the ships are not armed, although the best of them are meant to be used as commerce-destroyers in time of war. The guns designated for their use are usually kept ashore, and some of them seem to have been sent to South Africa at the time of the war. The marine defences of India are subject to strange vicissitudes. Some years ago new boilers made for the use of the torpedo-boats then stationed in Bombay Harbour were lost for many months, and the puzzled Admiralty eventually discovered them at Bermuda! In addition to maintaining the Royal Indian Marine, whose value for naval purposes lies in its officers rather than its ships, the Government of India pay a sum slightly exceeding £100,000 annually towards the cost of the East Indies Squadron. As at present constituted the

squadron is of no great fighting value, and even the flagship is a second-class cruiser. The payment is to a great extent made for services rendered by the Royal Navy in policing the Persian Gulf.

The Imperial Defence Conference of 1909 has raised new issues concerning the participation of India in the naval defence of the Empire, which must be said to be at present inconsiderable. Australia has agreed to maintain a unit consisting of one Indomitable, three second-class cruisers, six destroyers, and three submarines, though this unit will presumably be afterwards enlarged upon the lines of Admiral Henderson's report. The China Squadron, it is proposed, should be remodelled upon a similar basis, New Zealand furnishing its Indomitable. South Africa may eventually provide another unit. The report goes on to suggest the conversion of the East Indies Squadron into another unit, though the small ships for regular service in the Persian Gulf would no doubt still be required. India was apparently not consulted before the proposition was made public, and it has still to be seen whether the Government of India will accept it. The question is, of course, one of finance. The contention of most Indian politicians is that India already pays over £20,000,000 annually for defence, and they oppose further naval expenditure in addition. On the other hand, it is urged that three hundred millions of people cannot be defended cheaply, that India cannot depend upon her land forces alone, and that if each great unit of the Empire is to be self-contained India must bear her part in the task of naval defence. The question is complicated by the fact that the most important naval base in the Indian Ocean is Colombo, which is not under Indian control.

Whatever may be the correct solution of the difficulty, a settlement is not made easier by the attitude of the British Government and the self-governing Dominions. If India is to become a vital and willing member of the

Imperial organization she must be given some share in its councils. The principle upon which Imperial co-operation for defence should be based is, above all things else, willingness. In the case of India we have the necessary alternative of compulsion, and are ready to exercise it, but the compulsion should not be automatic when fresh developments are suggested. The Government of India retain the sole right to decide questions of expenditure upon defence. The representatives of the Indian peoples may criticize, but they cannot decide. They have, however, some right to be consulted and to make their views heard before decisions are made. Until their claims are recognized, India can never be expected\* to become a completely willing unit of the Empire.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### THE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF INDIA.

A man who derived his knowledge of India solely from an orographical map might very well be pardoned for inquiring why the country had any external affairs at all. There are few great populated regions of the world which seem to have been so effectively designed for isolation. The people themselves were wont to think of "The Black Water"—as in accents of dread they styled the sea—as a barrier which they should not cross. On land they were shielded by the gigantic natural rampart of the Himalaya, by the arid wastes of Baluchistan and Mekran, by the dense forests and wild mountainous country on the borders of Yunnan and Siam. Beyond lay obstacles almost equally formidable, the deserts of Eastern Persia, the grim line of the Hindu Kush, the icy uplands of the Pamirs, the vast inhospitable emptiness of Tibet. Well may its earlier inhabitants have fancied that India was cut off by natural screens from intercourse with the rest of the world.

Yet from the beginning of recorded history India has never been really isolated. The sea has been a highway, and not a protecting moat. The mariners of Babylonia carried to India, as they did to China, ideas which profoundly modified Hindu thought. The trading junks of China once thronged the harbour of Bombay. There was never a time afterwards when

Early  
Invasions.



the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal were not furrowed by the keels of ships. By the sea came da Gama, and all the wave of coastal conquest which followed in his wake. The cannon seized from Turkish fleets still lie rusting on the shores of Kathiawar. The English arrived by sea, and their rule is maintained in the last resort by sea power. Nor was India ever more shielded from intrusion on her land frontier than she has been upon her coasts. Her long and stirring history shatters the myth of isolation, which grew in the West in the days when the rise of Islam barred the pathway to the Orient. The more ancient and medieval Asia is studied, the more it is seen that the whole continent has always been conspicuous for great migratory impulses among large sections of its people. The Himalaya and the Hindu Kush, the desolation of Southern Afghanistan and Mekran, never sheltered India while there were passes to be scaled and desert paths to be traversed. The tale of invasions of India began with the irruption of the light-skinned race which poured into the Punjab, and it has hardly ended with the indomitable Chinese Army which made peace with Nepal a century ago when almost at the gates of Khatmandu. In the interval, horde after horde of conquerors have swept through the passes of the north-west to the sack of Hindustan. If mere raids are counted, the number of invasions is not to be told. Mahmud of Ghazni raided India thirty times, and the remnants of the great city of Patan-Somnath, by the yellow sands of Verawal, attest his iconoclastic fury. He was the second great historical invader of India, who came thirteen hundred years after Alexander the Great entered by way of the country north of the Khyber. Then followed the first Moghuls, the Turks under Tamerlane, Baber and his Amirs, Nadir Shah and his Persian host, and the final invasions of the Afghans.

Only twice has there been a movement in the reverse direction, on each occasion headed by the British. The

two British invasions of Afghanistan were, historically speaking, little more than raids. The rapidity of the exploit of Alexander is never likely to be repeated. His men lived on the countries they invaded. Modern armies require huge transport, not only for food and forage, but also for munitions of war. If India ever again becomes the prize of conflict between contending nations, the ground of battle will probably be sought in Afghanistan, and both sides will be forced to move slowly. A cloud of horsemen alone will never again ride through the mountains to seek empire over Hindustan.

India, then, though probably less vulnerable owing to the changed conditions of modern warfare, has a direct **India's Foreign Interests.** and even grave interest in external affairs. She has to guard her approaches, so far as may be; to endeavour to preserve peaceful conditions beyond her borders, lest her own peoples become disturbed; and to protect and develop her trade with other countries. In the earlier phases of British rule, when communication with Europe was difficult, the administrators of India took an active interest in the affairs of the whole East. The ships of the old Indian Navy, a force which was abolished when Crown control was substituted for Company control, sailed and fought throughout all the Eastern seas, from Basra to the Spice Islands. A Viceroy of India went in person to the conquest of Java. More recently, the immediate relations of the Government of India with other Asiatic countries have been greatly contracted, because steam and the telegraph have made it unnecessary for the British Government at home to delegate its authority. Some years ago a Royal Commission very clearly defined the present extent of the foreign interests of India, and its conclusions may be briefly summarized. The Commission declared that India had :—

- (1) Sole interest in punitive expeditions on her borders.

(2) A direct and substantial interest in questions affecting Persia, the coasts and islands of Arabia, and the Persian Gulf; in questions affecting Afghanistan, and that part of Central Asia which is adjacent to her borders and Afghanistan; in questions affecting Siam; in keeping open the Suez Canal; in maintaining order in Egypt so far as the security of the Canal is affected; and possibly on the coasts of the Red Sea, though not in the Sudan.

(3) A modified interest in questions affecting the East Coast of Africa as far as Zanzibar and the African islands of the Indian Ocean, except Madagascar; and in questions affecting China and the Malay Peninsula.

At present the Government of India  
 Foreign control Aden and the protected tribal  
 Department. territory in its vicinity, and exercise a  
 protectorate over the island of Socotra.

They have all the maritime tribes of the coast between Aden and Oman, including the Hadramaut, under their protection, as well as the islands of Bahrein, in the Persian Gulf. They exercise a controlling influence over the Trucial Chiefs of the Pirate Coast, in the Gulf, and maintain special and exclusive relations with the Sheikh of Koweit. They protect Musulman pilgrims to Mecca and Kerbela, and administer a large fund for the maintenance of priests at the Shiah mausolea of Kerbela and Nejef. They pay £6,000 a year towards the cost of the British Legation in Teheran and various Consular establishments in Northern Persia, and maintain at their own charges a chain of Consular officers between Baghdad and Meshed. They subsidize the Ameer of Afghanistan to the extent of £123,000 annually, and maintain direct political relations with his Majesty, being represented at Kabul by an Indian Musulman agent. They have a representative in Chinese Turkestan, and conduct certain business direct with the Tibetan authorities. They pay a sum averaging £12,500 annually towards the cost of

the British diplomatic and Consular establishments in China, and settle local border questions direct with the Chinese authorities of the province of Yunnan. The reality of Indian interests on the Siamese frontier is denoted by the fact that India pays the cost of the British Consulate at Chiengmai, in the teak districts of Siam.

The external affairs of India are in the hands of the Foreign Department, which also deals with the frontier tribes and with the whole of the Native States of India. As the Foreign Department further has control of the North-West Frontier Province and British Baluchistan, its task is enormous and complicated. At the head of the Department is the Foreign Secretary, but there is no Foreign Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, the portfolio being usually held by the Viceroy himself.

The tribes on the North-West Frontier are not the only frontier tribes with which the Government of India have to deal, but they constitute a primary and perennial problem. The tribesmen on the borders of Assam and Burma are comparative savages, extremely bloodthirsty on occasion, still addicted in some cases to the artless custom of collecting heads, but indifferently armed, and with no capacity for cohesive action. The men of the North-West are sufficiently in touch with civilization to be proficient in the use of firearms, and they are far more intelligent and capable. Every man is a warrior. Though divided into innumerable clans and septs, and prone to fierce quarrels among themselves, through them all there runs the green thread of Islam. They will unite with fanatical zeal at times, sinking their differences for the common purpose of opposing the British. Probably, if they mustered their full strength, old and young, they could put 200,000 fighting men into the field, though not all of equal fighting value. The great influx of arms from the Persian Gulf during the last three or four years has enormously increased the

North-West  
Frontier.

offensive capacity of the tribesmen. The number of modern rifles now distributed among them has been variously estimated at from 80,000 to 150,000, and is probably much nearer the larger figure than the smaller.

Strictly speaking, questions affecting the frontier tribes do not come within the category of external affairs. They dwell within the political frontier of India, but outside the administrative frontier. They are practically independent, but many of them receive allowances conditional upon good behaviour. For many years punitive expeditions against them were frequent, but during the last 13 years the peace of the frontier has rarely been broken. Lord Curzon created the North-West Frontier Province, a step which has been conspicuously successful, and he developed a policy the essence of which was the withdrawal of British forces from advanced positions and the employment of tribal forces in the defence of tribal country. It has worked so well that frontier wars have almost ceased to figure in the Indian Budget.

Nevertheless the frontier is always like a powder magazine which a spark may explode. Some military experts argue that the tribesmen should be finally subjugated right up to the political frontier. The insuperable objections are that the cost would be prohibitive, the operations would be prolonged, and a war with Afghanistan would inevitably follow. Whenever a frontier rising occurs the blame is always laid on the fanatical mullahs, who stir the tribesmen to frenzy. It is true that the *mullahs* are usually responsible, but they never preach war without a reason. The gradual advance of British influence was unquestionably the ultimate cause of the rising which ended in the Tirah War. A contributory factor at present is that the tribes find it increasingly difficult to exist. In former times they depended largely on raids into the plains. The extension of British control has rendered raiding difficult and dangerous, and certain to result in retaliatory measures.

The Mahsud Waziris are at present the most troublesome tribe on the frontier, and the real reason is that they have not sufficient cultivable land to maintain themselves. The remedy lies, among other things, in judicious grants of land.

The Kingdom of Afghanistan has been an abiding preoccupation of the British in India ever since their outposts reached the frontier hills. The Afghans held the Derajat, and actually ruled in Peshawar, early last century. Afghanistan. When, therefore, we complain that the tribesmen on our side of the frontier are wont to turn their gaze too frequently towards Kabul it is only fair to remember that they do so in pursuance of conditions which existed almost within memory of men still living. The Sikhs drove the Afghans out of Peshawar and Bannu, and the British in turn became their successors upon the annexation of the frontier. The then ruler of Afghanistan, Yakub Khan, only relinquished in 1879 his claim to the Khyber and the Mohmand country, Tirah, and the adjacent regions, and the districts of Pishin and Sibi in Baluchistan. The actual frontier has been still more recently demarcated, and certain portions remain undefined. So recently as 1849 an Afghan force fought against the British at the battle of Gujerat, in the vain hope of recovering their possessions in India.

The first direct intervention of Great Britain in Afghan affairs ended in disaster. An army which was sent to establish Shah Shuja on the throne of Kabul was massacred in 1842, mostly in the Jagdallak defile. Stern retribution was enacted, but when Shah Shuja was assassinated the Government of India allowed his rival, Dost Mahomed, to resume possession of his kingdom. They even helped him to regain possession of Herat, which had been seized by the Persians, by sending an expedition to Persia in 1855. The intrigues of his successor, Sher Ali, with Russia led to the second invasion of Afghanistan

in 1878. Kandahar and Jellalabad were quickly occupied, and Lord Roberts took the Peiwar Kotal. Sher Ali died, and a treaty was negotiated with his son, Yakub Khan, who not only ceded various districts to the British, but agreed to accept a Resident at Kabul. The Resident, Cavagnari, was speedily murdered, and a British Army marched to Kabul. Yakub Khan abdicated, and his throne was offered by the British to Abdur Rahman Khan, a grandson of Dost Mahomed. In return Abdur Rahman, while preserving his own independence, agreed that his external relations with foreign Powers should be subject to the control of the Government of India. Upon that agreement, which still subsists, the whole Afghan question turns.

Though Abdur Rahman faithfully abided by his obligations the secret of Afghan Policy. his policy was that he held the British at arms' length. He spent the rest of his life in establishing his authority in the outlying portions of his dominions. The British only made him Ameer of Kabul, and left him to fend for himself. When he died his writ ran without question to the utmost confines of Afghanistan. He ruled his people with great severity, and created an army of some efficiency, though its value has since declined. He established various manufactures, including factories for arms, but steadfastly set his face against the introduction of railways. His object was to surround his country, in effect, with a ring fence. Though he kept clear of Russia, and though Russia, on her part, had already in 1873 declared Afghanistan to be outside her sphere of influence, there can be no doubt that Abdur Rahman conceived his safety to lie in playing off Russia and Great Britain against each other. While he held comparatively aloof Great Britain always had in mind the possibility that he might lean towards Russia. While he maintained definite relations with Great Britain Russia was always ready to contemplate

the chance of closer union between Great Britain and Afghanistan, which might prove inimical to Russian interests. Abdur Rahman thought, perhaps with justification, that his real security lay in maintaining the isolation of Afghanistan, and that it was discreet not to lean too palpably to either side. In the belief that he thus cherished lies the explanation of the numerous minor incidents which occasionally placed some strain upon his relations with the Government of India.

When Abdur Rahman was made Ameer he received an assurance that if any foreign Power committed acts of aggression upon Afghanistan, the British Government would come to his aid in the manner it thought best. The assurance was repeated at the time of the Durand Agreement in 1893. After he died in 1901 it was renewed with his son Habibullah on the conclusion of a new treaty by Sir Louis Dane at Kabul early in 1905. Great Britain is, therefore, in effect, pledged to undertake the defence of Afghanistan if the country is invaded. The position is, however, somewhat complicated by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. In that Convention Russia again declared Afghanistan to be outside the sphere of Russian influence, though, as Lord Curzon pointed out in the House of Lords in 1908, it was a declaration made on that occasion for the twelfth time. Great Britain responded by declaring that British influence would be used in Afghanistan "only in a pacific sense," and though the statement represented the general character of British policy, it was the first time that such an assurance had been formally conveyed to Russia. The rest of the provisions concerning Afghanistan need not be here quoted. The difficulty caused by the Convention was that the validity of the Afghanistan section was made dependent upon the consent of the Ameer. Habibullah has never signified his consent, because he considers that he ought to have been consulted before

British  
Pledges.



the Convention was signed. He was not consulted beforehand because the two Governments could not face the interminable delays involved in a reference to Kabul; and it is believed, though never officially stated, that both Governments have now waived the clause about the Ameer's consent, and mutually agreed to regard the Afghanistan section as operative.

The Ameer is understood to regard the Convention with dislike because he perceives that a better understanding between Russia and Great Britain regarding Afghanistan renders largely nugatory the traditional policy of his dynasty. Obviously he cannot play off against each other two Powers who are fully agreed about their respective policies towards Afghanistan. It has been alleged, though never publicly proved, that had there been no Convention emissaries from the Afghan side of the border would not have stirred up the revolt of the Mohmands and the Zakka Khel in 1908. Whether that be true or not, the Convention has left traces of uneasiness in Anglo-Afghan relations. Yet intercourse between Peshawar and Kabul is not without cordiality, and last year a Joint Commission met on the frontier to settle various local disputes.

Much misconception prevails about the present Ameer. Though he has no very restrained idea of his own importance, he has considerable ability, and his position is by no means insecure. His recent policy of permitting the distribution of arms broadcast among his subjects is now believed to have been deliberate. His visit to India taught him that his standing army was of little value, and at a great review at Agra he reviled his sirdars for having deceived him; but he knew that, with rifles in their hands, and among their own hills, his people were among the finest guerilla fighters in the world. The risk of scattering arms throughout the country was great, but he felt himself strong enough to take it.

The real index of his strength is that, whereas his father had to crush three rebellions, Habibullah has held the throne for ten years, and even left his country for months, and never had a shot fired against him. He seems to have an excellent understanding with his brother Nasrullah, despite reports to the contrary. The Ameer leads the progressive element, and Nasrullah controls the more orthodox people and the reactionaries, but their aims are probably identical. The voluntary isolation of Afghanistan, though not without difficulties and dangers, probably best suits the policy of Great Britain. Soldiers contend with some justice that we cannot be in a position to fulfil our responsibilities to Afghanistan unless roads and railways are made, and the Afghan troops are better trained; but precedent and pledges alike forbid any departure from existing conditions.

If the North-West Frontier of India is always more immediate in its possibilities of trouble, the Persian Gulf remains the real danger spot in the external affairs of India. It is the only point whence British rule in India can be effectively menaced—not overthrown, be it remembered, but menaced and harassed. The way to the conquest of India probably still lies, as of yore, through Afghanistan. But it is quite possible, under certain circumstances, for a Great Power to worry the British in India, and to create among the Indian peoples an impression of the possible impermanence of British rule, without advancing to a direct attack. Russia, from the farther side of the Oxus, was able to produce innumerable “alarums and excursions.” How much more effective would be the veiled hostility of a Power seated, not beyond a sea of mountains, but on the shores of the Persian Gulf, or within sight of the Arabian Sea?

The comparative tranquillity of British rule in India has been due, among other things, to the fact that no other

Great Power of militant strength has been within easy reach. All round India lie regions which do not threaten her—the still unknown territories of Southern Arabia, the desolate ridges and valleys of Mekran, the vast bu'warks of the Hindu Kush and the Himalaya, the enormous solitudes of Tibet, the dark forests of the Brahmaputra and the Salween and the Mekong, the uplands of Yunnan, the neutralized plains of Siam. The one vulnerable place which lies open to easy acquisition, and extends a tempting invitation, is the Persian Gulf. Turkey, with Germany at her back, sought to aggrandize herself in the Gulf region even in the day of Abdul Hamid. The weakness of Persia, whose shores and islands command the entrance to the Gulf, is a constant source of anxiety. A foreign Power established in Gulf waters, even without armaments, and for the ostensible purpose of commerce, or to gratify that passion for the coal trade which afflicts all great Powers, would shake the stability of British rule to its foundations without firing a single shot. India's credit would be impaired, the growth of industries would be checked, the flow of native capital into commercial enterprises would instantly cease. The peoples of India have seen alien rulers rise and fall too often for our comfort. The presence of a foreign Power in the Persian Gulf would assuredly suggest to them the handwriting on the wall.

Hence ever since their first advent into  
 British India the British have been preoccupied  
 in the Gulf. about the Persian Gulf. Not for 100  
 years, as is sometimes stated, but  
 for 300 years, they have sought to maintain a policy  
excluding others from that inland sea. In 1621 the  
East India Company entered into a treaty with the  
Shah of Persia by which they agreed "to keep two  
 men-of-war constantly to defend the Gulf," and the  
 British flag has been flown there ever since. In the follow-

ing year they joined the Persians in ejecting the Portuguese from Hormuz; the first of a long series of encounters which always aimed at maintaining British supremacy. How the Gulf was cleared of all intruders, how piracy was suppressed and slavery terminated, how the chiefs of the Arabian coast were pacified and restrained, how the Gulf was turned from a marine Alsatia into a waterway as peaceable as the Irish Sea, how its coasts were buoyed and surveyed and lighted and policed, how Great Britain took no territory and claimed no advantage which other nations might not share, are stories too long to be told again. Possibly too much stress has been laid upon British services in the Persian Gulf. They are very great, but they were performed for our own interest and security, and we cannot expect other Powers to register self-denying ordinances out of sheer gratitude. We can only preserve our predominance and protect the rights we have created by showing ourselves determined to resist any attempts at aggression.

That determination has been repeatedly and emphatically expressed by the British Government. In 1903 Lord Lansdowne, then Foreign Secretary, said in the House of Lords:—"I say it without hesitation, we should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal." In 1907, when the Anglo-Russian Convention was signed, Sir Edward Grey drew attention to "the special interests possessed by Great Britain in the Gulf," and the Russian Government "explicitly stated that they do not deny" them, a statement of which the British Government formally took note. Both before and since these declarations the attitude of Great Britain regarding the Persian

Official  
Declarations.

Gulf has been repeatedly made clear by Ministers of both parties.

Great Britain maintains in the Persian Gulf a Resident and Consul-General, who is jointly responsible to the Government of India and the Foreign Office, and has his headquarters at Bushire. Under him are Consuls at various points, and there are also a number of British representatives in important centres of Southern Persia. British gunboats patrol the Gulf, protect the native dhows from capture in the date season, preserve order at the pearl fisheries, and stop gun-running. The chiefs who inhabit the Pirate Coast of Arabia maintain a maritime truce under British supervision, and refer local disputes to the Resident. The islands of Bahrein are under British protection and the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammerah maintain special arrangements with Great Britain. To catalogue the varied activities of British officers in the Gulf and its vicinity would be a formidable undertaking.

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|-------------------------------------|--|
| <p><b>Present<br/>Position.</b></p> | <p>Formerly the two Powers who seemed chiefly disposed to challenge British influence in the Persian Gulf were <u>France</u> and <u>Russia</u>. Changed political conditions have led them to modify their policy. Since the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention <u>Russia has ceased to display her former disquieting interest in the Gulf.</u> <u>France, too, no longer endeavours to acquire a preferential position in the State of Oman, and the only remaining difference with the Republic relates to certain treaty rights under which gun-runners still find shelter at Muscat.</u> The new factors are <u>Turkey</u> and <u>Germany</u>. Turkey is not really a new factor, for <u>Midhat Pasha in the seventies made large acquisitions on the Arabian coast ;</u> but since the Revolution Turkish attempts to obtain increased influence on the Arabian side of the Gulf have grown more marked. Turkish claims to the peninsula of El <u>Katar</u> have never been acknowledged either by</p> |
|-------------------------------------|--|

Great Britain or the local tribesmen, and are only ineffectively established. Germany began by not very successful attempts to develop a trade with Gulf ports, and followed by still less fortunate endeavours by German agents to gain possession of various islets. A larger issue, in which Germany and Turkey are jointly interested, is presented by the Baghdad Railway. The question whether this projected line will infringe British interests in the Gulf is a subject of much controversy. Great Britain cannot object if the line terminates at Basra, which is indisputably Turkish, but has the right under agreements to decide whether it shall be continued to Koweit. Some experts hold that a terminus at Basra will not be a menace to British interests, and think that Great Britain should confine herself to refusing to sanction a terminus at Koweit; but the British Government is inclined to entertain an invitation to assist in building the section from Baghdad to the sea, if sufficiently satisfactory terms can be arranged. In that case the terminus will probably be at Koweit. It may be regarded as tolerably certain that, whatever is the upshot of the negotiations respecting the Baghdad Railway, the British position in the Gulf will be less undisputed, and more difficult to maintain, in the future than it has been in the past. The more reason, therefore, to exercise vigilance in safeguarding British interests, which will not be accomplished by speeches alone.

The problems of Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf have been discussed at considerable length, because they bulk most largely in the external affairs of India. They by no means exhaust the foreign interests of the Indian authorities. Next in importance comes the question of Persia, which is to a great extent distinct from that of the Gulf. The welfare of Persia, and the preservation of Persian independence, is a matter of great concern to India. The present policy of Great

Other Countries.

Britain and Russia, acting in conjunction, is to abstain as far as possible from intervention in the internal affairs of Persia. It cannot, however, be implicitly observed without certain qualifications. While the Teheran Government lacks strength, and is unable to assert its authority in the outlying provinces, difficulties are bound to arise from time to time. Trade routes are closed by banditti, British or Russian subjects are attacked and even killed, the securities which Persia has pledged for the service of foreign loans become imperilled, or the revolt of provincial leaders creates a general menace. Thus Great Britain was compelled to address a peremptory Note to the Persian Ministry last year about the condition of Southern Persia, which had brought about an almost complete interruption of trade. Russian troops, introduced to protect Russian subjects, have not yet been entirely withdrawn from Northern Persia. A British force was recently sent to Persian Baluchistan, where the local chieftains were assisting Afghan gun-runners and had openly repudiated the authority of Teheran. Generally speaking, however, British policy, with which the Government of India is in complete accord, aims at leaving Persia to work out her own salvation. The process seems likely to be a slow one.

Indian relations with China open up another large set of questions which chiefly concern Tibet. Here again British policy aims at abstention, though again with qualifications. In the latter half of the 19th century Chinese suzerainty over Tibet became a mere shadow. The Government of India had direct relations with the Tibetan authorities, who committed various acts of aggression and obstruction, and were also found to be intriguing with Russia. A British expedition was sent to Lhasa, and it had only one permanent result of importance. It paved the way for the rehabilitation of Chinese suzerainty, which had never been denied by Great Britain. Under the Anglo-Russian Convention, both Powers

agreed to abstain from further interference in the affairs of Tibet, and even undertook to prevent their respective subjects from seeking commercial concessions in that country. They signed what was in effect a mutual self-denying ordinance. Great Britain, however, had hardly contemplated the substitution of Chinese for Tibetan rule. We had only anticipated a revival of Chinese suzerainty. The flight of the Dalai Lama, the arrival of Chinese troops in Lhasa, the merciless oppression of the Tibetan people, raise new issues which were unexpected and still await definite conclusion. At the same time, the decision that British interests in the north stop short at the Himalayas is fixed and irrevocable, unless unforeseen factors are revealed.

Of the other foreign questions of India, such as the better control of the wild tribes on the North-East Frontier, the difficulties raised by the Arab revolt in Yemen, the more precise definition of British interests on the Southern Arabian coast and in the Hadramaut, and a multitude of minor complications, nothing can be said: The general tendency of Asiatic politics is to draw India more and more from her seclusion. With the rapid development of oversea communications and the spread of railways, India's external affairs have ceased to possess any really local character. To every student of Imperial policy they have become as important as the politics of Europe, and it is imperative that they should be better understood.





## CHAPTER IX.

### THE INDIAN ADMINISTRATION: HOW IT WAS DEVELOPED.

[BY SIR WILLIAM MEYER, K.C.I.E.]

#### I.—BEFORE 1832.

In the middle of the 18th century, on the eve of the events which were to transform its mercantile outposts into vast territorial acquisitions, the East India Company had three principal settlements or "Presidencies" at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, each of which controlled dependent out-factories and was administered by a President and a Council consisting of the principal local servants of the Company and varying from 12 to 16 in number. In Council the President was merely *primus inter pares*, and each Presidency was directly subordinate to the Court of Directors in London. The issue of the long conflict between the British and French in Southern India, the battle of Plassey and the events which followed it, and the further expansion associated chiefly with the Governor-Generalships of Cornwallis, Wellesley, and the Marquis of Hastings, constituted these Presidencies into great dominions. By the end of the period of which we are now treating the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay had attained much to their present size, save for the subsequent addition of Sind to Bombay, while the

Bengal Presidency included roughly the present provinces of Bengal, Eastern Bengal, and Assam, and Agra, with Ajmer and some outlying territories in what are now the Central Provinces and Burma. The fact that the new Empire required control by a single Government in India, and in fundamental matters by the British Crown and Parliament, had been recognized by the series of Acts commencing with Lord North's Regulating Act of 1773, and including Pitt's Government of India Act of 1784, which gave the Bengal Presidency a Governor-General in Council with powers of superintendence and control over the Governors in Council, as they were now styled, of Madras and Bombay.

The Governors-General and the Governors were now persons of high *status* appointed from England, and each was associated with a small Council of three or four members, including the local commanders-in-chief, while, after the disadvantage of a purely collective administration had been evidenced by the quarrels and intrigues which so disturbed the rule of Warren Hastings, the Governor-General and the Presidency Governors had obtained the right of overruling their Councils in matters of grave importance. Indian affairs had been placed under the control of the British Government of the day by the establishment of a Board of Control—the President of which soon became *de facto* the entire Board and was to develop later on into the Secretary of State for India—to which the substance of the Company's power over the Indian Government was practically transferred. Each Presidency had its separate army, while in civil administration, too, the difficulties of communication, and the as yet isolated position of the three Presidencies still gave the Governments of Madras and Bombay a large degree of internal autonomy. The administration at first followed that of the native Governments whom we superseded, and was only gradually altered, the chief advance being, at the outset, in the direction of settled order,

safety of life and property, milder judicial punishments, and more certain and equitable taxation.

The main unit of administration was then, as now, the district, though the **Unit of Administration.** districts of those days were, as a rule, considerably larger than they are at present. Each district was in charge of a Collector (styled Deputy Commissioner in the new provinces acquired after the end of this period), whose primary function was the realization of the revenues. He was also, however, and still is, the chief magistrate of the district, and was responsible for police arrangements. Each Collector had assistants belonging to the Company's service who were either in subordinate charge of outlying portions of the district or worked directly under his orders. Apart from larger subdivisions under such an assistant, each district was, as now, split up into smaller areas generally designated *tahsils* or *taluks*, and in the immediate charge of native officers (*tahsildars*—in Bombay *mamlatdars*). Towards the end of this period, too, Lord William Bentinck inaugurated the appointment of native officers of a higher class, Deputy Collectors, who are now entrusted with the same duties and responsibilities as the Collector's European assistants. The Collector's principal subordinates, European and native, were like himself generally entrusted with magisterial and police functions also, their powers varying according to the revenue position they held.

At the base of all came, as ever in India, the village, with its own staff of petty officials and a large degree of autonomy which has perforce been subsequently curtailed by the advance of British administration. For the greater part of this period Collectors were directly responsible to the Presidency Governments, and in Madras and Bengal to the Boards of Revenue which these had established at headquarters; but in 1829 the important

step was taken, in the Bengal Presidency, of establishing an intermediate authority—viz., Commissioners of Divisions, each of which contained several districts. The Commissioner supervised the work of his Collectors in revenue and police matters, and also for a time exercised judicial functions, but these last have long passed, save to some extent in Upper Burma, to District and Sessions Judges. The Commissioner system has been applied to all the large provinces that have grown out of the old Bengal Presidency, and in Bombay. It has never, however, obtained in Madras, where the Collector continues to be in direct subordination to the Board of Revenue in revenue matters, and to the local Government otherwise.

The Supreme Courts of the Presidencies were of a double character. The Supreme Courts proper established in Calcutta by the Regulating Act of 1773 and in Madras and Bombay subsequently consisted of British barristers; but their jurisdiction was practically restricted territorially to the Presidency towns, and personally to European British subjects outside these.

#### The Courts.

Alongside of these Supreme Courts were Company's Chief Courts for civil and criminal matters, which served as courts of appeal in respect of the Company's interior or *mufassal* Courts. There was further a right of appeal to the King in Council (now the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) in important cases from all the Supreme Courts. The system of appointing natives of India to be subordinate civil Judges had already been applied.

Except in Bombay, where a code of regulations forming a body of substantial criminal law had been drawn up by Mountstuart Elphinstone, no attempt had, however, been made to codify the criminal or civil law administered by the Company's Courts, which was generally based on the Mahomedan law in criminal matters, though with a dropping of the harsh punishments, such as mutilation

and stoning, which that law permits, and on the personal law of the parties in respect of civil disputes. Occasionally, however, native custom, which was absolutely repugnant to Western ideas, was specifically overridden, as by Lord William Bentinck's legislation against the burning of widows in 1829. Such legislation as was required—and it was mainly confined to revenue and administrative matters—was carried out in the form of regulations by the Presidency Governments as such (the Indian statutes became known as Acts after 1833).

The Public Works Department, as we  
Public Works now conceive of it, was non-existent.

Department. The roads were few and poorly maintained, while as regards irrigation little had been done beyond taking advantage of such works as had been constructed by previous native rulers. Mail runners were kept for Government purposes along main lines of communication, but the  
\* use of this post by private individuals was conceded only as a privilege. As regards State responsibility for famine relief and prevention, little advance had been made over native methods, which may be described as a policy of *laissez faire*, tempered only by occasional and generally unsuccessful attempts to start spasmodic relief works or to send food to famine areas. It may be noted, however, that the policy of granting what is known as *takavi* advances—that is, small loans to cultivators where circumstances seemed to require it—was recognized so early as 1793.

The Company had a medical service, whose officers, though maintained chiefly for military purposes, were also available at the larger Civil stations. Hospitals had long been in existence in the Presidency towns, but their number in the *mufassil* was still small.

The educational efforts of the Government were still in the main confined to the establishment of a few colleges for Oriental learning, but missionary bodies in Calcutta

and in the South of India had already done much in the direction of starting schools and colleges, and in Bombay, Mountstuart Elphinstone had initiated a sound vernacular system of education.

The principal fiscal resources of the Government—apart from the trading operations of the Company which disappeared after the close of this period—consisted of (1) the land revenue ; (2) receipts from opium, Customs including a vexatious system of internal pass duties since abolished, and salt ; (3) Abkari or Excise revenue ; and (4) stamp duties and fees on judicial proceedings.

The land revenue was, as usual in Oriental countries, the mainstay of the Land Revenue Government. During the first years of the British rule it had been exacted without any definite principle, except that of obtaining as much as it was thought the land could yield to the State by means of frequent and arbitrary reassessments and by farming the collection of these to the highest bidder, a method which had become generally prevalent under native rule with the decay of the Mogul Empire and the political anarchy that set in subsequently. But in 1793 Lord Cornwallis placed Bengal under a permanent settlement, which not only gave the great landlords with whom he dealt fixity of assessment, but precluded the Government from raising this for ever. The alternative system since adopted outside the permanent settlement area, of giving the landholder an assessment which should yield him a material portion of the profits of cultivation, and which should be fixed for a considerable period of years, but be liable to revision thereafter with reference to the circumstances then existing, was now in process of development. At the close of this period the ryotwari system of Madras had already been framed by Sir Thomas Munro, and in the Upper Provinces of Bengal (now the Province of Agra) steps were being taken towards the well-organized land revenue system which that Province

owed subsequently to the labours of Bird and Thomason, and which resulted in the settlements of Upper India being made with large landowners or joint proprietors of villages, and not with peasant occupiers as in Madras, or in permanency as in Bengal. In Bombay matters were not yet definitely settled, but the ryotwari system of that Province may be said to have commenced from 1836.

The currency arrangements were as yet anything but uniform. and the rupees issued from the Company's mints were still of different standards and weights. In short, outside defence, law and order, and taxation, the Governemnt was still mainly of an exceedingly *laissez faire* character ; very little had been done towards economic improvements and for the education and health of the people.

## II.—FROM 1832 TO 1857.

This period was one of large territorial expansion and internal development. At its commencement the Company's territories consisted mainly of large coast tracts with an extension inland up the Gangetic Valley ; its close marks the attainment, by the annexation of the Punjab, Nagpur, Oudh, Lower Burma, and some minor tracts, of the British India of to-day, less only Upper Burma and Baluchistan. The control of the Home Government over affairs in India, exercised through the Board of Control and the Court of Directors, had become fuller and closer. The Charter Act of 1833 had developed the Governor-General in Council of the Bengal Presidency into a Government of India, with much fuller powers over the subordinate Governments, the Madras and Bombay Presidencies losing the right of legislation and all financial independence. Following on this Act came the creation of a Lieutenant-Governor without a Council for the North-Western Provinces of the Bengal Presidency, now the Province of Agra. Lower

Bengal was similarly placed under a Lieutenant-Governor in 1854, while the Punjab and Oudh were after annexation constituted into Provinces under Chief Commissioners. The Government of India had thus become a central authority dissociated from the administration of any large Province. The Charter Act of 1853 commenced the present discrimination between the Executive and the Legislative Councils of the Governor-General by adding to the former for legislative purposes an outside element, which, however, was still purely official, and the proceedings of the Legislative Council were from this time published and officially recorded. The same Act, it may be noted, threw open what is now known as the Indian Civil Service to competitive examination in England, thus replacing the old system of nomination by the Board of Directors. This period was one of constantly increasing administrative efficiency, combined with growing centralization. A uniform coinage had been introduced, and English had become the official language. Internal and economic development, chiefly associated with the Governor-Generalships of Lord Dalhousie (1848-1856), had led to the creation of new or improved departments for the management of post-offices, telegraphs, civil accounts, railways, other public works, education, and gaols. The first three of these were under the direct management of the Government of India, the last three mainly under the Provincial Governments, while the control of such railways as existed was divided between the Central and the Local Administrations.

In the older provinces tranquillity and improved communications were enabling a better developed administration. Districts were being gradually reduced to more manageable size, and the proceedings of the Collectors and Commissioners were necessarily becoming subject to greater check by the Provincial Governments, and those of the latter to larger control by the Govern-



ment of India. The revenue and judicial systems were being improved, and native agency was being employed in increasing proportion. As regards land revenue, the methods of revenue settlement had been greatly improved, and were gradually becoming systematized, while towards the close of this period it was already becoming an axiom that the Government should not, as a rule, take more than half the net assets upon a fresh settlement.

The gradual increase in the number of hospitals and dispensaries involved the larger employment of native agency and the establishment of medical colleges and schools for its training. Lastly, old-standing municipal arrangements in the Presidency towns had been widened, and the first practical commencement of *mufassal* municipal administration had been made by an Act of 1850, chiefly utilized in the North-Western Provinces, which enabled the establishment of nominated Town Committees, who were permitted to levy local rates.

### III.—FROM 1858 TO 1876.

This period, though short in duration, is marked by large administrative change, due partly to the necessity for rebuilding and strengthening foundations which had been shaken by the Mutiny, and partly to the assumption of direct government by the Crown which emphasized the responsibility of the Government of India for improved administration, while it enlarged the ultimate control of the Home Government and of Parliament. The first years of the period witnessed a series of important Acts of Parliament affecting Indian administration. This legislation, the most important portions of which are the Government of India Act of 1858, and the Indian Councils, Indian Civil Service, and Indian High Courts Acts of 1861, regulated the Government of India under the Crown and provided for its appointment of the Governor-General (henceforth commonly styled the Viceroy), the Governors of Madras and Bombay, and the

members of their small Executive Councils. The portfolio system was introduced into these Councils, so that a member in charge of a particular Department can deal with minor matters relating thereto on behalf of the collective Government. Home control was provided by the Secretary of State for India, assisted by a Council, to whom all important questions have to be referred from India. The Indian Legislature was placed on a new footing by adding to the Governor-General's Council for purposes of administration a considerable number of additional members of whom not less than one-half were to be non-officials, thus providing for the participation of native Indians. Similar Legislative Councils, consisting also of high officials and nominated non-officials, were created for the provinces of Madras, Bombay, and Bengal, and became competent, subject to the control of the Government of India and the Secretary of State, to pass legislation of a local character. The old Supreme Crown and Company's Courts of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay were amalgamated into High Courts, and a similar Court was established at Allahabad, while Chief Courts which are practically High Courts though on a somewhat lower footing, were later on established for the Punjab and for Lower Burma.

This period further witnessed the creation of three new important provinces, the Central Provinces, Assam, and Lower Burma, each of which was placed under a Chief Commissioner, and the elevation of the Punjab into a Lieutenant-Governorship, while a larger measure of control was established over the Native States. Criminal and civil law and procedure, and the Courts to which their working was entrusted, were placed on a satisfactory and generally uniform footing, while there was a large amount of salutary codification as regards other branches of law, and in fiscal subjects such as those relating to stamps and Customs. The Presidency armies

Further  
Changes.

were reorganized and placed under the closer control of the Government of India, while the abolition of the Company's separate European forces brought British and Indian military arrangements into intimate connexion. The police and gaol services were organized on the lines on which they are still worked, and a Forest Department was created. The adoption of the policy of constructing railways and productive irrigation works from borrowed money led to a vigorous prosecution of these, and the control of railways necessarily became more centralized. The machinery for executing public works was gradually improved by a special recruitment of civil engineers from England and by the development of engineering colleges in India. The Government of India took over the control of the paper currency and rendered the accounts and audit organization effective. Lord Mayo gave the Local Governments a salutary control over various services in which they were specially interested and assignments to meet the expenditure thereon; and concomitantly with this came the first important development of local self-government, giving opportunities for local interest in, and larger expenditure on, sanitation, education, and roads, by developing the municipal system, and providing for local rates, and the establishment of committees to apply these in rural areas.

#### IV.—FROM 1877 TO 1911.

This period, which commences with the Proclamation of Queen Victoria as Empress of India, has been marked by great administrative improvement and the expansion of the economic activities of Government, by the creation of fresh provinces, by the development of the financial resources and responsibilities of the Local Governments, by a large increase of local self-government in municipalities and rural areas, by the greater association of natives of India in the administration, by Army reforms, and by a large extension of the character and powers

of the Legislative Councils. Its varied activities are mainly associated with the Viceroyalties of Lord Ripon and Lord Curzon (1884-1889-1905), and with Lord Morley's tenure of office as Secretary of State for India. The following is a necessarily bald summary of the progress made in this period.

(1) New Provincial Arrangements—viz., the creation of two minor provinces, the North-West Frontier Province (detached from the Punjab) and Baluchistan; the unification of Oudh and the old North-Western Provinces as the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh; the detachment from Bengal of its Eastern districts and their conjunction with Assam as the Lieutenant-Governorship of Assam and Eastern Bengal; the annexation of Upper Burma and the conversion of the Province as thus enlarged into a Lieutenant-Governorship; the permanent leasing from the Nizam of Berar, held on a temporary tenure since 1853, and its conjunction with the Central Provinces.

(2) The formation of Legislative Councils in the United Provinces, the Punjab, Burma, and Eastern Bengal and Assam (the Central Province is now the only large Province without such a Council), and the development of the Central and local Legislative Councils carried out by the Indian Councils Acts of 1892 and 1909. The Councils now include a large elective element chosen directly or indirectly (the elective element in the Central Legislature is largely supplied by election by the non-official members of the Provincial Councils) by municipalities, district boards, and special constituencies such as bodies of landholders, chambers of commerce, and Universities, while a special measure of representation has been given to the Mahomedan minority. Including nominated members, the non-official element now predominates in all the Legislative Councils, but that of the Governor-General, and the councils have the right not merely of

dealing with legislation, but of discussing the Imperial and Provincial budgets, and of submitting resolutions on matters of public policy, while individual members can address interpellations to the Government. The resolutions of a Legislative Council are, however, not binding unless accepted by the Central or Provincial Government as the case may be.

(3) The disappearance of the separate Presidency armies of Madras and Bombay, and the present organization of the unified Army of India, which owes so much to Lord Kitchener, into divisions and brigades.

(4) Successive reorganization of the Governor-General's Executive Council which have given the administration of Army affairs, formerly in charge of a separate military member, to the Commander-in-Chief in addition to his previous functions as executive head of the Forces, and have provided members to deal specially with (a) Commerce and Industry, and (b) Education and Local Self-government. The other portfolios entrusted to specific members of council are now those of the Finance, Home, Revenue, and Agricultural (including the Civil Public Works), and Legislative Departments. Two Indian gentlemen have successively been admitted to the Viceroy's Legislative Council as legal members, and the Councils of Madras and Bombay have each been reinforced by an Indian member. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal has been provided with a similar Executive Council of three members (two civilians and one Indian), and power has been taken to provide like councils when required in other Lieutenant-Governorships. Lastly, the Secretary of State's Council in London now includes a Hindu and a Mahomedan member.

(5) Increasing development in the construction of railways and productive irrigation works, and the complete control of railways by the Central Government; but, on the other hand, the devolution to a Railway

Board, working under the Member for Commerce and Industry, of many administrative matters which formerly had to be considered by the Government.

(6) Successive stages of financial devolution which have provided the principal Local Governments with large permanent and growing sources of revenue, and have also given them wider discretion in the application of those resources.

(7) A policy which has extended the powers, functions, and resources of municipalities and rural local boards, and has given a large, and in many cases a predominant, elective element to these bodies. The distinct boards, corresponding roughly to our county councils, still work, however, for the most part under the presidency of the collectors.

(8) The closure of the mints to free coinage of silver, and the consequent throwing of the responsibility for fresh coinage upon the Government of India.

(9) A considerable extension of native agency in the higher administrative and judicial appointments, a policy the further development of which is now under consideration.

(10) The carrying out of important reforms in regard to famine administration, provision for railways and irrigation works, which (though not financially remunerative) are valuable as protectives against famine, education, medical and sanitary work, and police and Excise administration.

(11) The appointment of Imperial Inspectors-General, expert officers of the Government of India, who tour through the Provinces and advise the Central and Local Governments on subjects on which they have special knowledge, for important branches of the Civil admini-

stration which are controlled locally by the various Provincial Governments.

The general functions of Government in India are, as has been aptly observed by the Decentralization Commission of 1907-9, in many respects much wider than in the United Kingdom. "The Government claims a share in the produce of the land; and save where (as in Bengal) it has commuted this into a fixed land tax, it exercises the right of periodical reassessment of the cash value of its share. In connexion with its revenue assessments, it has instituted a detailed cadastral survey and a record of rights in the land. Where its assessments are made upon large landholders, it intervenes to prevent their levying excessive rents from their tenants; and in the Central Provinces it even takes an active share in the original assessment of landlords' rents. In the Punjab and some other tracts, it has restricted the alienation of land by agriculturists to non-agriculturists. It undertakes the management of landed estates when the proprietor is disqualified from attending to them by age, sex, or infirmity, or, occasionally, by pecuniary embarrassment. In times of famine it undertakes relief works and other remedial measures upon an extensive scale. It manages a vast forest property, and is a large manufacturer of salt and opium. It owns the bulk of the railways of the country, and directly manages a considerable portion of them; and it has constructed, and maintains, most of the important irrigation works. It owns and manages the postal and telegraph systems. It has the monopoly of note issue, and it alone can set the mints in motion. It acts, for the most part, as its own banker, and it occasionally makes temporary loans to Presidency Banks in times of financial stringency. With the co-operation of the Secretary of State it regulates the discharge of the balance of trade as between India and the outside world through the action of the

Indian Council's drawings. It lends money to municipalities, rural boards, and agriculturists, and occasionally to the owners of historic estates. . . . In India, moreover, the direct responsibility of Government in respect of police, education, medical and sanitary operations, and ordinary public works is of a much wider scope than in the United Kingdom. The Government has, further, very intimate relations with the numerous Native States, which collectively cover more than one-third of the whole area of India, and comprise more than one-fifth of its population."

In the discharge of their functions, the Indian Government are largely subject to the control of his Majesty's Government as exercised through the Secretary of State for India. Practically no fresh legislation can be undertaken without the Secretary of State's assent, which is also required to any new important departure in policy, whether financial or administrative, and specifically in regard to a number of matters principally connected with expenditure. The authorities exercising the functions of government in India may be divided into three grades:—(1) The Government of India; (2) the Local Governments; (3) statutory bodies, such as district boards, municipalities, and Port Trust, which have been created for the more efficient discharge of local duties. The Government of India retain in their own hands matters relating to foreign affairs, including relations with the principal Native States, defence, general taxation, currency, debt, tariffs, posts and telegraphs, railways, and accounts and audit, while other matters of ordinary internal administration fall mainly to the Provincial Governments. There are now eight principal or major Provinces, Madras, Bombay, Bengal, Eastern Bengal and Assam, the United Provinces, the Punjab, Burma, and the Central Provinces; and five minor administrations of a less important and more

The Division  
of  
Control.



dependent character, the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Ajmer, Coorg, and the Andaman Islands. Coorg and Ajmer are, however, little more than districts, which are respectively administered by the Resident of Mysore and the Agent to the Governor-General for the Native States of Rajputana; and the Andamans are primarily a penal settlement. None of the Provinces are, however, independent entities. Their Governments are subordinate agents of the Government of India, and it may be said generally that no Local Government can take any important step without reference to Calcutta or Simla, while the Central Government also lays down the lines of general policy for the country as a whole.

The local bodies above referred to are entrusted with functions relating mainly to the development, within their jurisdiction, of ports, education, medical relief, sanitation, vaccination, roads and streets, the control of markets, and suchlike matters, and are provided for these purposes with separate local sources of revenue. The control exercised over them by Local Governments is roughly analogous to that which the Government of India imposes upon these latter.

## CHAPTER X.

### EDUCATION IN INDIA.

When considering the advance made under the British Government in India in the various branches of the administration, it is too often the practice to take it for granted that our responsibilities date back to the latter end of the 18th century, and that, therefore, the destinies of five or six generations of Indians have been under our control. In no department of public life is such an assumption more unfair than in the case of education. In the first place British India, as we now know it, hardly came into existence as an organic whole until the time of Lord Dalhousie, and, secondly, it was only a few years before the expiration of the Company's Charter, and the direct assumption of the government of India by the Crown, that our responsibilities in the matter of education were susceptible of realization. It would, indeed, be fairer to say, rather, that it was only in the year 1839 that the British in India deliberately decided to go beyond the limits of their obvious responsibilities by undertaking a task which has no parallel in history. M. Chailley, in his admirable "Administrative Problems of British India," says, indeed, that "All colonizing nations are sooner or later faced with the problem of the education of the natives. It is a grave, a difficult, one may say a distressing, problem which cannot be evaded, and which involves a conflict between interest and conscience." And he goes on to claim

that "it is to the credit of the civilized peoples that in this conflict between interest and duty none of them has long remained deaf to the voice of honour."

**A Complex  
Problem.**

In the case of India, however, it may be doubted whether M. Chailley was in a position to realize to the full the difficulties of the problem. There was hardly the antithesis of civilized *versus* uncivilized peoples, which existed in the majority of the other countries he no doubt had in mind. The complexity of the problem as it confronted the East India Company, and, later, the Government of India, was enormously increased by the existence in India not only of a very old civilization, resting upon some of the highest philosophic teaching with which the world is as yet acquainted, but also of institutions of very long standing devoted to oriental learning. It is true that nothing in the nature of general education had ever been organized, or indeed thought desirable, by the governments in India which preceded ours; nay, education was, under the Hindu system, regarded as the close preserve of some of the higher castes, by no means to be invaded by those of the baser sort. But this fact, of course, added to the difficulties of initiating any scheme based on Western, and more democratic, ideas, while it also gave pause to those desirous of establishing an educational system on a broader basis, inasmuch as it appeared that any such innovation would tend to an infringement of the customs and traditions of the people.

**The  
Beginnings.**

In such circumstances it is not strange to find that the earliest attempts in India to establish schools for general education were made by missionaries, a fact which in itself not improbably retarded action by the Company, one of whose principles, emphasized on the assumption of the government of India by the Crown in 1858, was the observance of a strict neutrality in regard to the

religions of India. Apart from missionary institutions, such colleges as were established in the 18th century were for the promotion of Oriental learning; and the Charter Act of 1813, which required the expenditure of a lakh of rupees annually on education, may be said to be the first overt recognition by the rulers of the Company's territories of their responsibilities in this matter. With a growing demand for Indian clerical subordinates, literary attainments obtained a commercial value, while a knowledge of English ensured employment by the rulers of the country. The interests of the Company, it now began to be realized, also demanded the systematizing of education; and in 1823 a Committee of Public Instruction was established for Bengal to organize matters on a proper footing. Similar arrangements followed for Madras, and, later, for Bombay, but before the organization of this educational machine had reached this stage a most important decision was reached by the Government of Lord Auckland in 1839.

Until 1835 the Company's government had halted between two opinions, and their hesitation and the delay in the expansion of education which it involved are an illustration of the wide difference between India and other conquered and colonized countries in relation to this problem. Had India been, in M. Chailley's phrase, uncivilized, there could have been no difficulty in deciding upon the nature of the general educational system. We should have had a *tabula rasa* upon which to work, and the introduction of a Western system need have occasioned no hesitation. For the reasons given, however, there was a strong body of opinion in favour of establishing in India a system of education based upon the methods we found in operation there, since it was held that these were more in conformity with the genius of the Hindu and would be

The  
Influence of  
Macaulay.

less subversive of the social customs and traditions of the people. It was the strong personality of Lord Macaulay, at that time a member of the Governor-General's Council, which carried the day against the Orientalists and in favour of conferring upon India an education based upon English ideas. It is not necessary, indeed with our present knowledge it would be impossible, to agree with him in his low estimate of the value of Oriental learning and the ancient Hindu literature ; but there can be little doubt to-day that, in all essentials, the decision to which he led the Government of his day was the wise one. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that, had the contrary opinion prevailed at the time, the system it advocated could have survived to-day as that of the British Government in India. But it is undoubtedly the case that the divorce of Oriental learning from the Government's programme, coupled with the obligation to preserve the strictest neutrality in religious matters, has given rise to difficulties for which no parallel can be found in the case of any other country in the world.

**The Present  
System.**

Education on Western lines came, then, gradually to be organized in all provinces, and received special furtherance at the hands of Mountstuart Elphinstone in Bombay and Mr. Thomason in what are now known as the United Provinces ; but, while the State expenditure, despite the encouragement given to the subject by Lord Dalhousie's Government, continued small, no great advance could be achieved. The basis of the present system, by which the cost of primary education is met by a rate levied on the land revenue, was devised first in 1851 by the Collector of Muttra, who succeeded in raising a voluntary rate of about 1 per cent. on the land revenue. The system was speedily adopted elsewhere. It is thus clear that the problem had been seriously grappled with, and that the local authorities had already gone considerable lengths in

the direction of organizing public instruction upon a systematic basis, when, in 1854, Sir Charles Wood addressed to the Government of India the celebrated despatch which outlined and directed the adoption of the measures for improving the educational system which continue, in substance, in force to the present time.

The chief specific directions conveyed in this despatch, with a view to securing a much wider extension of English and vernacular education, included the establishment in each province of a separate department for the purpose; the institution of Universities at the three Presidency towns; the establishment of training schools for teachers; the maintenance and further extension of colleges and high schools; and increased attention to elementary education in the vernacular schools. Finally, Sir Charles Wood urged upon the Indian authorities the introduction of a system of grants in aid, anticipating (as results have proved with too great confidence) that this would ultimately lead to the discontinuance of the need for a general system of education entirely provided by the State.

Sir  
Charles Wood's  
Despatch. //

In the light of what has been said as to the earlier customs of the Hindus in respect of their social system and of education it will not be a surprise that the Indian community failed to respond to Sir C. Wood's expectations in the matter of primary education. Efforts at securing local support to the project tended to make the whole educational scheme unpopular, and it became clear that a policy which aimed at imparting primary instruction broadcast was not likely to secure the unqualified support of the higher castes. The suggestion was accordingly made, in conformity with the general plan which had been in operation for some time, that it would be more expedient to impose a special rate on land to

defray the cost of elementary education, and this is the system now in force.

The arrangements inaugurated in Commission of pursuance of the scheme outlined in 1882. the despatch of 1854, which had been approved and supplemented by the Secretary of State for India in 1859 after the assumption of the Government by the Crown, resulted in a very large expansion of education ; and the trend of results has come under observation and special inquiry in 1882 and again in 1901-4, during Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty. It was evident, on the earlier occasion, that elementary education was not receiving that share of State or local support to which it was entitled ; and it was found necessary to lay down rules of a stringent character requiring local boards and municipalities to devote a fixed proportion of their educational expenditure to primary schools. The Commission of 1882 further urged the gradual transfer to local management, whenever possible without loss of efficiency, of secondary schools as well as primary.

Before noticing the more recent reforms, it is necessary here to trace the **Attitude of Higher Castes.** briefly some of the idiosyncrasies of the Hindu character as reflected upon the results of the educational system. It will be realized readily that the community into which we introduced the system culminating in the directions given in 1854 was one differing both in its social customs, its past traditions, and its domestic organization from any other in Asia, and as far asunder from Western communities as it is possible to conceive. On the one hand, in the hereditary priestly and clerical castes of the highest degree of intelligence, in some cases highly educated, there existed, at the summit of the social organism, material which was ready to adapt itself to our requirements with almost marvellous promptitude. Accus-

tomed, by hereditary right, to direct the domestic affairs of the lower castes, and also, in the majority of States, to exercise a preponderating influence in public affairs, this class suddenly found that their road to influence and affluence lay in adapting themselves to an Occidental system of tuition. Full and prompt advantage was taken of the opening afforded. On the other hand, the submerged millions made a lamentably slow response to our invitation. The social fabric had never contemplated the education of the masses, nor had these ever experienced the need of it. The agriculturist and artisan classes had been accustomed to rely for such literary and mathematical skill as was occasionally needed in the pursuit of their callings upon a special class of the community whose function had thus been prescribed for countless generations. In a country where labour was not only meticulously subdivided, but where the subdivision formed exclusive social groups circumscribed and hedged about by marriage and other restrictive ordinances, it naturally took a long time for the new ideas to filter downwards. And meanwhile the aristocratic castes were profiting.

Two results ensued. In the first place, by the promptitude with which Brahmans and the Brahman and writer classes fell Writers. in with the new order of things (1) they succeeded, to a large extent, in perpetuating to themselves a practical monopoly of the proffered educational advantages; and, in the second place, the practice grew up of looking upon these as the means to an assured end—viz., employment by Government. In other words, the scheme of a Western education, designed to raise the masses of India from the depths of the ignorance in which they had remained content for ages, came to be an instrument in the perpetuation of the traditional social system of the Hindus. The highest castes took advantage of it to regain, with the



English rulers of India, the political as well as the religious prestige which had been threatened by the democratic notions of the newcomers.

This was not, of course, a policy consciously pursued. It is merely an interesting instance of the persistence of an inbred characteristic. Unconsciously the special feature of the social system of the past two thousand years overrode the superficial tendencies of an imported scheme ; and this fact explains the failure of the people to respond to the grant-in-aid system. It explains, too, why elementary education was, at all events until recently, sacrificed to secondary and higher education, and why rules and regulations have been necessary compelling the local bodies who administer education to devote a fixed proportion of their resources to primary schools. The local bodies being preponderatingly representative of the priestly, mercantile, and writer castes, their interests are chiefly the provision of facilities for the higher tuition of their own children. Again this is not of set and conscious purpose so much as of the nature of innate proclivity, almost instinct. It is not necessary to reprobate the automatic tendencies of a social system and a civilization more than twice as old as our own ; but it is desirable to appreciate the fact, since it affords an explanation of the failures to achieve desired results which successive investigations have brought to notice. The degree of our failure should not, however, be exaggerated. When the conditions are properly viewed it is perhaps legitimate to wonder at the measure of success which has attended the efforts of the British Government in India in a matter of such complexity. The figures showing the number of schools and scholars are, in this view, full of encouragement ; and before proceeding to consider the latest developments of educational policy in India it may be well to

glance at these, together with the sums of money now being expended on public instruction.

In 1871 there were 19,646 primary and secondary schools in India, giving instruction to some 700,000 scholars. In 1881-2 these numbers had risen approximately to 90,000 institutions with 2,200,000 scholars, while in 1901-2 the figures approached 104,000 and 3,900,000 respectively, including 400,000 girl scholars. In 1882 there were only 67 colleges giving tuition to 6,000 students, while in 1901 there were 191 colleges (including special colleges) attended by about 23,000 students. The cost of public institutions is met from provincial revenues, local funds, municipal funds, fees, and other sources, such as donations, &c., and in 1908-9, the last year for which complete figures are accessible, the total number of scholars appears to have reached nearly six millions, the cost of educating them amounting approximately to £4,500,000. Having regard to the tendencies adverse to the spread of general education already noted, these statistics cannot fairly be regarded as giving cause for despondency.

A discussion of the present stage of educational policy in India can best proceed side by side with a consideration of the measures for reforming the system which were initiated by Lord Curzon between the years 1901 and 1904. After he had been three years in India, and had thus obtained ample knowledge of the practical working of the educational methods pursued, Lord Curzon was persuaded that the time had arrived to make a searching investigation into their defects, and to this end convened a strong and representative Conference, over which he himself occasionally presided, whose deliberations covered practically every branch of the system. The first result to take shape was the appointment of

Some  
Statistics.

Lord Curzon's  
Inquiries.

a Director-General of Education, whose function was to be advisory, not only in relation to the Central Government, but also to the provincial administrations. Without executive powers, he was to be a referee in educational problems, and the hope was that the varying systems in different provinces would, by means of his appointment, become more co-ordinate in their policy.

The second, and perhaps the most important, result was the appointment of the Universities Commission in 1902. It had long been felt not only that the Indian Universities, up till then purely examining bodies, had failed to influence general education in the right manner, but also that their constitution required amendment before improvement could be expected. The standard of qualification for the Senate of the Indian Universities was low, and the unlimited tenure of fellowships tended to swell the body of fellows without securing vigour to the administration. Again, the regulations governing the affiliation of colleges to the University were found to be faulty and to need revision. These and other matters formed the subject of specific recommendations for change by the Universities Commission, of whom five members were distinguished Indian educationists, and they were eventually embodied, in 1904, in a new Universities Act. The subjects of technical and European education in India were dealt with at considerable length by the Conference of 1901, as were also questions relating to the improvement of normal schools and training colleges, the extension of primary and female education, the inculcation of moral training, &c. ; but the most important for present purposes, of the remaining subjects, were the discussions of the Conference on the subject of the

abolition of competitive tests for Government employment.

The deliberations of Lord Curzon's Conference, in fact, brought to light and placed on record the inefficiency of the administration of the Indian Universities, the incompleteness of their control and influence over affiliated colleges, and the need for according greater encouragement to pupils to take up an industrial and technical course of training. The Conference condemned the system which encouraged the idea that all educational tests were to be regarded as qualifications, more or less analogous to bills payable on demand, for Government service. It will be seen that in all these deficiencies we have really symptoms of that extraordinary conservatism of India which is the obstacle to change or reform in whatever department of life. Permeated with the ineradicable idea that education should be the perquisite of those classes of the community to whom it is an hereditary appanage, and as a corollary that those classes should *prima facie* find themselves the recipients of State patronage, the notion that educational qualifications are the gateway to influence and Government office is at the root of the Hindu conception. Control and discrimination in administrative matters have never been a distinguishing feature of the Indian character, and hence, when the University Senates had grown to unwieldy size, and included a majority of Indians, reform and advance became impossible. The idea of raising the standard of University or other qualifications was attacked as being an endeavour to stifle the aspirations of the students and to deprive them of their prospective livelihood. On the other hand, the practical interest taken in primary education by Indians was comparatively small; and Lord Curzon's Government was compelled then, and later (in 1904), to give

strong emphasis to the need for furthering this by all possible means.

Educational matters illustrate anew what is so plain to those familiar with other departments of Indian administration—namely, that reform must come from without, and must, in the first instance, be unpopular. To reform, to strengthen, to add to the sphere of usefulness of the Universities; to improve the quality of the affiliated colleges by demanding a higher standard of control and tuition; to raise the standard of University tests, and to widen the plane of education generally—all these aims involved the infringement of past practice and a disturbance of the *status quo*; and it required energy and courage of no mean order to initiate and carry through the stages of investigation and legislation necessary as a foundation to change.

It is, unfortunately, open to question whether, in India as a whole, the policy of reform, of which the foundations were thus laid, has lately been prosecuted with the same vigour and determination. It may, indeed, be doubted whether the reforms in regard to the Universities were themselves sufficiently drastic. Endeavours made recently in Bombay to induce the University to modify its tests and to expand its curriculum have hitherto failed to produce results, and the Bombay Government have been compelled to rule out the lowest University test as a qualification for Government employment. Such conflicts seem to indicate that the ambition for complete self-government in matters of higher education has come into being prematurely, and while this ideal has doubtless developed as the outcome of past policy, dating from the establishment of the three Presidency towns' Universities in 1857, and from the hopes expressed in the despatch of 1854, it is clearly desirable, if progress is to be made on the right lines, that reforms, even if they should bear an

outward semblance of being retrograde, should be enforced where necessary.

And it would be idle to contend that all is well in matters educational in India. As early as 1904, before overt symptoms of unrest had made themselves apparent, the Government of Lord Curzon, in reviewing educational progress, had to take cognizance of certain tendencies, "unfavourable to discipline," which criticism had attributed to the extension to India, without modification, of a system of education modelled upon that of the West; and the Government orders proceeded—correctly enough, so far as they went—to rule that the remedy for such tendencies must be sought not so much in any formal methods of teaching conduct by means of moral text-books or primers of personal ethics as in the influence of carefully selected and trained teachers. The provision of proper persons as teachers is, of course, one of the most important—but in India, under present conditions, one of the most difficult—requisites as a condition precedent to the attainment of satisfactory results, and until the general condition of the subordinate educational staff is raised much above its present level it will be unreasonable to hope for material improvement.

It is most important that this, perhaps

the most urgent need of all, should be borne steadily in view, especially at a time when the facile cry of free and

**Reforms  
Required.**

compulsory primary education is being raised. The unreality of such a cry can best be appreciated when two facts are realized. First, four villages out of five (taking India as a whole) are without a school building or school staff, and it would therefore be impossible to make compulsory primary education a reality. In the second place, every province has a free list, and the free list is never full. It is the fact that not a single boy whose parents wish to have him educated is debarred from gratifying their desire by the existence of the very small

fee which is levied. But even if the demand for abolition of all fees were a reality, there can be no question whatever, where the financial resources of Government are limited, between the relative importance of the unlimited provision of inadequately staffed primary schools and of placing existing schools upon a satisfactory footing. When assistant masters in village schools receive, as they did till quite recently in some provinces, pittance of Rs.3 or Rs.4 per month, it is idle to talk of an unlimited expansion of primary education. Even now the lowest paid assistants receive not more than Rs.8, except in Bombay, where the *minimum* salary has just been raised to Rs.9. Lord Curzon's Government were right in laying emphasis upon the value of the "influence of carefully selected and trained teachers"; and when we have secured them in existing institutions it will be time enough to contemplate the gradual expansion of facilities up to the ideal point where every village shall have its school.

But it is not only in the primary schools—nor even in the secondary schools—that the qualifications of the staff of the educational department are deficient. When a competent observer like M. Chailley remarks that the teaching staff in Indian colleges is far too small he is criticizing the University which permits the affiliation of an institution which is inadequately equipped, and, through the University, the Government, from whom the authority is derived : and when he proceeds :—"Nor does the quality of the teachers compensate for their numerical feebleness. On the contrary, defective quality is the weakest point in the college teaching," he, in effect, condemns the inadequacy of the Government control throughout.

A great deal of discussion has recently taken place regarding the Religious and Moral Training. secularization of Indian education, and there seems to be a growing conviction, among Indians and English alike, that the

complete divorce of all religious and moral training from the curriculum has been an error which is in no small measure responsible for the recent unrest in India. So much has recently been written on this aspect of Indian education that it may be accepted as inevitable that the Government of India will endeavour to modify past policy in this respect in so far as modification is possible with a strict regard to the observance of religious neutrality ; but in no aspect of the education of youth is the provision of properly trained and qualified teachers more desirable than in that of ethics. The parrot-like assimilation of text-books in which the Indian student is such a past master can have no value in such a subject ; and it seems not impossible to hope that the institution, as part of the curriculum, of moral training may of itself result in raising the level of the teaching capacity of Indian schoolmasters.

Local autonomy in educational matters, as in many other departments of Indian administration, is a most desirable goal to have in view, and, with certain rigorous safeguards, the policy, advocated in 1854 and 1882 and since reiterated, of leaving the management of primary and secondary schools to the control of local boards and municipalities, is the one most likely to achieve permanent success. Absolute uniformity in educational matters in a continent like India, with its wide diversities of race and language, would be most undesirable, even if it were possible. But there must be the safeguard of inspectability. If in England there is such necessity for inspection by the Board of Education inspectors, how much more urgent is the need in India ! And it is precisely in this department of the Government's past educational policy that there is need for criticism. The Indian Educational Service—that is to say, that small fraction of the educational staff of India which is re-

The Need for  
Inspection.



cruited in India—should be recognized as being one of the most important branches of the public service, and should be selected with the utmost possible care. As a service it should be made to attract the best available men. The number of posts in each province filled by Europeans is at present far too small for the requirements of the case ; but if it be impossible, on financial grounds, to increase the numbers, it is of urgent importance to place the service upon a footing, both as regards methods of recruitment and of prospects, which shall attract men of the highest calibre.

Reference has been made to the need for closer inspection of public schools in India ; the value of such inspection must depend upon the numerical adequacy and efficiency of the European inspecting staff. Again, since we are proceeding upon a Western system of education, the professorial staff of the high schools and colleges should include not only a leavening of Europeans, but of Europeans carefully selected for their proficiency. The system of recruitment at present in force, coupled, perhaps, with the unattractive prospects offered by service in the department, fails to secure the best men available, and does not provide for a sufficient number.

A hopeful feature is the renewed attention which is again being accorded to the subject of education, and although the reforms which Lord Curzon initiated have perhaps not as yet been brought to complete fruition, and although the unrest in India may have diverted the attention of the authorities from the subject, it is to be hoped that it is realized what a close connexion exists between the two. If one cause, more than any other, can be said to account for the unrest it is the inherent defects in the stupendous scheme of giving a Western education to an Eastern people. It was inevitable that mistakes should be made ; and it has been characteristic of us to shut our eyes to possible

dangers. That the authorities in India are determined to grapple with the difficulties, and endeavour to find means of improvement, is evidenced by the recent creation of a Department of Education in separate charge of a member of the Viceroy's Council. That appointment, it is true, raises an apprehension that a most undesirable process of centralization may be pursued ; but, provided that this tendency is rigorously resisted, there is ground for hoping that a persistent and logical effort will be made to see that the reforms advocated are gradually brought into being.

The vitalizing and strengthening of the Universities, which should be the mainspring of the system, must be carried into effect. The methods upon which the Indian educational service is recruited in England and organized in India should be carefully investigated and revised ; and the strength of that service, both in the professorial and inspectorial branches, strengthened. The pay of the lower grades of the educational service should be revised throughout India so as to render it reasonable to expect that competent assistant masters will come forward to join the department ; and the tests qualifying for admission should be so arranged as to afford some guarantee of their moral and educational fitness for their work. The curriculum should include such moral or religious teaching as may be desired in each province or locality ; and the whole system throughout should be subjected to a more rigorous and real inspectorial control than is possible with the inadequate staff which is at present made to suffice.

Reforms such as these will cost a great deal of money, but they will achieve real results, and when the public instruction organized by the State upon Western lines has thus been revitalized, it will be time to consider the question of the further extension of the system by the adoption of free and compulsory elementary education.

It has been impossible to deal at length with the important development of industrial and technical education ; but the success of these depends in large measure upon the adoption of the progressive and enlightened attitude by the Universities which should follow upon what has been advocated. The germs of all these improvements are to be found in the resolutions of the Conferences of 1882 and 1901, and in the orders of the Government of Lord Curzon in 1904 ; and it is now for the Government of India to falsify the apprehensions of those who feared that the reforms then initiated would remain a dead-letter.

## CHAPTER XI.

### INDIA AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT.

The future of India is inseparably bound up with industrial development. Whether British rule endures in its present form, or is ultimately modified, the country will require a systematic development of its resources and the organization of a trained industrial population if it is to work out its own salvation. It has to create fresh wealth rather than to hoard what it already possesses, and it cannot hope to preserve its existence upon a solid basis by agriculture and the export of raw materials alone. People are constantly explaining the needs of India, but they do not always stop to think where the money is to come from to satisfy those needs. For instance, India requires better military and naval protection. A country with an enormous land frontier and a coastline of abnormal extent in proportion to its area will not for ever maintain its integrity with an army of 235,000 men and a few small ships. That expenditure on defence in India is destined to increase rather than to decrease must be pronounced inevitable.

Again, the system of education requires vast development if India is to gain her rightful place in the world, and for that purpose also much money will be required. The system of administration is bound to grow more complex if progress is to be attained. The dream of primitive simplicity in governance is utterly at variance with the needs of great modern States, and the craving for

national advancement will entail more officials instead of fewer. Wealth is needed to create wealth. Every successful Indian industry breeds other industries. The money made in the cotton mills of Bombay to-day is used to smelt iron and make steel in Bengal to-morrow. In this great issue the interests of Indians and English are identical, though for different reasons. The British are concerned, because the increasing prosperity of India, and the creation of capital which is wisely employed and not hidden, may reasonably be supposed to strengthen the stability of their rule. The Indians are concerned, because they derive the most direct benefit from the growth of prosperity. Even the most ardent Nationalist has a direct interest in the industrial development of India. He dreams of the day when his country will stand alone without external aid ; and though most of the Nationalists are unpractical dreamers with no conception of economics, they must surely see that to stand alone India requires power, and in her case power cannot be gained without wealth. Three hundred millions of people, whose country lies on the main highway of the world, can never hold their own by the methods which have served a handful of Montenegrens in a wilderness of mountains. Thus, whatever turn events may take, the industrial development of India becomes everybody's business.

The clue to the present condition of  
 Stage of India probably lies not so much in possible  
 Transition. antagonism to British domination, or  
 in the wave of reviving aspiration which  
 has swept through Asia, but rather in the fact that India, perhaps more than any other Asiatic country, is in the throes of a great transition. In no respect is the effect of the transition more marked than in questions affecting industrial development. For centuries the basis of the life of the country was the village, which, as Mr. Yusuf Ali has said,

was "a self-contained economic community." Invaders swept through the peninsula, princes warred with one another, Emperors marched their armies far and wide, but the village people followed their immemorial ways. There was a great deal of manufacture, but no organization of industry in the modern sense. Gold was worked, but most of the minerals of the country lay untouched. Foodstuffs were chiefly consumed where they were produced, and in the absence of railways little attempt was made to distribute food products throughout the country, while practically none were exported. Such enterprises as the vast jute industry were still undreamed of.

The impact of the West has changed the old conception which made the village the only real basis of the Indian communities. Certain industries are being organized in the Western manner. The mill chimney is no longer an unfamiliar feature of the Indian landscape. One may stand on the railway bridge at Byculla, Bombay, and gaze upon an array of busy mills which to Lancashire should be a portent full of warning. In the great cities of the United Provinces and the Punjab, and on the banks of the Hughli, the adoption of the factory system is creating many new industrial centres. The vast red-brick mill, with its whirling machinery, may not always be the best symbol of progress, but it is an index of wealth. No one who has studied the question wants to see the small individual worker who toils in his own home crushed by the competition of great enterprises backed by large capital. There are two million hand looms in India, and the Government wisely desire to shield and encourage those who work them. Room will always exist for the handloom workers and kindred artisans in the midst of so huge a population. But India needs more wealth, and wealth in the volume required can best be produced by the organization of industry.

Some experts argue that the factory system upon

The Factory  
System.

Western lines is perhaps not best suited for the Indian artisan. The climate is not favourable, the waste is often great, the business methods are frequently defective. The objection need not be discussed, because it is hardly pertinent to the main issue. It would be easy to show examples of great mills which prove that healthy conditions, successful management, and substantial profits are by no means difficult of attainment in India. Experience seems to suggest that large mills are best, but it may be that a network of smaller factories will be more in keeping with Indian conditions. The real point is that organization is imperative, and that the industrial regeneration of India, the creation of those larger material resources which will enable India to stand as an Empire upon a firmer basis, will never be effected by the encouragement of individual workers alone.

When the problem is approached more nearly, it is soon discovered that the transitional stage through which India is passing is the dominant factor. There are innumerable artisans in India, but the majority of them are still tied to the village, the economic unit to which they belong. So far there is no large permanent class dwelling in the towns and cities all their lives, accustomed by tradition to work, not in their own homes or shops, but in a mill or factory with thousands of others. They flock to the towns seeking work, they even obtain a certain degree of skill in a particular task, but in their own minds they remain birds of passage. The city is not their permanent home, and they do not desire to dwell there for ever. To all these broad generalizations there are necessarily large exceptions, but it may be stated roughly that the average worker in a mill or a mine does not wish to make himself a home near the scene of his transitory labours. Circumstances often compel him to spend his whole life there, but he does so with reluctance. The village, the home of his ancestors, calls him, and

he retreats there periodically, when he has saved a little money, as well as when he is ill or too old to work. Meanwhile he is content to live in the city under conditions which are rarely comfortable and often miserably squalid. Frequently he has no choice, for the housing of the working classes has received little systematic attention in India. A few employers of labour have wisely furnished good dwellings for their workpeople, but more often the mill is surrounded by an agglomeration of wretched hovels. The creation of a larger class of permanent town-dwelling artisans, regarding the factories as their natural source of employment, is therefore a condition essential to better industrial development.

But the obstacle presented by the comparative lack of urban operatives is only one of many. When that is overcome there is encountered the difficulty of caste restrictions. The intricacies of caste are manifold, but one of the consequences of the system is that it unquestionably operates among large classes of men in a way which prevents them from entering upon new callings. The alacrity with which young Americans will rapidly pass from one occupation to another has very little counterpart in India. A man wishes to follow the trade which his father followed and his caste enjoins; and he wishes to follow it in accordance with traditional usage. Were it not that many sections of the community are only lightly bound by caste, and that caste prohibitions are generally weakening, the organization of industrial labour would be far more seriously hindered than it is. Then, as has been pointed out by Sir Alexander McRobert, who has had great experience in Indian labour questions, the family system in India presents a complication not met with elsewhere. A man will recklessly throw himself out



of employment, because he knows that, in obedience to custom, his family will support him.

A further source of trouble is the common indifference of men for their work. Probably the laziness and inefficiency of Indian workmen has been exaggerated. The peasant is not normally lazy, but is usually a slow, patient, steady toiler. The men who work at trades in their own homes generally labour for long hours. In factories the same classes of men require constantly keeping up to their task, and will slacken instantly if vigilance is relaxed. Sir Alexander McRobert says that the factory hand is rarely proud of doing his work well, and that "his object first and foremost is to get to pay-day by the easiest possible route." There can be no doubt that the average Indian does not possess the faculty of continuous industry to the same extent as the average Chinese. The cause is perhaps partly climatic. For the true explanation of the slackness of factory hands we must also peer a little deeper. The factory system is foreign to Indian ideas and traditions, and the operatives have not yet fully adjusted their mental outlook to its special requirements. The spirit in which they enter upon it is part of the same feeling which leads them to make shift with wretched quarters while they are working in the mills. Indian labour is often inefficient, not from lack of capacity or inherent laziness, but because the workers do not regard work in the mills as their real and permanent calling in life. To this initial difficulty must be added lack of suitable training, the frequent absence of thoughtful encouragement, and, above all, the absence of education. Innumerable calculations have been made concerning the relative efficiency of Indian and European workmen. They are all a little beside the mark, because they do not take sufficiently into account relative training and environment and heredity. Under present conditions the

European workman is usually incomparably superior to the Indian ; but a competent and sympathetic European overseer, who knows how to handle his men, will sometimes get results from skilled Indian workmen which are astonishing. Time will certainly produce a great change for the better.

A constant drawback to the development of Indian industries is the scarcity of labour. Indian employers are wont to smile bitterly when they hear talk of the "inexhaustible supplies of cheap labour." Mr. T. J. Bennett remarked at a recent discussion on the subject that he did not think the supply was inexhaustible, and he knew it was not cheap. Certain it is that in every industry in the country the lack of competent hands is loudly deplored. The real cause unquestionably lies in the state of transition to which so many of India's difficulties must be ascribed. A country which possesses over three hundred million inhabitants, and employs less than a million of these in factories subject to inspection, cannot be in contact with an insoluble difficulty. The potential supply is probably inexhaustible in comparison with India's prospective requirements for many decades to come, but factory labour is not yet very popular, the conditions are not sufficiently attractive, and the channels of recruitment are not properly organized. Half the trouble is due to the expectancy of incomparable cheapness. Very cheap labour is not really cheap, in proportion to its results, and the rising tendency of Indian wages, so frequently complained of by employers, will possibly in the end bring them the salvation they desire.

Considering the obstacles which have to be overcome, the industrial development of India has been very rapid in recent years. The two leading manufacturing industries are cotton and jute. In 1883-84 there were 74 cotton mills, with over  $1\frac{3}{4}$  million spindles, representing a

The Scarcity  
of Labour.

What is  
being Done.

capital of  $5\frac{1}{2}$  millions sterling. In 1908-09 there were 232 cotton mills, with nearly six million spindles, representing a capital of over  $13\frac{1}{2}$  millions sterling. There were 23 jute mills in 1883-84, with 112,000 spindles, representing a capital of less than  $2\frac{1}{2}$  millions sterling. By 1908-09 the jute mills numbered 52, with 607,000 spindles, representing a capital of over  $7\frac{1}{2}$  millions sterling. The woollen trade does not show corresponding progress, and cheap pulp-wood paper from other countries checks the expansion of the paper industry. The State is responsible for a considerable share of industrial development, not only in its printing presses and railway and engineering workshops, but still more in its military arsenals and factories. The aim of the Government of India is to make the country ultimately supply its own needs, not only in railway plant, but in war material and for other Government purposes, so far as is possible. The exploitation of mineral resources proceeds apace. In 21 years the production of coal has increased from  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to  $12\frac{3}{4}$  million tons annually. In the year 1908 alone the number of persons employed in mines increased by 8 per cent., though the miners are very unskilful and their standard of efficiency is low. It is interesting to note that in some districts a new "mining caste" is at last being evolved.

Despite the vicissitudes of the cotton industry, which are partly due to defective management, it continues to expand. Formerly Indian mills confined their work mainly to spinning yarn, but now they are weaving cloths of a quality which was thought impossible even ten years ago. The great scheme for providing hydro-electric power by collecting the rainfall on the Western Ghats, is expected to give a considerable impetus to the mill industry in Bombay. A huge iron and steel industry, developed by Messrs. Tata, is about to be inaugurated at Kalimatti in Bengal. Innumerable minor indications of industrial progress are visible, and the most

notable change in recent years is the degree to which Indian capital is being invested in these enterprises.

A cardinal principle in the development of Indian industries must be the creation of a far more efficient and widespread system of technical education. It is needed in two chief directions. One is the training of men with higher qualifications, capable of becoming managers, overseers, foremen, and engineers, or of starting industries on their own account. Such admirable institutions as the Victoria Jubilee Technical Institute in Bombay, the Sibpur College near Calcutta, and the Engineering Colleges at Poona and Rurki, need multiplying all over the country. They find their complement in the Indian Institute of Science at Bangalore, a magnificent project which owes its existence to the generosity of the late Mr. Jamsetjee Tata. The second necessity still remains to be met, for up to the present there has been no attempt at a general diffusion of opportunities for technical training of a kind suitable for boys and girls who do not aspire to be more than working artisans. Mr. Harcourt Butler, the new Minister of Education, is understood to be investigating the subject; but it has to be remembered that even in England facilities for the training of artisans and craftsmen are not yet very numerous or well organized. The need for such elementary training is, however, greater in India than in this country.

The Government are not unmindful of the duty they owe to the new class of urban workers. The Act passed this year not only prevents the undue use of child labour, but it limits even adult males in factories to a 12 hours working day. These restrictions have been introduced in the face of strong opposition from a section of the employers, though others have warmly supported the changes made. The opponents of the legislation were

Technical  
Education.

Labour  
Legislation.

shortsighted, because it is to their own best interests to make factory work popular. Many employers in India have still to learn that the solution of their troubles lies largely in their own hands. They care too little for the welfare of their workpeople and fail to realize the vast character of the experiment upon which India is entering. It is nothing less than an attempt to change the ingrained character and traditions and environment of a considerable section of the population. It can only succeed on a large scale if the workers are attracted by good pay and comfortable conditions of living. Employers have a direct interest in seeing that their workpeople are well housed, though few have recognized their responsibility.

The principal industry of India is and must always be agriculture, and no consideration of Indian industrial development can omit some reference to a topic which really requires separate treatment. At the 1901 Census nearly two-thirds of the population returned some form of agriculture as their principal means of subsistence. Nearly 20 years ago Dr. Voelcker, in a report which has become a classic, declared that it was impossible to generalize about Indian agriculture. In some districts, such as Gujerat, there was little to recommend by way of improvement, whereas elsewhere much might be done. He contested the popular belief that Indian agriculture is, on the whole, primitive and backward, and thought that, considering the conditions, it was wonderfully good. Many of his suggestions have since been carried into effect. The foundations of a system of agricultural education have been laid, and an organized system of agricultural inquiry has been established. The Provincial Agricultural Departments are doing excellent work, there are numerous experimental farms, an Inspector-General of Agriculture was appointed some years ago, and during his Viceroyalty Lord Curzon

established at Pusa a higher teaching institution known as the Agricultural Research Institute. A number of scientific experts have been attached to the Imperial Department of Agriculture, and more appointments are believed to be in contemplation. Government expenditure on agriculture has increased enormously in recent years, and Mr. H. S. Lawrence calculated in 1908 that it had grown from £10,000 to £200,000 ; but he added that the United States, which spends £2,300,000 annually on its Department of Agriculture, would regard this sum as a very humble beginning.

A general survey of the position of Indian agriculture leads to the impression that it is capable of more improvement than Dr. Voelcker was inclined to admit. In every country the application of modern scientific principles to agriculture has been attended with benefit, and there is no reason to suppose that Indian agriculture can remain stationary. In Australia, as well as in the United States, enormous advances have been made in agriculture in recent years. While it is easy, however, to effect improvements when dealing with a population of 4,000,000, the problem becomes vastly different if 200,000,000 people directly dependent on the soil have to be handled. From the economic point of view, the improvement of the staple of Indian cotton is perhaps more important than any other agricultural issue. The Bombay Government have done much to demonstrate the possibility of growing longer stapled cottons, but they need the support of the cotton trade, which is not forthcoming as it should be.

Many people hold that for the effective development of indigenous manufactures, a protective tariff is necessary in India, and that the Government of India should at any rate have liberty to decide their own fiscal arrangements. Into that contentious question there is no need to enter, but it may be observed, in a purely impartial spirit, that tariffs alone will not expand

the industries of India. The Bombay millowners complain of the Excise duties on cotton goods, which operate unfairly in favour of Lancashire. Their representations would be far more convincing were it not that they themselves handicap their industry by unwise methods of control and finance, which must militate against prosperity far more than the Excise duties. Reform in mill organization has been talked of for 20 years, but seems no nearer. Again, whatever may be the possible advantages of fiscal autonomy, a more pressing need for India is the unlocking of the vast stores of hoarded capital which ought to be put to reproductive uses. The process has begun, and much additional rupee capital has been invested in industrial enterprises in the last decade, but a flood of fresh capital, both Indian and English, is needed to assist the industrial development of India. The opportunities are boundless. The rise of the jute industry was like a romance, and it may have many parallels yet. Twenty years ago hardly any manganese ore was produced in India, but in 1907 the output was over 900,000 tons, though the trade has recently suffered some diminution. No attempt has yet been made to manufacture ferro-manganese. The ore is still exported raw, though India buys large quantities of imported steel. Sir Thomas Holland has declared that "the manufacture of sulphuric acid on a large scale and cheaply would be the starting-point of an economic revival." Sulphuric acid, he says, is "the key to most chemical and to many metallurgical industries." India pays 20 millions sterling annually for products obtained in Europe from minerals identical with those lying idle in her own soil. But India must be content to be beaten by the producers of cheap chemicals in Europe, "until industries arise demanding a sufficient number of chemical products to complete an economic cycle, for chemical and metallurgical industries are essentially gregarious in their habits." Many examples of the same kind might be quoted. India exports vast quantities of hides and skins

which she ought to be manufacturing into leather, and buys millions of pounds worth of sugar which she ought to grow herself. She imports enormous consignments of cotton cloth which might be made within her borders if the staple of her cotton was systematically improved. Great though Indian industrial progress has been, there can be no doubt that, given a continuance of peace and security, remarkable developments will be witnessed in the next decade or two. The foundations of India's industrial prosperity have been solidly laid, her markets lie at her door, and her productive capacity is capable of infinite expansion.



## CHAPTER XII.

### THE FINANCES OF INDIA AND THEIR CONTROL.

[BY SIR WILLIAM MEYER, K.C.I.E.]

The fundamental fact to be borne in mind in dealing with Indian finance is that the budgets and accounts published by the Government of India include also the transactions of the Local Governments, and that the revenues enjoyed by the latter are mainly derived from sources which they share with the Central Government. Taking the position arrived at by a revision of the financial settlements with the Provinces announced in the present year's budget, we find that, generally speaking, what are termed the "divided" heads, under which the Provinces get not less than one-half the receipts, are land revenue, Excise, stamps, income-tax, and the incomings from the larger irrigation works. The Provincial Governments now get the whole of the receipts under forests and registration, and the takings of the spending departments which they manage, such as ordinary public works, police, education, medical courts, and jails. The Government of India, on the other hand, get the whole of the revenue accruing from the export of opium (the taxation on opium consumed within the country comes under the head of Excise), salt, Customs, mint, railways, posts and telegraphs, military receipts and tributes from Native States.

The revenues of the Government of India are styled Imperial revenues, and those of the Local Governments, Provincial. As regards expenditure, the Government

of India are mainly responsible for outlay relating to defence, railways, posts and telegraphs, interest on debt, and home charges ; and the Provinces for charges connected with land revenue and general administration, forests, police, courts and jails, education and medical, while charges for irrigation and ordinary public works are common to both Imperial and Provincial, but with the Provincial element largely predominating. The Central and Local Governments share also in expenditure on famine relief when necessary.

Each Province has a financial settlement with the Government of India which regulates the scope of its revenue and expenditure. These settlements, which were formerly subject to revision every five years, have since 1904 been of a more permanent character, and the element of permanency is now to be further increased, so that the Provincial Governments will obtain the full benefit of administrative economies, or improvement in the revenues in which they are interested. A further reform in this connexion, announced in connexion with the budget for 1911-12, is the conversion of about 2 1-3 millions of revenue formerly accruing in the shape of fixed assignments by the Government of India into shares of expanding revenue so that practically the whole of the Provincial revenues are now of a growing character. The revenues of the eight major Provinces now amount collectively to about 26 million pounds, or approximately one-third of the total revenue shown in the Government of India's budget. The Provinces are not, however, in any way independent in respect of their finance. Their budgets have to receive the approval of the Government of India, and a Province cannot meet excess of expenditure over current revenue by drawing on the balances to its credit (the result of past savings or special grants from the Central Government) without the sanction of that Government. Further,

apart from this general control, and the competence of the Central Government to prescribe general lines of policy which may affect Provincial finances, the Local Governments are bound by the provisions of Government of India codes, such as the Civil Service Regulations, and the Civil Account Code, which prescribe *inter alia* a large number of specific restrictions on expenditure. Thus, to take a single instance, a Local Government cannot create an appointment carrying a pay of more than £200 per annum, or raise the pay of such a post already in existence, without the sanction both of the Government of India and the Secretary of State. The present policy, however, which is supported by the recommendations of the Decentralization Commission of 1907-1909, is to relax these detailed restrictions in considerable measure.

Local Governments, again, have no borrowing powers, since their resources are closely bound up with those of the Government of India, with whom the control of the debt rests, nor can they impose additional taxation or make fundamental change in an existing revenue system without the sanction of the Government of India. Lastly, the Accounts and Audit Department is an Imperial agency, independent of the Local Governments.

The powers and resources of the Provincial Governments have been materially increased during the last generation, and are likely to be still further added to, not merely by reason of the growing complexity of the operations of Government, which requires relief of the central authority by well-considered delegations, but owing to the fact that the Legislative Councils as now constituted, with their non-official majorities and large elective element, can impose a check on the local bureaucracies which had formerly to be exercised from outside by the Government of India and the Secretary of State. There is as yet no separate Legislative Council

Influence of  
Legislative  
Councils.

for the Central Provinces ; but in the other major Provinces a select committee of the Legislative Council, in which the non-official element is well represented, scrutinizes and makes suggestions on the Provincial budget in its preliminary stages, and with special reference to the allocation of such new expenditure as the Province is in a position to afford. Later on, again, the Provincial budget as approved by the Government of India is discussed by the Provincial Legislative Council as a whole ; and that body is competent to submit resolutions proposing the deflection of expenditure from one head to another, or in regard to the financial position and the employment of funds generally. Such resolutions are, however, not necessarily binding on the Local Government: It can act on them or submit them to the Government of India when reference to that authority would be required or not, according to its discretion. Similar resolutions can be moved in the Legislative Council of the Governor-General, where, however, there is still an official majority, in respect of the Budget of India as a whole, and with special reference to any alterations in taxation or other new departures which it may contain ; and as the animated debates which have taken place in these Councils during the last year have shown, the non-official members are fully alive to their present position.

The new Councils are not, however, likely to work in the direction of economy. The members are ready to render lip-service to that austere but ungenial deity, but they reserve their real devotion for special and sometimes novel shrines of the goddess of spending. Mr. Gokhale—to cite the most distinguished of the non-official members of the Indian Legislature—while denouncing military expenditure and calling attention to the large growth of civil administrative charges, is quite ready to postpone the redemption of non-productive debt or to propose a policy of free and eventually com-

pulsory education which would run away with millions ; and members of the Local Legislatures are already pressing for additional Provincial outlay in the direction of increase of salaries to subordinate officials, larger State aid to local bodies, and so on. The majority of the Local Governments, again, are more eager for increase of administrative efficiency and local development than for economy, and though the financial settlements effected with them in 1904 and the succeeding years were much more liberal than those they had previously had, several Provinces had in a few years outstripped their resources. When a Provincial Government finds itself in such a pass it promptly proceeds to ask for additional assistance, temporary or permanent, from the Government of India, and is naturally supported by the public opinion of the Province. To accede to such demands save in very exceptional circumstances would, however, be impossible without destroying the increased sense of responsibility which development in the direction of local autonomy requires from the local Governments and their Legislatures. It seems necessary, therefore—and this policy is hinted at in the latest Government of India Budget—that these authorities should be made to realize more completely their position as guardians of the public purse by receiving, as suggested by the Decentralization Commission, the power to levy local taxation subject to the approval of the Government of India and the Secretary of State. Orators who now speak of the over-taxation of the ryot, and in the next breath suggest fresh objects of expenditure, would then have to realize that they cannot indulge in such a policy without adding to the public burdens.

Just as the provincial finances are under  
**The Secretary of State.** the control of the Government of India,  
and in some matters of the Secretary of  
State also, so are those of the Govern-  
ment of India under the control of the Secretary of State

in Council. The latter has the direct management of what are termed the home charges—viz., the large amounts, now aggregating more than 18 millions per annum which have to be disbursed in England for military purposes, stores and machinery, interest on debt, and furlough and pension allowances. The India Office deals also with the raising and application of sterling loans, and with contracts with railway companies in respect of such matters as the management of State-owned lines. Further, as regards the revenues raised and expended in India, the Secretary of State has full control vested in him by the Government of India Act of 1858, and the independent financial powers of the Government of India are strictly limited. The Secretary of State's sanction, for example, is required to any reduction or increase of taxation or other measure which would materially affect the Indian revenues, to loans, to any new departure of importance in fiscal policy including a material revision of a provincial settlement, to outlay of an unusual character, and to the construction of railways and large public works. There are also a number of specific restrictions in such matters as the granting of pensions and the creation of pay or new appointments, while no important alterations may be made in the Civil Service Regulations or other important financial code without the Secretary of State's approval. Lord Morley has by common consent drawn the leading strings in which the India Office can thus hold the Governor-General in Council tighter in many respects than most of his predecessors; but it must be remembered *per contra* that he has materially relaxed them in a matter which was productive of more references than all the rest put together—viz., in respect of the pecuniary conditions of specific posts. The Government of India can now, generally speaking, create fresh appointments on their own authority up to an individual cost of £400 a year and raise the pay of an existing post up to £600, while in

respect of lump increase in subordinate establishments they have power up to £3,333 per annum.

In the field of the relations between Simla and Whitehall the development of the new reforms scheme, with the largely increased powers it has given to the Viceroy's Legislative Council, must, however, as Mr. Valentine Chirol has forcibly indicated in his valuable work on "Indian Unrest," tend to further financial autonomy on the part of the Government of India. As Mr. Chirol has truly observed, there is no matter on which all classes of Indian politicians are in such general agreement as the seeking of increased revenues as these become necessary by raising the Customs tariff without similar internal taxation; and it will become more and more difficult as time goes on to compel the Government of India to champion opposite courses thrust on them from home, as they had to do, for instance, in 1894 in respect of Excise duties on locally produced cotton goods. Necessarily, too, such difficulty will be greatly increased if England adopts a policy of Tariff Reform, and thus deters herself from pleading that when she forbids India to impose more than a light tariff for revenue purposes she is acting on what experience has shown her to be the true interest of the dependent country. Inevitably, then, the pressure of Indian public opinion and of the growing industries of the country, as voiced in the Legislative Councils, must be in the direction of greater financial discretion, and of tariffs which will be directed against Great Britain along with the rest of the outside world.

We now come to the consideration of **Revenue and the financial administration of the Expenditure.** Government of India, which, as already explained, includes that of the Provincial Governments, and of its practical results. The following abstract shows the revenue and expenditure charged against revenue of each year of the last decade, the

figures for 1910-11 being as yet only approximately accurate (revised estimates they are technically styled) and those for 1911-12 the Budget Estimates lately presented to the Legislative Council. The figures are in millions of pounds to one place of decimals :—

| —          | Revenue. | Expenditure. | Surplus. |
|------------|----------|--------------|----------|
| 1902-3 ..  | 65·3     | 62·2         | 3·1      |
| 1903-4 ..  | 71·0     | 68·0         | 3·0      |
| 1904-5 ..  | 71·1     | 67·7         | 3·4      |
| 1905-6 ..  | 70·8     | 68·7         | 2·1      |
| 1906-7 ..  | 73·1     | 71·5         | 1·6      |
| 1907-8 ..  | 71·9     | 70·7         | 0·3      |
| 1908-9 ..  | 69·8     | 73·5         | 3·7*     |
| 1909-10 .. | 74·6     | 74·0         | 0·6      |
| 1910-11 .. | 80·3     | 76·9         | 3·4      |
| 1911-12 .. | 78·0     | 77·2         | 0·8†     |

\*Deficit.

†Estimated.

In considering these large figures the first thing to be borne in mind is that less than one-third of the revenues are derived from taxation proper, which, in the last year of our series, is estimated to produce 24·1 millions, distributed thus :—Excise, 7·2 ; Customs, 6·2 ; stamps, 4·8 ; salt, 3·3 ; income-tax, registration, and cesses, 2·6.

Receipts :  
Taxation  
Proper.

The Excise receipts are derived from duties and vend fees on liquors, opium, and intoxicating drugs consumed in the country (the duty on imported liquors appears, however, under Customs). The Customs revenue is produced by a general revenue tariff of 5 per cent. *ad valorem*, with exemption, or lesser rates, for food grains, machinery, railway materials, and iron and steel products. Cotton twists and yarn, again, are free, while the tax on woven cottons is  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., counterbalanced by a like Excise on the products of Indian mills. Liquors, arms, and now tobacco and silver are subject to special and high rates of taxation. The Customs revenue also includes a duty on exported rice, which accrues principally from Burma.



The stamp revenues are derived from judicial and Court fee stamps in connexion with proceedings in the Courts and from duties on various commercial and other documents.

The salt tax consists of a duty equivalent to 1s. 4d. on each maund (about 82lb.) of salt imported or locally produced. Ten years ago this rate was, generally speaking, 3s. 4d. per maund ; it has been brought to its present level by successive reductions in 1903, 1905, and 1907. The present incidence is less than  $\frac{1}{4}$ d. per lb., and much lower than the Government takings from salt in some other countries—*e.g.*, Germany, Austria, France, and Italy.

The income-tax, which since 1903 has been levied on incomes in excess of Rs.1,000 (£67) a year, instead of on those exceeding Rs.500, as formerly, does not apply to receipts from agriculture, and is raised at 5 pies per rupee (about 6d. in the pound) on incomes above Rs.2,000, and at a somewhat lower rate on incomes below that level.

Of the non-taxation factors the most important is the land revenue, which represents the State's ultimate share in the ownership of land, and intercepts profits which would otherwise go to private landholders. The State demand was permanently fixed over a century ago in the greater part of the two Bengals, and in portions of Madras and the United Provinces. Elsewhere it is periodically revised by land settlements, the usual period of which is about 30 years, and is supposed, generally speaking, to amount to one-half the net agricultural profits. Recent settlements have, however, as a rule shown progressive liberality in going below this figure. The incidence of the land revenue may be taken, on a rough average, at about 11d. per acre in the permanently settled tracts, which now represents about one-fifth of the rental, and

at 2s. per acre in the temporarily settled areas. Along with land revenue may be classed forests, the receipts from which are derived from grazing fees and the sale of timber and other products of the State forests, and are partially balanced by the expenditure on the development of these. The receipts from land revenue and forests taken together amounted to 19·7 millions in 1902-3 and are estimated at 23·3 millions in 1911-12. The increase is due to the extension of cultivation, a rise in prices which, while hitting the professional classes, has materially benefited the agriculturists, and the development of the Government forest property.

The State owns most of the railways in India, working some direct as State Railways and lines, and leasing others out to com- Irrigation. panies, who obtain as a rule a guarantee of a certain return of their capital while sharing the surplus profits with the Government. The receipt side of the Government of India's Budget shows the net receipts from State lines—*i.e.*, gross receipts less working expenses—and the expenditure side the interest charges on the railway portion of the debt, while payments to and from companies figure under expenditure or receipts as the case may be. The railway transactions were for a long period a source of net loss to the Government of India and were denounced accordingly by the National Congress school of critics, but from 1899-1900 onwards they have yielded a surplus, save in 1908-9, when wide-spread agricultural distress and bad trade produced a considerable deficit. In 1902-3 the railway receipts and expenditure were 10·3 and 10·1 millions respectively; in the Budget for 1911-12 the corresponding figures are 14·0 and 12·1. Irrigation works in India are mainly State properties, and now produce a revenue of about 3·8 millions, largely balanced by expenditure on mainten-

ance, construction of minor works, and interest on the irrigation debt.

The opium revenue accrues from the opium exported from India, mainly to China, and is derived from direct Government monopoly in the Gangetic Valley and from taxation levied at Bombay on Malwa opium, the product mainly of native States in Rajputana and Central India. The opium revenue (4.5 millions in 1902-3 and estimated at 4.3 millions in 1911-12, with counterbalancing charges for production and supervision of 1.6 and 1.2 millions respectively) is now a diminishing factor since, with effect from 1908, it has been agreed that the Indian export to China should be reduced in amount by one-tenth per annum *pari passu* with the efforts of the Chinese Government to obtain a gradual extinction of the home-grown article, and though this arrangement has as yet only formal force up to the current year, it is likely to continue, even if it be not accelerated. As yet, however, the ultimate effect of this policy on the Indian revenues, which will be to extinguish a source which was producing, when the reduction policy commenced, a net revenue of about 3½ millions per annum, has been obscured by the fact that the reduced export to China has been counterbalanced by a large increase in the price of what is still sent while on the other hand the gradual reduction of poppy cultivation in India is diminishing working expenses. Thus, in 1910-11 the opium receipts amounted to no less than 7.5 millions (against a Budget estimate of 4.7), with an expenditure of 1.2 only, while the much smaller revenue estimated for 1911-12 will probably be considerably exceeded in fact. These additional receipts are, however, only temporary windfalls, and the Government of India are wisely devoting them to special non-recurring expenditure and to the reduction of debt.

Post Office, telegraphs, and mints at present yield

a revenue of about 3·4 millions, which is almost counter-balanced by corresponding charges. Receipts in connexion with the military department are about 1·2 million, and an almost equal amount is derived from interest on the loans made by the Government to Native States, local bodies, and agriculturists, advances to railway companies on the invested portion of the paper currency reserve (the amount held by the Government against the note circulation), and on temporary investments of the Secretary of State's balances. Other miscellaneous receipts aggregate in all about three millions.

The total expenditure was 62·2 millions in 1902-3, and is estimated at 77·2 millions in the Budget for 1911-12. Expenditure.

The main heads are as follows, the figures in brackets showing the amount classified under each in the two years in question:—Charges for collection of taxes (2·4, 2·9); land revenues and forests (3·6, 5·0); opium (1·6, 1·2); interest on ordinary debt and other obligations (1·8, 2·1); Post Office, telegraphs, and mints (2·6, 3·2); police (2·7, 4·6); Courts and gaols (2·9, 3·8); education (0·8, 2·3); medical and sanitation (0·7, 1·3); other administrative charges (3·1, 4·9); Civil pensions and leave allowances and miscellaneous charges (4·6, 4·9); famine relief and insurance (1·0, 1·0); railways (10·1, 12·1); irrigation (2·6, 3·4); ordinary public works (3·1, 5·5); military (18·8, 20·8).

It should be noted that the total of the expenditure provided for 1911-12 comes to 78·9 millions, but 1·7 of this is met by drawings from the provincial balances, which were increased to this end in 1910-11 by special grants from the Government of India for education, sanitation, and other special expenditure. The year's expenditure further includes an outlay of about one million in connexion with the coming Royal visit. Taking the principal increases during the last decade—that under land revenue and forests is due to strengthening and

improvement of the condition of the district establishments, to the taking over by Government of the charges of various agencies which were formerly met by special cesses now abolished, and to the development of forests. The police administration has undergone thorough reform, in pursuance of the recommendations of a Commission appointed to this end by Lord Curzon. The Courts and gaols establishments have been improved, and a considerably larger amount is now spent by the State on education and medical and sanitary operations, while there has also been increased expenditure in the development of agriculture and veterinary and scientific operations. The railway and irrigation expenditure has grown with the expansion of these systems, and a larger sum is now spent on ordinary public works, which includes outlay on roads, bridges, and buildings, including school-houses and hospitals.

The increase under military charges, against the gross incidence of which should be set off receipts amounting to about 1·2 million, is due mainly to the extensive reforms introduced by Lord Kitchener, which have made the Indian Army a vastly better instrument for war. The high-water mark of this expenditure was reached in 1905-6, when the military charges totalled 21·9 millions. Since then the outside political situation has admitted of some shutting down of fresh outlay, while Lord Kitchener's counterbalancing economies have produced their result. The increase includes, it may be noted, a material betterment in the pay conditions of the native soldier which the increased cost of living called for, and pay concessions to the European troops, which were in the main dictated by the arrangements of the Home Government in regard to the British Army as a whole. Comparing the 21 millions *circa* which India now pays for her defence out of a revenue of 78 millions with the fact that in the United Kingdom the cost of defence, including the interest on past war loans, is considerably more than

half the State income (the Indian debt, as will presently be shown, is now no burden on the taxpayer), it may be safely said that the burden of armaments which India has to bear, though a constant subject of criticism by what may be termed the Moderate Opposition in that country, is a relatively light one, and that it would be far heavier had the country to stand alone. As it is, India pays nothing normally for her naval defence, a matter which may require further consideration hereafter, save a contribution of £100,000 per annum to the Home Government, while the maintenance of an Army of about 235,000 men, of whom 75,000 only are British, for internal security and defence against external aggression cannot be reckoned in the least excessive for a country which now contains over 300 million people. Nor does the fact that Indian troops are occasionally drawn upon by the Home Government for service out of India show, as is often alleged, that the Indian establishment is unduly large. The fact that it can spare men as an exceptional measure in an Imperial crisis does not in the least affect the normal balance of safety. The real grievance here was that in former years the War Office endeavoured, with some measure of success, to saddle India with a part of the cost of troops thus employed outside her borders, but of late years the burden of such expenditure has been completely met by the Home Government.

The only other head that requires notice is famine relief and insurance, under which the Government of India are bound to allot a sum of not less than one million yearly, which in times of serious famine would, of course, be considerably exceeded. The difference between the actual famine outlay, if any, and this total is devoted to the construction of protective irrigation

works or railways, and to avoiding fresh debt by application to productive public works financed from capital.

Reverting now to the total figures of revenue and expenditure already given, it will be observed that there was a steady increase of revenue to the extent of nearly eight millions between 1902-3 and 1906-7. Save in respect of Excise, where there has been a continuous increase of the local duties, which vary in different parts of the country, with a view to restricting the consumption of liquors and drugs rather than with any primary desire for revenue, and a slight increase for similar reasons in the duty on imported spirits, there was, however, no increase of taxation during this period. On the contrary, it was marked by successive reductions of the salt duty, by the larger exemption from income-tax already referred to, and by the abolition of a number of special cesses. The increase was due mainly to the advancing prosperity of the country as evidenced by growing receipts under railways, Excise, and land revenue ; and although the progress of expenditure, the chief features of which have been already referred to, was also large during this period, each year closed with a substantial surplus. In an interesting debate which recently took place in the Viceroy's Legislative Council, Mr. Gokhale maintained that the increase in charges had been in excess of the development of the country's resources ; and it must be admitted that Sir Edward Baker, whose tenure of office as Finance Minister (1905-8) was cast for the most part in years of plenty, acted on the assumption that the net revenue from railways, which at one time exceeded two millions, was not likely to fall below this figure, and that he was not sufficiently mindful of the way in which the revenues of India may be suddenly depleted by bad seasons and poor trade. In 1907, too, it was known that the reduction of

the opium revenue, already referred to, was bound to come; nevertheless in that year Sir Edward was a party to a further reduction of 8 annas per maund on the salt tax, bringing up the total remissions of taxation which had been carried out since 1903 to about  $4\frac{1}{2}$  millions per annum. The year 1907-8, which was one of poor seasons, and closed with a surplus of only £300,000, indicated a turn of the tide, and in 1908-9 there was a deficit of 3·7 millions, the first since 1897-8, due to continued bad crops and depression of trade. Railway receipts dropped from  $12\frac{1}{2}$  to 10 millions, while, by what can only be termed an extraordinary lack of supervision by the railway authorities, the expenditure under this head was the highest that had yet been attained. The position improved in 1909-10, the receipts of which, owing to betterment under land revenues and railways, rose to 74·6 millions, but a simultaneous growth of expenditure, though of less amount, reduced the surplus to £600,000.

In introducing the Budget for 1910-11 the present Finance Minister, Sir Guy Fleetwood Wilson, felt the position so precarious, with reference to the future disappearance of the opium revenue and the demonstrated uncertainty of the net railway receipts, that he obtained the imposition of fresh taxation to the extent of over a million by enhancing the duties on imported liquors and petroleum, raising the stamp duties on certain instruments, and putting special duties on imported tobacco and silver. It was objected by certain non-official critics in the Legislative Council that this increased taxation was not really necessary, the Finance Minister having underestimated the receipts from opium, and the revised estimates for the year have in fact shown that opium has (for reasons already indicated) produced some three millions more than the Budget had anticipated, while net railway receipts have been nearly  $1\frac{1}{2}$  million better. Having regard, however, to the



windfall character and eventual disappearance of the opium receipts, to the uncertainty of large railway surpluses, and to the necessary expansion of expenditure in certain directions, notably under education and sanitation, Sir Guy may be congratulated on his courage in putting the resources of the Government of India on a more stable basis, and on only assenting to some reduction in the tobacco duties for the current year. The fact that the Government of India's estimates are usually cast in a cautious spirit, and that good times may cause the estimated surplus to be largely exceeded, has often subjected Indian financiers to the charge of inaccurate estimating, but in a country whose resources depend so largely on the seasons, and where the field of taxation is very limited, the fault is on the right side. The people would not understand constant changes in taxation, and it should therefore be a fundamental maxim not to reduce imposts until it is reasonably certain that there is a safe recurring surplus of receipts over expenditure.

Outside the Government of India's  
**Finances of** accounts are the transactions of district  
**Local Bodies.** and sub-district boards and of municipalities. These bodies have now an aggregate income of about six millions, excluding debt and deposit transactions. Their sources of revenue are entirely distinct from those of the Government, and are mostly derived from a cess on land, supplemented, since 1905, by a proportionate grant from the Government, in the case of the rural boards, and by rates on houses and land, taxes on professions and trades, tolls and octrois in municipalities. The three latter sources, however, are not common to all parts of the country. These bodies have borrowing powers, subject to the control of the local Governments, and their expenditure is mainly on roads and streets, medical relief and sanita-

tion, primary education, and lighting and markets in the case of towns.

It may reasonably be asked what the Government of India have done with the **Capital Transactions.** collectively large surpluses of recent years. Apart from some strengthening of the cash balances in India and England, which have to be large owing to the fact that the Government of India are obliged for the most part to act as their own bankers and to have funds in hand to meet the obligations arising at a vast number of local treasuries, as well as for unforeseen emergencies, the answer is to be found in the fact that the Government of India have embarked on a large and continuous outlay on capital railway expenditure and on the construction of productive irrigation works—i.e., schemes which, after meeting all charges, are calculated to produce an appreciable profit. Taking the estimates for 1911-12, the programme of capital railway expenditure amounts to 9·5 millions, and that of productive irrigation to 1·3. This outlay is normally financed (a) from the revenue surplus, (b) by money available from the famine insurance grant, (c) by the surplus receipts from savings banks and other deposits over outgoings, (d) by capital raised by guaranteed or assisted railway companies, and (e) by State borrowing in England and India. The Indian loans which are so frequently issued, and which to some minds might convey the impression that the Government of India are exceeding their resources, are incurred, save when there may be an exceptional year of large deficit, solely for productive purposes. The portion of the capital railway and irrigation expenditure which is met from current revenues is adjusted by a counter-transfer from the ordinary or non-productive to the public works or productive portion of the total debt, and the interest on the public works portion is debited to railways and irrigation. The effect of this system, the results of which show

how profitable a policy of borrowing may be if well applied, will be seen from the following figures. In 1888 the total debt of India amounted to 149 millions (73 ordinary and 76½ public works), and the interest charges thereon to 6·2 millions. The net receipts from railways and major irrigation works, however, exceeded the outgoings by 1·4 million, so that the net burden of debt was 4·8. In March last the total debt amounted to 274·8 millions (41·4 ordinary and 233·4 public works), and the total interest charges to 8·2 millions; but the railways and major irrigation works had given a surplus of takings over outgoings of 8·9 millions, and were thus able not merely to defray the whole interest on the debt, but to yield £700,000 besides, so that at the present moment the apparently growing Indian debt imposes no burden whatever on the Indian taxpayer.

Another matter with which the investor should be more fully acquainted is the complete success of the closure of the Indian mints to the free coinage of silver in 1893, which reached its full economic results at the close of the last century, in dissipating the fluctuations in the exchange value of the rupee which had disorganized Indian finance and distracted trade for many years previously. The subsequent and successful policy of the Indian Government has been to divorce the rupee from its much lower bullion value, and give it an artificial exchange value of 1s. 4d. by undertaking fresh coinage only to the extent to which this appears to be demanded by trade requirements as indicated by the Secretary of State's Council drawings and by the imports of gold into India. To avoid the risk of such fresh coinage being found eventually redundant, the profits thereon are credited to a special gold standard reserve fund, the greater part of which is invested in sterling securities and is thus automatically increased by the interest accruing. This fund is intended as a reserve in support

of exchange, should the normal rate of 1s. 4d. per rupee be threatened, and it was called upon in 1907-9, when a heavy drop in the Indian exports and the appreciation of gold consequent on a financial crisis in America and other outside factors told on the exchange position. The rupee fell in exchange value, and this was met by stopping the Secretary of State's drawings on India, and replacing these by a reverse issue of sterling bills drawn by the Government of India on London in exchange for rupees at a rate which was practically that of 1s. 4d., until the skies cleared again and exchange assumed its normal features.

In the meantime the Secretary of State had to draw from the gold standard reserve to meet the home charges and the Government of India's special bills, the equivalent of his drawings being set aside in rupees in India. The gold holdings of the reserve, which had been about 14 millions, were thus reduced by more than eight million pounds, but the restoration of normal exchange conditions and prosperity has since enabled these amounts to be made good, with a further increase of two millions to the fund. Exception has been taken to the Secretary of State's policy of keeping this gold reserve in England and of investing the bulk of it, and it is held by such critics that a large part of the reserve should be in actual gold and kept in Calcutta or Bombay. Economically it is, of course, more advantageous to have the gold in London, where it would be needed in connexion with the stoppage of the Secretary of State's Council drawings, and to let it breed interest while not required; but a drop in exchange is often the effect of panic, which might be dissipated by a prompt display of gold, and to this extent, and as a matter of sentiment which may react on business, it would be well to promote public confidence in India by keeping a considerable portion of the standard reserve fund in gold there. Another matter in which the India Office has been criticized, and, as the present

writer thinks, justifiably, is as regards a decision come to in 1907 to apply half the future profits on silver coinage to railway construction, instead of adding the whole to the gold standard reserve. This policy has since, however, been modified to the extent that it will not be applied till the total gold holdings of the Government of India, including those in the currency reserve held against notes in circulation, exceed 25 millions. These are, however, minor matters as compared with the fact that it has been demonstrated by the sharp test of experience that the artificial value of the rupee can be maintained through a considerable period of adverse exchange.

**Secretary of  
State's  
Drawings.**

The Secretary of State's Council drawings are closely connected with the Indian currency policy. To put the matter in a simple form, and eliminating adjustments necessary on account of capital receipts and outlay, it may be said that the Secretary of State has to draw bills on India against the home charges of the Indian Government, which amount now to over 18 millions per annum. On the other hand, India's trade in normal circumstances shows a large balance of exports over imports, thus requiring the eventual liquidation of debt from the outside world. Balancing one of these factors against the other, the Secretary of State sells for gold drafts in rupees on the Indian treasuries, the actual gold value being determined by the competition of the market. In normal circumstances, however, it cannot be much more than 1s. 4d. per rupee, as otherwise it would pay debtors to India to remit gold there, while if the tenders were materially less than this figure the Secretary of State's offers of bills would be cut down and eventually stopped. The trade of India in good years shows, however, a larger export balance than can be wholly defrayed by the Secretary of State's counter-bills for revenue purposes. If, however, this

balance were entirely left for private transmission to India in the shape of gold, such gold would eventually accumulate to an embarrassing extent in the Government coffers, since practical demand for it as a medium of exchange in India is as yet but small, and a considerable quantity of it would eventually have to be sent back to England to purchase silver for fresh rupee coinage.

To obviate this, the Secretary of State, on a trade demand, sells bills in excess of his actual requirements. Thus, in 1906-7, while the net home charges amounted to little more than 18 millions, the Secretary of State's Council sales came to over 33 millions. Such excess drawings are sometimes, but very erroneously, supposed to involve an additional drain from India for the benefit of the London market, whereas they are merely a convenient method of shortening a circle of transactions which would otherwise take place; and India gets the full benefit of such surplus remittances in the shape of additional rupees coined from silver thereby purchased, by facilitating the conversion of silver profits on coinage accruing to the gold standard reserve into gold in London, or by building up a balance at the India Office which will reduce the amount of the next sterling loan. The actual net remittances of India to England, of which so much has been heard as "the drain," is the amount, now about  $18\frac{1}{4}$  millions, of the home charges *plus* about  $2\frac{3}{4}$  millions representing net private remittances to England. A large proportion of the home charges goes to defray the interest on the sterling debt, which constitutes the greater part of India's debt liabilities; and it has already been shown how, financially, this is now no burden on the people of India; while, economically, it represents the result of an immense amount of prosperity, agricultural and industrial, developed by the railways and irrigation systems. It is, moreover, quite open to the people of

India to hold more of the debt in their own hands ; the Government of India always borrow as much as they can in rupees, and it is the relatively small market for loans bearing a low rate of interest in India that compels them to raise money in London.

The balance of the home charges for the most part represents purchase of stores which cannot be procured, or so cheaply procured, in India, and payments to civil and military officers on leave, or pensioned—a cheap return for the protection, good administration, and prosperity which India has secured from the British connexion. The private remittances, again, are largely due to the investment of capital in India by persons now resident in Europe. In short, thanks to the excellent investment of her borrowings by an “alien Government,” India is in a much better position as regards payments to Europe than most countries whose economic development is recent and who owe their prosperity largely to the influx of Western capital. We should probably, in fact, hear very little of “the drain” were it not that the circumstances of Indian Administration cause her debts to England to be advertised by the Secretary of State’s drawings, and that the scope of these is not correctly apprehended.

This sketch has necessarily been confined to a few years only, but a larger retrospect of Indian finance would bring out still more clearly the general progress of the country, the value of whose seaborne trade now exceeds 250 millions, the steady development of its agricultural resources—set back though these must occasionally be by failures of the monsoon rains—and the growth of new and flourishing industries.

The “Indian unrest” of which so much has been heard of late years, is, taken in the wide sense, a healthy symptom that the country is, under British inspiration, shaking off Oriental apathy and enlarging its sphere of wants and aspirations. Too much attention has been

given to the fact that on the political side this movement has in certain quarters degenerated into sedition, and even into anarchical crime. With a firm and wise administration, these will, however, be but back eddies. The stream of real importance is that which is flowing in the direction of financial and economic development, and this development can be materially furthered, with much advantage to the individual investors as well as to the Imperial connexion, by a more plentiful supply of British capital.



## CHAPTER XIII.

### THE CO-OPERATIVE CREDIT MOVEMENT.

By no means the least important movement set on foot in recent years in India is that which aims at financing agriculture on less onerous terms than has been the tradition of the past ; and no notice, however brief, of Indian development would be adequate which ignored the organization of co-operative credit societies. Every Hindu is at heart a money-lender ; and it is perhaps this circumstance which, while it has in the past rendered possible the toleration of the exorbitant rates of interest charged by money-lenders in agricultural areas, accounts for the rapid development of the system of co-operative credit when once it was given an authoritative start. In order to understand the urgency of the need for some reform in the methods of financing agriculturists it is, however, necessary to give a short account of the condition of affairs at the close of the nineteenth century.

Before the advent of the British, land and its possession was of no great intrinsic value. There was little certainty that the ryot would reap what he sowed, or that, when he had reaped it, he would enjoy the fruits of his labour. Added to this was the perennial uncertainty of the climate and the periodical recurrence of failures of the monsoon. Nevertheless agriculture had to be carried on somehow in the interests of the whole society, non-agricultural as well as agricultural. The village community included the *shroff*, or *bania*, whose business it was to speculate

in the organization of means for counteracting or minimizing the uncertainties and discouragements in the path of successful tillage. It was as much to his own interest as to that of the community at large that the ryot should be encouraged to labour; and the money-lender of those days was frequently the saviour of society.

With the establishment of the *Pax Britannica*, and the growth of security of tenure, the value of land, as property, increased enormously. Concurrently, however, with the protection of property, the safety of the person was also guaranteed. In earlier times grave oppression or excessive exactions by the village banker brought their own swift retribution; but this check disappeared under our rule, which substituted a resort to the civil Courts. Such a remedy was of little or no value to the ignorant cultivator, while it was eminently suited to the intelligent and sometimes unscrupulous usurer. The process of dispossession of the ryot, through foreclosure of mortgages and so forth, proceeded in some parts of India at a dangerous pace, and forced upon the Government the adoption of measures such as the Deccan Agriculturists Relief Act of 1879, designed to check the transfer of ownership of land to the non-agriculturist classes in extinction of indebtedness. In a country like India, however, such measures could only have a partial success, and it was clear that some means were required for enabling the ryot to obtain credit both for tiding over bad seasons and for effecting improvements. Accordingly, in 1883 and 1884, the Land Improvement and Agriculturists Loans Acts were passed, under which the various local governments in India were empowered to advance money on easy terms for specific purposes. Considerable relief has been afforded by these measures, as is evidenced by the fact that, in the year 1908-9, a sum of £2,261,040 was advanced to cultivators, while the total advances out-

standing at the close of that year were £3,887,283. But it was felt that relief could not hope to be complete so long as Government were the agents, since the formalities and regulations which must be observed and adhered to regarding repayments of Government loans acted as a deterrent to many, and caused them to continue to prefer a resort to the local usurer.

Towards the close of the 19th century  
 The New Societies. attention was drawn to the development in Europe of the system of credit societies as organized in Germany and Italy, and Mr. F. A. Nicholson, in his comprehensive report upon the possibility of establishing Land Banks in India, strongly recommended the adoption of measures based upon the system introduced in Germany by Raiffeisen. Other officers of Government in India took the matter up, notably Mr. Dupernex, and eventually, in 1904, the Co-operative Credit Societies Act was passed by the Indian Legislature authorizing the formation of central societies (called "co-operative unions"), empowered to raise loans and accept deposits in the interests of affiliated urban or rural societies, of which the last named work without share capital and with unlimited liability. The movement, inaugurated by this legislation, has met with an altogether unexpected degree of success, as will be shown further on, but it will be well to glance again at the conditions obtaining in Indian society, since these afford the explanation, on the one hand, of the difficulties of inaugurating the new system, and, on the other, of the promptitude with which it appears to have taken root when once officially inaugurated.

India is collectivist to the last degree. The family of the Hindu is a joint family; the village community is a complete organization, self-contained and self-sufficing. Past custom and old tradition fill a place in Hindu life which is hardly susceptible of realization by

the most conservative of Europeans. Individualism, therefore, is entirely foreign to the Indian scheme of life. One result of this is an absence of initiative. For example, in times of famine, though splendid acts of individual charity are frequently to be met with, it is the *Sarkar* (Government) and its officers who alone are looked to for help, and individuality or resource in emergencies are seldom to be found in the private citizen. Private enterprise, and the energy to organize, in regard to matters affecting the community at large, are extremely rare. Reference has already been made to the extraordinary expansion of agricultural credit, consequent upon the added security of tenure which followed the advent of a strong central Government in India ; but this did not have the effect, as might have been expected, of strengthening the bargaining power of the agriculturist in his relations with the money lender. The conditions which, perhaps, justified the usurious terms exacted for financing agriculture in earlier days had passed away ; but the cultivator, though possessing for the first time valuable security, found no relaxation of the terms imposed on the loan of the necessary capital, but only a greater readiness to accommodate with advances for unproductive expenditure on marriage, and other ceremonial occasions.

In fact the community itself displayed no capacity for adapting itself, economically, to new and potentially improved conditions. The apathy, which in India has always obstructed efforts at social or economic reforms, stood, in the first instance, in the way of any scheme of co-operative credit, not because this was foreign to the constitution of Indian society, but because it was a novelty. The social organization had for centuries been furnished with a caste whose special function was to finance agricultural and other industries, and any change which tended to modify the old order was looked at

The  
Difficulties.

askance. As is usual, therefore, the intervention of the British Government was necessary, and it is instructive to note that, when the Co-operative Credit Societies Bill was introduced into the Legislative Council in 1903 it was objected to by several Indian members on the ground, among others, that there was, in the Indian character, an absence of the spirit "of co-operation." The objections were overruled, Government passed the Bill into law, and within eight years are compelled to amend the Act so as to allow for its expansion. As was stated when the amending Bill was introduced, "It has been found that the root of the matter does exist in India and that Indians will co-operate." In fact, the collectivism which characterizes Indian society appears to lend itself with extraordinary readiness to the mutual self-help which is the basic principle upon which Raiffeisen, in Germany, and Luzzatti, in Italy, reckoned in establishing their co-operative credit societies.

Let the figures speak for themselves.

**The Success Attained.** On March 31, 1906 (after two years' working), there were in India 283 societies with a membership of 28,629 and a capital of Rs.4,73,219, of which Rs.70,152 represented the Government's contribution. Two years later there were 1,357 societies with 148,429 members and a capital of Rs.44,07,024, of which only Rs.6,51,816 were contributed by the State; and the latest figures available give 3,456 as the number of the societies, 226,958 as the number of members, and Rs.1,03,27,743 (of which only Rs.7,21,775 are from Government) as the capital. The societies are thus increasing at a phenomenal rate, and they are firmly established on a self-supporting basis; while loans are well and punctually repaid. Now that the Government have floated the scheme it is being willingly and generously supported by leading Indian capitalists, and in several provinces Central Land Banks have been established in furtherance of the movement. Even under

the original Act the measure was aimed not only at organizing the credit of agriculturists, but, in urban areas, at establishing similar societies for special industries such as the weavers and leather-workers. Under the amending Bill it is proposed to afford facilities for co-operation, not merely for borrowing, but also for purchasing and producing, and in the light of the marked success which has attended the first measure, there seems no reason to doubt that, in its enlarged scope, it will also suit the constitution of Indian society and meet a long-felt want.

It is perhaps reasonable to hope that in the legislation of 1904 the Government of India have at last found means, consistent with the organization of the social system of India, for checking the transference of lands from the agricultural to the non-agricultural classes, and that an era of increased prosperity is in sight. Now that the first impetus has been given, private Indian gentlemen, especially in Bombay, are coming forward in support of the co-operative movement; and although, as yet, the registrars of the local societies are Government officials, there seems reason to hope that the time is not far distant when the scheme can be entirely divorced from official support and control.



## CHAPTER XIV.

### INDIA AND THE COLOUR QUESTION.

In an interesting appendix to his book on "Ancient and Modern Imperialism," Lord Cromer draws attention to the marked extent which colour antipathies play in the modern as compared with the ancient world. He observes that modern peoples have enslaved only the dark-coloured races, while ancient empires were indiscriminate in the sources whence they drew their slaves ; and he is inclined to find the origin of the sense of white superiority, which is so strong a force in modern world-politics, in the recrudescence of slavery in the 15th century, which established in men's minds a connexion between darkness of skin and race inferiority. Certainly so far as concerns those regions of the world where antipathy of race is strongest an evident connexion with the system of negro slavery will be readily admitted. The Southern States of the American Union are now directly paying for the horrors of the slave trade in the troublesome problems provided by their black population ; and the Bantu races of South Africa, though not of pure negro stock, yet have a common origin with the American negro in the swamps and forests of Central Africa, and the taint of servitude in a modified form is theirs as well. They were only "black cattle" in the eyes of the Dutch settlers and to this day they remain

the hewers of wood and drawers of water—or the equivalent thereof in a timberless and drougthy land.

In Asia, again, between indigenous race and race, even where these differ in complexion, there exists no colour antipathy; but the negro is still despised by the Persian and Hindu as intensely as by the European. In their thoughts he is still the *habshi*, the barbaric Ethiopian who has been enslaved by the great conquerors of the past and doomed to degrading offices about the palace, just as he is depicted in "The Arabian Nights." The Arabs, alone, as they carried Islam into Northern Africa, seem to have developed a tolerance for the black peoples which certainly admitted of inter-marriage. Possibly this was due to the deterioration of the invaders, and possibly to some uplifting of the conquered people under the influence of the new creed. But we know that the pure Asiatic still holds the Sudanese mixed races in disdain, and that the Chinese, who inter-marries freely with the various races of Malaya, would not resort to Kaffir women during his exile in South Africa. Asiatic, as well as European, finds the negro antipathetic; and both have reasons for looking on him as a slave.

But the theory of the slave taint is obviously inapplicable to the latest recrudescence of the colour question, for this concerns peoples who have not been enslaved by Europe. South Africa, Canada, the United States, and Australia have all within recent years manifested an aversion for the peoples of Asia, which is going to provide one of the difficult problems of the century. Under modern conditions antipathy cannot possibly go further than the policy of absolute exclusion which these States have enunciated, and which they are apparently prepared to make good by war if need be. There needs must be an overwhelming impulse of some kind behind

Antipathy of  
Asiatics.



this determination, which at first sight has so little to excuse it on grounds of humanity and justice and is so much at variance with the traditional tolerance and catholicism of the English name. In South Africa it may be argued, and blunders of method on the part of the Transvaal Government have made the argument plausible, that the cause of the Hindu and the Chinaman has never had fair hearing. Their case was hopelessly prejudiced from the beginning by the South African's antipathy to the Kaffir, and by his ignorance which confounded all alien races in one common dislike. Undoubtedly in this there is a measure of truth, but a glance at Canada and Australia will show how far it is from being the whole truth. Unlike South Africa, which has all her native problems yet to solve, Canada and Australia disposed of the North American Indians and the Australian blacks far too easily for them to have inherited from the struggle any abiding antipathy to alien races in general. Yet in their determination to hold their doors against the peoples of Asia all three Dominions are equally resolute.

For this aversion, therefore, we have  
**A Comprehen-** to look for some common cause, applicable  
**sive Aversion.** to the Asiatic as well as to the black.

It will not be one concerned with the peculiar failings alleged against the negro in Ohio, or the Chinaman on the Pacific Coast; nor will it be based on the measurable difference of attainments between the aliens and our own people. For no one can deny that the Indian coolie has attained a higher civilization than the Basuto, and is possessed of qualities of industry, thrift, and peacefulness which are ordinarily welcomed in a European State. As for the Japanese, it is idle for new half-grown countries like Australia, and Canada to pretend to despise the achievements of a race who have made themselves a Great Power, and shown so many of the higher qualities. If the

democracies oversea have much to teach the Kaffir, they have at least something to learn from Hindus and Japanese.

It seems, then, that the underlying cause of race aversion is a most comprehensive as well as a most compelling one. The root impulse, indeed, is readily recognized, for it is the simple emotion of fear; it is only in expressing the complexity of the things feared that the difficulty lies. Let us put ourselves in the place of one of the newer peoples. Numerically few in themselves, with large lands needing development, their crying need was labour. They found it in the indigenous native races, or, failing these, they drew it from abroad. In either case the coloured helot lives on less than white men's wages and at a lower standard than he. The first result is that white men refuse to labour at the same class of work, and the "poor white" comes into existence. Soon the labourer, black or yellow, begins to be discontented with the convention which makes him a mere drudge. Contact with white races, while it does him no good in various ways, at least spurs his ambitions. He seeks to rise in the social scale by becoming an artisan, a shopkeeper, a cultivator. Unless checked by restrictive legislation he soon becomes all three, in each case underselling the white man by reason of his thrift and cheaper living and ousting him from his place. Those who have seen whole streets of Indian shops in some country towns in Natal and the Transvaal know how real such a danger is. From these consequences the European seeks no escape save by repression. If it were only a question of economic competition, however, we might acquiesce in the Dominions' attitude, but we should hardly be enthusiasts for it. But in truth it is far more. There enters into the question a variety of social and moral and political issues. What the Dominions honestly feel is that the whole question of their national future is at stake.

Contact with civilization has always debauched the black man by teaching him new vices. The Asiatic is not intoxicated in the same way by his new surroundings, for he remembers a civilization of his own; but enfranchisement from the ties of home and custom, and, it must be confessed, the enhanced sense of his own value which he imbibes from contact with less reputable whites, tend to make him an unattractive member of the community. But it is the distant rather than the immediate prospect that appals. If the black alien is allowed free play he will undoubtedly develop a sort of civilization which will be an inferior copy of the one he sees around him; and as he progresses in wealth and intelligence and the white man is continuously being displaced in the economic struggle, there will come a day when the black will demand intermarriage with the white, and eventually a further day when by constitutional or violent means he will achieve his purpose. To all white men in the Dominions such a prospect seems racial suicide. Integrity of race comes before everything, for in that is summarized all that makes life worth living, to the European. Better stagnation and hard times, and better, if need be, a ruthless war of extermination, than the slow betrayal of European traditions and morality by a mixture of blood.

These are the thoughts that are turning South Africans more and more to the idea of segregation as offering the only escape from the evils of assimilation by the Bantu races; and similar to these are the arguments that lead Canadians and Australians to the resolve that the expanding millions of Asia shall never swamp their territories with a brown or yellow flood. The only difference is that the horror of race mixture is not as instant as it is in South Africa, where the Kaffir is in a great majority and where crimes of violence are fre-

quent. What the Australian and Canadian chiefly fears is the economic dislocation which Asiatic competition brings; the gradual squeezing out of the white man from the regions open to immigration; a gradual deterioration of the national character through contact with the social and moral ideas of Asia; and certainly, as regards the Chinese and Japanese, the political dangers which would ensue from the settlement in their midst of hundreds of thousands of subjects of a foreign Power.

As regards China and Japan, the matter hangs for the moment in unstable equilibrium. China is not yet in a position to contest the question of her subjects' free right of entry. Japan is our ally and does not acquiesce in the exclusion of her subjects. But for the time being an uneasy compromise has been reached by which she undertakes voluntarily to restrict their emigration. A firmer settlement will be required ere long, and it will tax the world's statesmanship to attain it peacefully. As regards India, however, it can hardly be said that there has been a settlement at all. After a long period of disputes and misunderstandings Indians have been excluded from the Dominions; but this has been done in such a way as to leave feelings of bitterness both in India and England, and some uncertainty as to whether the end has really been reached.

Sentiment is nowhere stronger than in Asia, and in estimating the reaction of the colour problem on India it is important to consider how the Indian himself regards questions of colour difference. Hundreds of thousands of Europeans are living in India, and it might be supposed that contact with them had given rise to colour antipathy in India itself. But this is not the case. Between Europeans and Indians there is, indeed, a sense of great discrepancies of thought and feeling rendering each a riddle to the other and immeasurably impeding the understanding and sympathy

India's  
Attitude.

which must preclude any close intercourse. These differences are greatest in the domain of social and domestic life, and peculiarly great as regards the position of women. They are strong enough to present a formidable obstacle to intermarriage and to create a prejudice against those of mixed race. But there is nothing in the Englishman's feeling for the Asiatic resembling his aversion for the negro. Community of race with the Aryan, similarity of religion with the Moslem, respect for the vanished empires and monuments and literatures of the East, may account for this. No reasoning person who thinks of the Ramayana or the Taj Mahal can fall into the crude error of regarding the peoples who produced them as on a level with the black races who have given nothing to the world.

Nor does the Indian readily connect differences of complexion with racial or social superiority. Probably this was not always so. It is possible that India has had colour problems as vexed as any that now perplex the world, and that caste was a deliberate invention of a fair-skinned invading race to prevent its contamination with darker blood. But centuries of conquest and disorder have broken up the old gradations, and though caste endures, purity of blood does not. You may see small, dark, round-headed Brahmans and fair pariahs; and these anomalies are respected by a certain conventional delicacy in the use of adjectives for colour. "Wheat coloured" is a complimentary attribute; "fair-skinned" is, curiously enough, appropriated to the British soldier; and *kala* (black), which conveys a sense of the degraded or terrible, would not be applied in ordinary language to a dark-skinned Hindu, but only to a negro. The brown man admires fairness of complexion; but he feels it unsafe to him to make it any longer an index of racial superiority. On the other hand, he intensely resents being mistaken for what he regards as black. Nor, in spite of the way in which the "damned

nigger " attitude of a few Europeans has been exploited, can it be fairly said that such offence is often given. If Europeans are unpopular with Indians, it is not for any sense of colour difference, but because they are felt to be intellectually and morally strangers.

But the dominant reason why there is no colour question in India is climate. The Europeans in Indian sun, which makes it a place where India. no white man may make a home or rear up sons to succeed him, has saved it from being the battleground of two competing societies and civilizations. When two peoples sharply divided by race and religion are settled side by side in the same streets of the same cities, when their children attend the same schools and play and fight together, when the religious usages of each are performed in hearing and often in sight of the other, when the two intermingle freely and have constant dealings in business and litigation, obviously there are infinite opportunities of friction. Yet, as has occurred with Hindus and Mahomedans in India, if both are numerically strong enough for neither to exclude the other, and if both are of the same civilization, the mere material advantages of peace and quiet may do much to hide if not to compose the discord. But when one race, numerically weak, thinks itself superior and sees itself in danger of such economic competition from the other as will compel it to abandon its own higher standard and to admit the other to intercourse that may lead to admixture of blood, then all the prejudices and passions of race are shaken from sleep by a self-interest that is neither entirely noble nor entirely sordid, but wholly imperious; and to them are added, by way of extra exacerbation, the many subsidiary irritations and annoyances arising from mere contact with neighbours of different customs and practices from ourselves.

From such causes of colour conflict India is free. The European usually lives in his own surroundings at a dis-

tance from the native city ; he has his own churches, clubs, schools, and in large cities to a large extent his own shops. So far as possible he has preserved small portions of his own civilization in every station in India. By so doing he may have been a loser as regards knowledge of the people, but he has saved himself from the discomforts and annoyances incidental to closer contact. More than all, he does not feel himself competing with the native of India, nor, save for the minority of advanced political opinions, does the Indian look on him as a competitor. There is grumbling when wealthy Indians acquire houses in European civil stations ; there is heart-burning among the small community of English families domiciled in India as subordinate posts in the public service are more and more closed to them. But most Englishmen regard themselves as having no tenure of India other than that which they derive from doing work which there is no one else to do ; and they can survey the Indian's progress in the arts of commerce and administration without any of the bitterness which they would feel if they thought that their own civilization or their livelihood was threatened.

India and  
Foreign  
Countries.

The feeling of the Hindus of caste towards the out-caste classes is a closer approach to race antipathy as we know it. But there is no race problem in an active form, since immemorial custom has rigidly segregated the depressed communities, and they have shown few signs yet of any endeavour to extricate themselves from their seclusion. Regarding the rest of the world, India has hitherto been supremely uninterested. Temperament and geography alike have made her a recluse. Within historical times she has sent forth no armies or navies, no missionaries, and no explorers. Mountains, forests, and seas have barred the free migration of her people ; and having long ceased to be nomads, they have come to look with sus-

picion upon the man who wanders. Respectability of life in the Indian's eyes is best secured by abiding at home. If a man goes elsewhere he goes to better himself, and the chances are that he does so in disreputable ways. When he returns there is no great curiosity to hear about his experiences in exile : the traditional view is that doubtless the narrator is making out the best account he can of places probably inferior and experiences probably undesirable. A tale of successes is discounted ; a tale of hardship finds little sympathy. Even of regions with which she has long had traffic, such as the Hejaz, Afghanistan, Ceylon, and Mauritius, India has known and cared but little ; and of the great outer world she has had no vision whatever.

Economic pressure, facilities of transportation, and the spread of education have done much in the last few decades to break down this reserve. Indian labour has found its way in increasing volume to Mauritius and British Guiana and Uganda and Natal. The Boer War took many Indians of intelligence superior to the labourer's to South Africa. Hindu students have begun to find their way to technical colleges in the United States and Japan. Indian gentlemen of position have begun to travel either for the purposes of Royal ceremonials or to find and to confer with political sympathizers. India has awoken from her lethargy towards the rest of the world to find herself engaged in colour conflict with new European democracies in two Continents.

Of the struggle in British Columbia a brief mention will suffice. The pioneer Indian settlers there were Sikhs discharged from a Hongkong regiment, who found the high wages of Vancouver so much to their liking that they sent for relatives and friends from India until the community grew to a few thousands. They were received not unsympathetically at first, and helped through the rigours of their first winter. Many of them found con-

Struggle in  
British  
Columbia.



genial work in the lumber trade, and a few took to commerce, and all prospered. But a simultaneous incursion of Chinese and Japanese immigrants in larger numbers aroused the resentment of the labour organizations, and these both in Canada and the United States were relentless in stirring feeling against all Asiatics. The charges of uncleanness and vice were, as regards the Indians, certainly exaggerated. The Hindus in British Columbia have departed largely from caste restrictions in the matter of food and drink, but are not either an insanitary or an immoral community. Nor because of the climate was there ever much real danger of their effecting such a lodgment as to prove a danger to the white. But the labour organizations carried the day, and after discreditable riots had occurred in the neighbouring State of Washington, it was decided to terminate Indian immigration into Canada.

This was done by the device of prohibiting the landing of immigrants who have not journeyed directly from the land of their birth with a ticket purchased there. An attempt was also made to induce the settled Hindus to transport themselves at the State expense to Central America, but it fell through in the moment of success. The chief political importance of the small settlement in British Columbia lies in the fact that some of its members are in touch with anarchist Hindu leaders in the United States; and that through this channel money and inflammatory literature and misleading information find a way back, particularly to the Punjab, where they have contributed to recent disquiets. It is denied that arms also have been imported. Even within recent months a Sikh journal published in Vancouver has been proscribed in British India as seeking to promote disaffection. But, broadly speaking, Vancouver is no longer a serious storm centre. There can be no doubt that Canada is too well defended by nature

for even the hardy peoples of the Punjab to be really anxious to invade her.

It is quite otherwise with South Africa, which, particularly in Natal, has a climate where the Indian can thrive. It is in

The Case  
of Natal.

Natal that the colour question as it affects India really arises in its most acute form. Of recent years the dramatic struggle in the Transvaal has attracted more attention; but, as we shall see, it turns immediately on a minor issue—the means of identifying a few thousand Indians lawfully settled in the country. Potential danger there may be, but no immediate danger. In Natal the issue is far wider. It is simply whether the country can be preserved for white civilization.

It is nearly 40 years since Natal, finding that her multitudes of Kaffirs would not make efficient labourers, embarked on her fateful policy of importing indentured labour from India. The coolies were indentured for five years, with the option of re-engaging for two years more, or of returning to India, or of settling in Natal on payment of a special poll-tax of £3 a year. Their wages were low according to South African standards, yet sufficiently high, according to Indian ones, to bring the Indian labourer in his thousands. By 1897 there were nearly as many Indians as white men, only some half being still under indenture; and the free Indians had encroached upon the white man's sphere in every walk of life—particularly in retail trade in the small towns. To realize how seriously white civilization was menaced, one must remember that the black race also outnumbers the European race in Natal by ten to one. In 1897 Natal awoke to her danger and passed the notorious "Natal Act," which prohibits the landing of any immigrant not qualified to write out a passage of fifty words dictated to him in a European language. The difficulty of preventing Natal Indians from passing over the boundary into the Transvaal has contributed greatly to the feeling against

the Indian in the latter Colony ; and this feeling, reflected in Natal, has led to a steadily growing movement in favour of refusing trading licenses, of deporting coolies at the end of their indentures, and even of prohibiting indentured recruitment.

Often this feeling found expression in offensive ways that seemed to ignore the undoubted services that Indian labour had rendered. On the other hand, the numbers and wealth of the Natal Indians have been a source of great strength to their brethren in the Transvaal, and have encouraged them to demands which would not otherwise have been made. The growth of feeling against the Asiatic in both Colonies has culminated in the Natal Government's decision to allow no settlement in the country after the expiry of indentures ; to which the Government of India, holding to the view which they have always maintained that British Indian subjects should be entitled to full citizenship anywhere within the Empire, have replied by declaring their intention to cut off the supply of indentured labour. Honours are easy ; but it remains to be seen how Natal will get along in future without fresh Indian coolies, and, what is even more difficult, how she will deal with the large numbers already settled in her borders. The labour problem is likely to become acute at once, for recruiting in India was definitely terminated on the last day of June this year.

The narrative of the struggle in the Transvaal must be told very briefly. As long ago as 1885 the Kruger Government passed a law requiring Asiatic immigrants into the Transvaal to register themselves and pay a registration tax of £3. The law was not well administered and complaints were numerous, and owing to the strained relations between the Republic and the Home Government these were actually made a cause of offence against the latter. After the war the Crown Colony Government found itself confronted with much

the same problem as its Republican predecessor. But feeling no doubt as to the measures demanded by public opinion, it decided to give permits of admission to only those Indians who had been resident before the war. Very soon the permit system broke down. Prospects in the Transvaal were attractive enough to stimulate the forgery of certificates and the procuring of false evidence of identification to an alarming rate. The Government decided that more effective means of identification were required and instituted finger-print impressions. All Indians were required to register by this system. A storm of opposition broke out. It was objected first that compulsory registration was a needless imputation on the honour of lawful residents ; secondly, that it was a device for their wanton extrusion ; thirdly, that the use of finger-prints degraded them to the level of "Kaffirs and criminals." The registration law was passed ; and the Secretary of State disallowed it. The Imperial Government could not overrule the wishes of the new colony, but responsible Government was on the eve of coming into existence in the Transvaal, and so his Majesty's Ministers took the coward's course of waiting to be pressed a little harder. The first act of the new Parliament was to apply the invited pressure, and the Registration Act became law. But the delay and vacillation of the Home Government, and finally their recorded protests that the position of Asiatics lawfully resident in the Transvaal was unsatisfactory, threw fuel on the fire of agitation.

There was no attempt on the part of the Indian leaders to fight the question on the main issue of unrestricted immigration. They took the bad line of concentrating their wrath on the registration provisions. These were, indeed, open to serious objection. The rules, which were made in haste and without expert advice, insisted on ten finger prints. With expert recorders so many would not have been necessary ; it was clumsy and

impolitic to insist on them, seeing that in India so many prints were required only from convicted offenders. Mr. Gandhi and his friends made the most of this point, preaching to ignorant and illiterate followers that the Transvaal Government was making them like Kaffirs, criminals, and dogs, and bound them by oath not to register. These leaders have only themselves to thank if unbiassed opinion suspected them of being chiefly concerned to defeat the registration system in order to keep a gate open for illicit entry. On the other hand, the Government were at no pains to amend the procedure or to adapt themselves to Indian susceptibilities. After delays, which seemed to the Indians to portend concession, they put the law in motion. The Indians had not registered and the leaders were arrested, glorying in their martyrdom. A few weeks of prison, however, weakened Mr. Gandhi's resolution, and he arranged a private treaty with the Colonial Secretary. The Indians were to register voluntarily and not within the Act, and thereby save their honour. What concession Mr. Smuts promised is uncertain : it is known only that Mr. Gandhi declares that he promised a repeal of the offensive Act. Apparently, the main battle was over, and the Government had secured its object.

But some of the Punjabi and Bombay Tactics of the leaders, less supple than Mr. Gandhi, Indians. declined to be bound by his undertaking to register "voluntarily." He had raised the storm, they said ; let him allay it if he could. Two of them assaulted Mr. Gandhi as he went to register. This did not deter most of the Indians from registering in a sullen and dilatory fashion. But the process was hardly complete when the dispute broke out afresh over the repeal of the Registration Act, which Mr. Smuts refused. The Indians burned their certificates in a bonfire and defied the law. Forgotten claims were revived, and new ones invented. From the details of the registration

system the controversy passed to the admission of a certain number annually of schoolmasters and priests : and the right of travel of distinguished Indians. Whatever the justice of these proposals, they were not put forward on their merits at all, but only as a happy means of embarrassing a Government whose patience had been sorely tried by the astute tactics with which it had been opposed, and which had long since been worried past the point at which reasonable concessions were to be expected. Again the Transvaal Government put the law into force in a wooden and impassive manner. The chief result was to disclose that the bad draftsmanship of the Acts offered new opportunities of evading them ; while a shriek went up of the indignities and hardships undergone by the martyrs who went to gaol. The Johannesburg gaol is notoriously cramped, and prison discipline is bound to conflict with the leisurely observance of minute caste ceremonials by political prisoners who are also adepts in the art of passive resistance. It is probable that there was some measure of reason in the complaints which a little judicious tolerance would have redressed. But the Transvaal Government remained inert ; and the Indians successfully made it appear that cruelty and insult were its deliberate policy. For it is not the broad fact of exclusion, but it is the highly coloured tales of petty oppression, of parity of treatment with the Kaffir, of municipal and railway discriminations, of alleged indignities on arrest and deprivations and hardships in gaol, that first really touched the public imagination in India.

It is greatly to be regretted that not one of the three Governments concerned have realized their responsibility to end this mischief. Every one knows how the Indian's story of wrong gains by repetition, till a threat becomes a savage beating, and one homicide a massacre. There have been correspondence and inquiries in plenty, but there has been no attempt to allay or to appease public

feeling by an authoritative statement by the Imperial Government of facts and policy. During the period antecedent to Union the question was suffered to fall into abeyance. It was felt that there was more hope of a larger settlement from a Government which was responsible not merely for the Transvaal but for Natal. The Union Government has now been in office for more than a year, and is preparing to deal with the Asiatic question. Surely it is time that the larger settlement was made—not in the privacy of Ministers' rooms or of semi-official comment on official despatches, but openly to the world, that the Empire may right itself in such an important matter.

“The continued ill-treatment of Public Feeling Indians in South Africa” is the text in India. that inspired Mr. Gokhale's speech when he moved a resolution in favour of prohibiting indentured labour for Natal; and the phrase would be unhesitatingly accepted by the great mass of Indian and even English opinion in India. There is no doubt of the sincerity and gravity of the feeling; and the fact that the Imperial and Indian Governments have shown somewhat ineffective sympathy with it has lent it strength. Indians feel that if there is no official reply to the stories of insult and humiliation these evils must be true. “That the Indian has not received the just treatment to which he is entitled as a subject of the British Crown, and that disabilities and indignities are heaped upon him because he is an Indian, are broad facts that are not and cannot be disputed.” This is the emphatic verdict of a recent writer on India who will not be readily suspected of undue sympathy with Indian national aspirations. All Indian opinion would be with him—indeed, most English opinion. None the less, the new democracies abroad would be equally emphatic in condemning

Mr. Chirol's *dictum*; and men of moderate and reasonable judgment are to be found among them too. Where opinions so conflicting are honestly and resolutely held, truth cannot lie wholly on one side. We must not let an appeal to rights and justice and such abstractions conclude the matter for us without some attempt to give these definite meaning. This is all the more necessary since with the Indian community at large the controversy has passed now into the field of pure abstractions. Individuals were excited by the misfortunes of other individuals whom they knew. But in the hands of the politicians the demand is one for the right of Indians to full political citizenship on equal terms with any other subjects of the King-Emperor—a speciously just and reasonable claim which is sure to command the sympathy of loose thinkers.

There is no question of the day on which it is so necessary to rid ourselves of false pre-possessions. Doubtless it is a fine ideal that the British Indian subjects of the King should be British citizens in the fullest sense, free to go where they will within the Empire, and to find their living as they like with no more restrictions than any Englishman. Doubtless it is unpleasant to remember that the Kruger Government's discrimination against British Asiatics was counted unto it for an offence that helped to necessitate war. Doubtless it is capable of being represented as a monstrous injustice that Sikhs and Pathans who served the British cause in South Africa should be denied asylum there by the very Government that some of them died to set up. Doubtless, again, it is a perturbing realization for the millions of India that the Government which they have believed all-powerful is powerless to save them from the exclusive legislation of the Dominions. But when we come to think the matter out we shall discover more important considerations than any of these; and we shall



find that the bitterest criticism that the Imperial Government deserves is only the blame of being so slow to realize what were the really governing factors of a new and difficult problem.

For what are the rights and the justice **Rights of** that we are bound in honour to secure to **British Indians.** Indian British subjects? The widest rights and the most even justice before the law that we can imagine, subject only to one condition, that equality of treatment must be qualified exactly in so far as it is necessary for the maintenance of our rule, and no further. The Raj must be preserved or it can confer no benefits; consistently with its preservation its benefits should be the widest. But no one talks of injustice or disabilities because the very conditions of our rule in India necessitate in practice a wide disparity of treatment between Europeans and Asiatics. In India the law purports to regard both equally, yet even the law discriminates in such matters as trial for offences and appointments to high office. Rules and regulations discriminate still further, for instance in respect of the grant of arms, or the differential rates of pay fixed for posts open to both races. Administrative practice tacitly distinguishes most of all. No one pretends that in its provision of hill stations, cantonments, and civil stations, railways, official houses, and medical and spiritual ministrations the Indian Government does not take thought more generously for its European than for its Indian subjects. It recognizes that in all these respects the former's needs are the greater; but it endeavours to prevent the disparity from exceeding the minimum required for efficiency. Granted the major premiss that Englishmen are needed in India, the Government is not only justified but wise in making reasonable provision for their physical, mental, and moral welfare.

But, it will be said, there is all the difference in the world between the small preferences shown to Englishmen

in India for climatic reasons and a policy which denies to Indians the very right to exist at all within the Dominions where they could thrive and prosper. The latter is a flagrant violation of the solemn promises of impartial justice to all creeds and races made by Lord Canning in the Queen's name after the Mutiny. As to this, let us admit at once that the pledge of 1858 was made without a thought for oversea nations hardly born, and certainly without any vision of a future in which they might have a say in its fulfilment. But no promise can in equity be held to extend to new conditions which those who made it could not possibly foresee, particularly when it involves others who were no party to the promise. Proclamations meant for India were not meant to bind the Dominions; it is unfair that they should, and it is madness to imagine that they ever will. We must get back to the essential conditions of the problem to be in sight of its only real solution.

These essential conditions may be summarized as racial, geographical, and historical. These conditions have created that indeterminable difference between white and brown, discussed already, which leads the white man to the conviction that his civilization is imperilled if brown men share it on an equal footing. Geography has decreed that South Africa should be a battleground by making it a country where, but for artificial restrictions, the two races can expand and thrive side by side; and the long history of British Colonial development has settled that the Dominions shall be supreme in their house even to the extent of closing the doors to whom they will.

The Essential  
Conditions.

Now it is possible to take the view that South Africans are wrong in their conviction that an Asiatic immigration carries the terrible consequences imputed to it; but it is not possible to maintain that there exists any power to constrain them, and that a serious attempt to do so

would not end the Empire altogether. Some idealists will call this a humiliating and impotent conclusion. To these we can only say that since a British Empire of the new kind in prospect, lacking the ideal equality of full common citizenship, may yet in this complex and material world be a greater force for good than no British Empire at all, but only a small commercial island on the coast of Europe, it may still be statesmanship to admit the lesser evil for the greater good. But if, as every one thinks who has encountered in real life the problem of the Asiatic in the Dominions, and seen the insidious mischief to white civilization which his presence works, South Africa and Canada and Australia are absolutely right in their determination not to have him, then let us face that difficult fact with such candour and resolution as we may and cease at last from speaking with two voices.

The newspapers report that "anti-Chinese disturbances broke out at Birkenhead in consequence of alleged insults offered to white women. A mob of 3,000 persons on Sunday night smashed the windows of many Chinese houses." One can imagine Mr. Smuts wiring to the Colonial Office—*Mutato nomine de te fabula narratur*. Race instinct, it seems, is asserting itself in Cheshire as plainly as on the Rand, and if it were possible to imagine Indian labourers invading Lancashire mills or Norfolk agriculture, how long would the talk of "equal justice" and "indignities and disabilities" avail to stay the tide which would rise and sweep them back? Justice to our own comes first, and we should not in justice to the Dominions deny them (even if we could) that right to defend their civilization which we should be the first to assert at home. The Dominions are still unfilled; they have not been won for England or the white race so long as the brown races can submerge them. It is something to the good that in the Memorandum

on "The Position of British Indians in the Dominions," prepared by the India Office for the recent Imperial Conference, this governing fact is at last clearly and definitely recognized. "It is useless," says the Memorandum, "to attempt to veil the fact that the policy of building up new nations of European blood within the Empire is absolutely incompatible with the idea that every British subject, whatever his race, shall have free right of ingress to any part of the Empire. This being so all that his Majesty's Government is entitled to ask is that the immigration policy of the Dominions shall be so framed as to avoid wanton injury to the self-respect of non-European British subjects. The policy of basing exclusion upon an education, not a racial, criterion, meets this requirement, although, in its application to individual cases, it admits of being administered so as to exclude Indians on racial grounds." So far as it goes, this declaration of principle is unexceptionable, but it has had very little publicity accorded it, and there is no sign at present that the India Office intends to bring its meaning home to the peoples of India, where an authoritative and unmistakable statement of the principle is most necessary.

Surely it is time that the Imperial Government showed itself capable of taking an Imperial survey, and, instead of displaying a hypocritical sympathy with natural but mistaken aspirations that it has no intention whatever of really supporting, set itself to redress the soreness that it has tacitly done so much to cause. The Indians still understand and respect an order meant to be final. Once they realize that the decision is against them they will acquiesce. Conservatism and the home-staying instinct are strong still; nor is India so over-populated that in self-preservation she must pour her people abroad; nor has administration done more than a fraction of what it may do to increase her capacity. And once the Dominions feel that the Home Government is not pri-

vately against them, the door will be opened to those subsidiary measures of alleviation which common sense has long demanded, but which prejudice, suspicion, and exasperation have refused. There is no reason even now why the Union Government should not borrow a competent officer to advise it on Indian prejudices and peculiarities, instead of relying on the quite inadequate counsels which it has hitherto commanded; why the identification of Indians lawfully resident abroad should not be completed inoffensively; why a certain limited supply of educated teachers and *maulavis* should not be admitted; and why Ruling Chiefs and notables should not visit the Dominions as travellers without let or hindrance. That this has not been done hitherto is attributable chiefly to the devious and elusive tactics of Mr. Gandhi and his friends who succeeded—as they desired and hoped to succeed—in thoroughly arousing the devil in the Transvaal Government and people; but in a large measure, too, to the weak sentimentality of the Indian and Imperial Governments. The former has at least this excuse, that it had many other troubles on its hands, and it was rather an agreeable change to be able for once to run with the hounds rather than be hunted as the hare. But for his Majesty's Ministers it is difficult indeed to find apology. Their vacillation and shortsightedness have shown how little they are qualified to handle the really complex problems of a changing Empire. The moral of the problem is that it is time we found a better organ to handle inter-Imperial affairs.

## CHAPTER XV.

### RELIGION AND CASTE.

[By CLAUDE H. HILL, C.S.I., C.I.E.]

The task of giving, in a limited space, an intelligible account of the religions professed by the millions of His Majesty's subjects inhabiting India presents difficulties which can perhaps be realized best by a brief reference to the statistical drybones of the Census returns for 1901. Of the total population (including Native States) of 294½ millions then recorded, 207 millions were returned as Hindus, 62½ millions as Musulmans, and 8½ as Animists. While these figures have to be supplemented by the numbers of Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, Parsis, Christians, and Jews, those relating to the Hindus have also to be subdivided into various sects. Hinduism itself is of so fluid and complex a character that it has taken Sir Herbert Risley many pages of discussion in his "People of India" to arrive at its elliptical definition as being "Animism more or less transformed by philosophy," or, in other words, as "Magic tempered by metaphysics." To the lay mind, however, no definition can convey any conception of the complexity and unlimited variations of the manifestations of Hindu religious belief, and one must be content to endeavour to describe some of its broader features, and at the same time to indicate its intimate

connexion with, or rather dependence upon, the social institution of caste.

In the first place, it should be of peculiar interest to us of the British Empire to realize that the basis of the higher Hinduism is, in its earliest known form, closely analogous to, if not identical with, that of the earliest religions professed in Europe. Max Müller, in his lectures on the "Science of Religion," has pointed out "that the highest God has received the same name in the ancient mythology of India, Greece, Italy, and Germany, and had retained that name, whether worshipped on the Himalayan mountains or among the oaks of Dodona, on the Capitol, or in the forests of Germany"; and he has drawn therefrom the inference that the ancestors of the whole Aryan race worshipped an unseen Being, under the self-same name, "the best, the most exalted name which they could find in their vocabulary—under the name of Light and Sky." Just as, in Europe, this ancient worship degenerated into a form of nature worship and idolatry, so, it appears, the religion of that branch of the Aryan family which migrated to India and came in contact with the Turanians and Dravidians assimilated customs and beliefs which overlaid and modified its earlier simplicity. Fetichism and totemism, of which there are remains to-day in India among the aboriginal tribes, exercised their influence upon the Aryan immigrants, and while the religion of the latter, in its ultimate Brahmanical form, succeeded in absorbing and embracing practically the whole population, from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin, in a degree never since approached by the more drastic efforts of subsequent reformers, this achievement appears to have been purchased at the expense of a general lowering of the ideals and standards of the conquerors. Just as, no doubt, the earlier Aryan immigrants took women from among the conquered races, so also they absorbed

some of the customs of the races to whom they thus became related ; and, with a tolerance which is characteristic of the Indian of to-day, not only permitted the continuance of the indigenous practices which they found prevalent in their new home, but even grafted some of these on to their hereditary rites and beliefs.

That this was so, and that, at all events in the earliest Aryan incursions, there was no rigid severance, either social or religious, between the indigenous populations and their conquerors, seems to be corroborated by the fact that the earliest records we have of the Indo-Aryans and their customs—namely, the Rig-Veda—contain nothing to show the existence of any division of the people into castes. The oldest of the Hindu sacred books is, indeed, a curious medley of superstitions, tempered here and there by philosophic speculations, some at least of which would seem to have been derived from Dravidian sources ; and Sir Herbert Risley gives reason for believing, with Professor Macdonell, that the doctrine of metempsychosis, in its elementary form, may have originated with the indigenous inhabitants of India.

But, if the Aryans were indebted to the peoples they had subdued for the idea of transmigration of souls, they appear not only to have “lent to it a moral significance of which no trace is to be found among the Animists,” but also, after evolving from it the theory of an automatic retribution which is known as *Karma*, to have made this theory the basis of the social fabric as we now know it in India. It has, of course, to be admitted that the origin of the caste system is wrapped in obscurity, but the deductions made by Sir Herbert Risley from known analogous facts, which are entitled to hold the field for the present, justify us in tracing the complex structure of the Indian religious and social system to the effects of successive Aryan immigrations. The earliest of these, bringing a race numeri-

Origin of  
Caste.



cally weak into contact with the indigenous tribes of India, would account for the assimilation of many of the customs and beliefs of the mass of the populace, but, as they received added strength from later incursions of members of their own race, the tendency would be towards a preservation by the immigrant conquerors of their distinctive racial characteristics, and towards the adaptation to that purpose of such of the indigenous traditions as they had assimilated. On this theory it does not seem too far-fetched to suppose that the idea of reincarnation, when once it had become part and parcel of the Indo-Aryan's belief, should be made to operate forcibly in the direction of the preservation of race distinctions, and, ultimately, of social gradations. Thus it would naturally occur that, while the earliest Aryan literature, written before the Indo-Aryans had established themselves permanently south of the Himalayas, contains no reference to caste or race distinctions, the dominant race, in order to maintain, not only *inter'se* but towards the darker races whom they had subjugated, would so modify its social and religious polity as to ensure the preservation of the purity of its descent. And the theory of metempsychosis, as is shown by its development to-day, would be a powerful factor to this end; and would be a weapon for the enforcement of laws of endogamy, hypergamy, and exogamy far more cogent than any argument based on mere racial pride.

Whatever the original cause, however, the facts are clear, and, as Max Müller expresses it, "Modern Hinduism rests on the system of caste as on a rock which no arguments can shake." However defined, it is impossible to ignore the fact that it is not only a religious force, but a social principle having its roots more firmly fixed than probably any other corresponding organization that the world has ever seen. It has survived reforms and hostile invasions by the proselytizing Moslems, and continues to-day, after hundreds of years of contact with

other faiths and civilizations, the predominant system in India. The manner in which the social and religious aspects of Hinduism act and react upon one another is best exemplified by the history of the reform movements which, from time to time, have arisen with the object of purging the Vedic religion of the impure accretions with which, from the time of its original contact with the Animism of the Dravidians, it has been overlaid. The greater of these movements, in chronological order, are Jainism, Buddhism, and (in comparatively recent times) Sikhism ; while in our own period the sects of the Brahmo- and Arya-Samajists have endeavoured to set up a reformed ideal of philosophic Hinduism.

Before giving a brief sketch of these movements, however, it will be well to glance at Hinduism as it presents itself to the casual observer to-day.

**Present  
Condition of  
Hinduism.**

The first impression derived from a cursory study of the outward manifestations of the religion of India is undoubtedly one of astonishment at the multiplicity of shrines, at the devotion of the people, and at the apparently heterogeneous nature of the deities enshrined. In the more or less orthodox provinces, as contrasted with the tracts where aboriginal Animism still predominates, there is in nearly every house some image or emblem purporting to be the elephant-faced god Ganesh (a son of Shiva) who presides over the entrance of the home (cf. Janus) and must be propitiated at the outset of any journey or undertaking. Out of doors, temples to Vishnu or Shiva, according to the particular cult locally predominating, are the most conspicuous shrines. But throughout India one may come across innumerable local deities whose familiar names bear no resemblance to those of any of the gods of the orthodox pantheon. Cross-examination will probably elicit the assertion that the object of worship was at one time a man, or appeared on earth as such ; but the exigencies

of orthodoxy are satisfied with comparatively slight evidence in support of his claim to have been an incarnation of one of the recognized manifestations of the godhead.

In more backward places, where aboriginal ideas have persisted, colouring the local Hinduism, the process of deification is by no means confined to eponymous heroes in human shape. There is an altar near the top of a mountain in the Western Ghats which was established only 20 years ago, and the deified hero was clothed, while on earth, in the shape of a horse. No other horse, however, had ever scaled those heights before, and the local village elders had no hesitation in concluding that under the equine form must, for purposes of his own, have been hidden the spirit of the Godhead. And yet, except in the most backward tracts, it would be an error to conclude that the mass of the people were plunged in ignorant paganism. Clumsy and ugly as are many of the outward symbols of their worship, the philosophy and ideals of the higher Hinduism are yet present to the minds of the people to a degree which it is difficult at first to realize. They no more directly worship the hideous *ling*, or the revolting image representing the goddess of smallpox, than do enlightened Christians the images of the Virgin and Jesus Christ. Those things merely symbolize some activity or power of the Universal Godhead, and the poorest cultivator may have a curiously definite conception of the intricacies of the doctrines of *Karma* and metempsychosis.

Religion  
and  
Morality.

While there is no gainsaying the elevation of the concept of the former, which replaces what might be termed the doctrine of "rewards and fairies" by one according to which every act of a man carries with it inexorably its own consequences through the whole succession of his subsequent lives, in the form of what Sir H. Risley describes as a self-acting retribution or automatic reward, it is, as a matter of fact, a

doctrine of singularly small influence on the ethical side. Sir Alfred Lyall has said :—" In India, few people would admit that their religious beliefs were necessarily connected with morality "; and he goes on to indicate what is perhaps the great distinction between Europe and India in this respect :—" In Europe morality can, on the whole, dictate terms to theology, and though both sides still equally dread an open quarrel, yet theology has most to fear from a dissolution of partnership. In Asia theology is still the senior partner, with all the capital and credit, and can dictate terms to morality, being, for the most part, independent of any connexion with it."

It is here that there emerges a curious sidelight on the connexion of caste with the Brahmanic sacerdotalism. Perhaps the most comprehensive sentence describing modern Hinduism is that contained in Sir Denzil Ibbetson's Census Report of 1881 :—" A hereditary sacerdotalism, with Brahmans for its Levites, the vitality of which is preserved by the social institution of caste, and which may include all shades and diversities of religion native to India, as distinct from the foreign importations of Christianity and Islam, and from the later outgrowths of Buddhism, more doubtfully of Sikhism, and still more doubtfully of Jainism." Now there are various factors at the present day which tend automatically towards the subversion of the caste system ; not only the material facilities of communication and travel afforded by modern means of transit, but, in a far more potent degree, the germination of a moral influence emanating from Western education and the resultant advance in purity of administration. Caste, as we have seen, rests upon no authority derived from the earliest Hindu scriptures, and is, as we shall see further on, the feature of Hinduism which comes first under condemnation at the hands of successive reform

Strength  
of  
Brahmanism.

movements. These reform movements, in their modern exemplars, are the fruits of a rising moral sentiment regarding which Sir Alfred Lyall has a significant passage in his "Asiatic Studies."

After describing the spirit of philosophic paganism as it manifests itself in Hinduism, he says:—"The popular religious beliefs must obey the pressure of slowly rising moral influence and if the *social condition of a people continues to advance*" (the italics are mine) "this process goes on until at last the authority of morals becomes as necessary to theology as at first the authority of theology was to morals." This furnishes us with a key to the conflict that is going on in India to-day. The social condition of the people is advancing, and moral influences are gaining an ever-increasing hold upon them, and must, if that advance is fostered, eventually act as a solvent of the social restrictions at present imposed upon them. On the other hand the ascendancy—nay, the existence—of orthodox Hinduism depends upon the maintenance of those restrictions. Brahmanism—the "hereditary sacerdotalism" of our definition—must, if it is to survive, enforce rigid adherence to the doctrine of caste; and it is for this reason that we see in the India of to-day, side by side with an organized effort to spread the cult, from Benares, of the Vedanta philosophy, and to elevate the general tone of Hinduism, an ever-increasing determination, on the part of the younger members of the innumerable Brahman sects, to retain the social institution of caste in its most rigorous and exclusive form. And the strength of the orthodox position is very great. In a community in which, for more than 2,000 years, certain occupations have, under a divine sanction, been allotted to certain hereditary castes, and involve pollution if performed by those of higher *status*, in which the Brahmanical claim to adjudicate upon what can and what cannot be done has, without question, been acquiesced in for an even longer period—

in such a community it will be very many generations before the advance of the social community, and the rise of moral influences, will establish the authority of morals as co-equal with that of theology.

The earliest of the reform schisms—earlier even than Buddhism—was organized in the sixth century B.C. Perhaps stimulated thereto by the degradation

The  
Jains.

of the earlier Hinduism in contact with the Animism prevailing in India, a degradation countenanced by the Brahmans in pursuance of the principle of absorbing and including "all diversities of religion native to India," Mahavira, the founder of Jainism, rejected the divine authority of the Vedas and the sway of the Brahmans, and established a cult which, theoretically, disregarded caste distinctions, denied the existence of the Hindu gods, and (retaining the doctrine of transmigration) looked, not to the Hindu Nirvana, or individual absorption in the universe, but to the attainment of perfection in all things, enjoyed without limit of time or space. In practice, however, the modern Jains are as rigorous in their insistence on the distinction of themselves as a caste, and upon the social limitations of other castes, as are the most arrogant Brahmans.

Gautama, the founder of Buddhism, succeeded, by his preaching and by the example of his life, in establishing a universal religion which alone has, for

Failure of  
Buddhism.

a time, superseded Hinduism throughout India. The abolition of the social distinction of caste was rather an incident to his teaching than a main objective. In spite of the purity of his doctrine, and of the appeal which its democratic character necessarily made to the masses of the subordinate castes, the cold logic of its agnosticism must have been far over the heads of the people, and can scarcely have been an attractive one at a period when the standard of civilization was at

a comparatively low level. Securing the support of the rulers of India, Buddhism became, for some five or six centuries, the chief religion of India; but as soon as it failed to retain kingly support it was again superseded by a Brahmanism which was adapted far more closely to the general needs and feelings of the public. Though Buddhism ostensibly ignored caste, and rested upon the theory of the equality of all men and the universality of their suffering, the way of release from which is the burden of its scriptural doctrine, it had apparently never attained to a point of influence at which the recognition of the brotherhood of man overrode the social distinctions of antecedent Hinduism.

As in the case of Buddhism and Jainism, the founders of the sects of the Dead Weight of Custom. Lingayets and of the Sikhs expressly abjured the social institution of caste; but whereas this prohibition is still acted up to by the Sikhs, the Lingayets, under the weight of surrounding influences, ultimately developed "sub-castes based upon social distinctions," and themselves, as a body, became a caste of the sectarian type, with all the concomitant restrictions and endogamous laws. The Sikhs are still untrammelled within their own sect by sub-castes; but there appears to have been, of recent years, a tendency towards the recognition of social distinctions as affecting intermarriage. The fact is that the dead weight of custom, operating with the ever-active and jealously fostered sanction of institutions whose divine origin has for so long been undisputed, lies upon the whole body politic, and has, as yet, been too strong for the reformers. These, as is perhaps natural in the case of peoples whose learning has, until within comparatively modern times, been confined to members of the priestly and clerical castes, whose intellectual proclivities are flected so uniformly in a philosophic and transcendental direction, have bent their efforts almost

exclusively towards a logical interpretation of cosmic evolution in its relation to sentient beings, and in the process have endeavoured to adapt so much of the higher philosophy of the earliest thinkers as was possible to their ends. Metempsychosis, as a basic law, has coloured all their teachings ; and the practical needs of living humanity, where these have conflicted with a comprehensive scheme of esoteric philosophy, have had to give way. Human society, as it exists, has been less the care of the great thinkers of India than humanity in relation to the universal meaning of things. It is the old essential diversity of outlook which differentiates the characteristics of Eastern and Western civilizations. In the West expediency prevails, and the practical needs of the community are the touchstone of policy. In the East, philosophic theorizing usurps the place of tangible reform. Unfortunately, the mass of the population of India has not as yet achieved that social advancement which would enable it to voice its needs : and so, while philosophers form sects and reformers initiate theories, the *vis inertiae* of a society unable to grasp the reasoning of their would-be saviours, backed by the authority of the orthodox sacerdotalism, nullifies all their efforts. No religion has, as yet, persisted and become a world force which has been too far in advance of the social development of the people among whom it has originated. As Emerson has said, " The religion cannot rise above the state of the votary. . . . In all ages, souls out of time, extraordinary, prophetic, are born. . . . These announce absolute truths, which, with whatever reverence received, are speedily dragged down into a savage interpretation."

In our own time the Arya Samaj sect has arisen, under the leadership of Devananda Saraswati. Its peculiar interest, in the light of what has been written above, lies in the circumstance that it initiates, or at least has

Modern  
Movements.



been an instrument in furthering, a *quasi*-national movement. In common with earlier reformers, the Arya Samajists endeavour to get rid of much of the later impurities of Hinduism, and, while not specifically assailing the caste system, aim at certain other social reforms. For example, they would raise the age at which girls should be married, and they permit the remarriage of widows. What distinguishes the Arya Samaj, however, more sharply from previous reform movements is its undoubted political aim. It is avowedly a proselytising movement, and appeals to all Hindus on a basis of assumed common nationality; and it has organized itself into a strong educational association. There are many points at which it comes into collision with orthodox, or rather Brahmanical, Hinduism—as, for example, in prohibiting the worship of idols and other similar ceremonials—and it yet remains to be seen how far it will receive Brahman support. If it succeeds in doing so (at present it is largely confined to the Sikhs) it is safe to say that it will be in virtue of its political importance. In this aspect it has much in common with the orthodox Hindu revival movement, which has its headquarters at Benares. Though national progress, as understood by a section of the educated fraction of India, may be the only real point of union in the two movements, it is possible that this community of objective may bring about concession on both sides; but it may be doubted whether the Arya Samaj, any more than its predecessors, will succeed in overcoming the differences of race, language, custom, and belief which operate so strongly against the fusion of Hindu society into a homogeneous or national whole.

We have thus seen that Hinduism is a  
 Hinduism a social system rather than a religious  
 Social System. creed,<sup>†</sup> but a social system which rests  
 upon what is accepted as divine authority; that the  
 Brahmanical hierarchy which controls the system

depends for its authority upon the maintenance of the social *status quo* ; and that the theory of transmigration affords a strong impetus to cling with determination to the caste system. Hinduism has shown its capacity for absorbing into itself all the indigenous religious beliefs, and for basing upon that absorption a further extension of its social structure. From time to time efforts have been made to free society from the shackles of caste and from the impurities with which Hinduism in its process of expansion has trammelled itself. But the sects formed with this object have in every instance, except perhaps that of the Sikhs, succumbed to the overwhelming influences surrounding them, and have become merely an addition to the innumerable subdivisions into which the social fabric is split up. Finally, in our own period we find a movement set on foot whose hope of achieving a success more lasting than that of its forerunners lies not so much in the promotion of social advancement as in the inculcation of a national sentiment. Whether this can be done upon a basis so recondite as Hindu philosophy, without, at all events, first bringing about that social advancement of the people which cannot fail to be accompanied by a higher moral consciousness, may reasonably be doubted. The road must be a long and a hard one : and it is perhaps permissible to think that the Arya Samajists would have had a fairer prospect of nationalizing India on a basis of religion had they seen their way to a frank admission of the need to push their social reforms to the point of rejection of caste. Compromise in such a matter may give them the simulacrum of countenance from the orthodox party—but possibly at the sacrifice of a factor far more vital to ultimate success.

In dealing with the religions of India it has been necessary to devote a greatly preponderating share of space to Hinduism, as compared with Mahome-

Islam in  
India.

danism and the other religions of India—not only because more than seven out of every ten persons are classifiable as Hindus, but also, as has been seen, because of the extraordinary complexity of the subject. It is, if Burma with its modified Buddhism be excluded, practically the only indigenous religion in the country, and cannot be dealt with, as in the case of other faiths, merely as a creed, but must, if its meaning is to be appreciated at all, be examined in its aspect as a social system. Mahomedanism in India stands on an entirely different, and far more simple, footing. Though of course a foreign importation, forcibly thrust upon the conquered Hindu population so far as the power of the conquerors availed, Islam south of the Himalayas remains, to all intents and purposes, the same as it is in other parts of the world. It is true that a large proportion of the 60 odd millions of Mahomedans is racially Hindu, and that, as a consequence, some of the spirit of Hinduism has entered into the worship of Allah in India. The spirit of tolerance, so strongly characteristic of the Hindu, has modulated the original fire of proselytizing zeal; and save on some of those ceremonial occasions on which rites such as the sacrifice of kine, repugnant to Hinduism, are enjoined on the followers of the Prophet, Mahomedans and Hindus live peaceably and amicably side by side.

The effect of hundreds of years of association has, indeed, done more than this. Although there is no technical difference between the faith of the Musulman in India, with his various sects, and the Musulman of Turkey, prolonged residence in India has resulted in producing a modification in the general outlook. It is usually assumed that, in some contingencies and for certain purposes, the world of Islam is a factor which must be considered whole and entire; and there is, of course, substantial ground for this belief. Viewed in this light and if the assumption applied with the same force to the millions of his Majesty's Mahomedan subjects

in India, there would in truth be a political problem of very serious import. In the first place, however, the injunctions of the Koran requiring loyal obedience to temporal sovereignty, whether Musulman or otherwise, have been widely taught and are generally accepted as requiring obedience; and, in the next place, a spirit of tolerance, born of the close contact with Hinduism, to which reference has been made, has served to temper some of the more ardent characteristics which we are accustomed to attribute to the followers of Islam. At the same time, it would be idle to deny that, except in respect of private or tribal feuds, the Mahomedan does not like at the bidding of temporal rulers of another faith to take up arms against an Islamic State.

A brief notice must suffice for the remaining religions of India. It may come as somewhat of a surprise to many people to learn that Christianity, with about three millions of followers, occupies the third place in importance, while the Parsis, influential and prominent as they are, number barely 100,000 souls. The Christians have their chief centre in Southern India, while the Parsis, originally refugees from Persia, where the doctrines of Zoroaster came under persecution after the seventh century, when Persia was conquered by the Mahomedans, were given hospitality on the West Coast. Zoroastrianism, though possessing, in the Zend-Avesta, a Scripture having, in some respects, a curious affinity to the earliest Vedic records, has kept aloof from, and been ignored by, Hinduism, and has exercised no kind of influence on Indian thought or religion.

The dominant religion of India is, then, as we have seen, a curious medley of contradictions and paradoxes. A Medley of contradictions. ing between, and embracing within its capacious fold, pagan Animism and the most

cultured and refined Vedanta philosophy, exercising throughout this wide gamut a more direct and constant influence upon the lives of its votaries than is the case with most other religions, it is, nevertheless, an intricate social fabric rather than a theological creed. The Brahmanocracy, which originally erected the social system as a bulwark for its policy of absorption, now defends that system behind a zareba of Divine authorities, clinging tenaciously to caste ordinances as the very essence of its own ascendancy. Again, though his religion enters so intimately into the daily life of a Hindu, governing his going out and coming in, his rising up and lying down, and the whole scheme of his daily routine, it has but a remote and indeterminate moral influence upon him. Though some of his Scriptures inculcate moral precepts of the highest beauty, they contain no coherent and definite plan of communal life. Devised and interpreted by a priestly aristocracy, based upon the theory of an infinite series of rebirths, and deriving "a certain measure of support from the social penalties imposed by the caste system," Hinduism has failed to create any code of common morality or patriotism. This failure is, no doubt, in part due to the variety of nationalities and languages which chequer the surface of Indian society, but, on a review of the religious and political history of the country since the Indo-Aryan immigrations, the conclusion seems irresistible that a common national or patriotic sentiment is incompatible with the ideals of Hinduism so long as it is hampered by a rigid doctrine of such fissiparous tendency as the social institution of caste.

## CHAPTER XVI.

### PRIMITIVE RACES OF INDIA.

[BY EDGAR THURSTON.]

Abundant evidence exists of the widespread distribution throughout the Indian Peninsula, in Assam and Burma, of prehistoric man in the Palæolithic, Neolithic, and Iron Ages, and in the era of rude stone implements represented by the cromlechs, dolmens, and *kistvaens* of the Deccan, the hat and umbrella stones of Malabar, and the *menhirs* of Assam. Even at the present day echoes from these remote times keep up the traditions of a primeval usage. For example, among certain tribes of the frontier bordering on Assam and Burma the use of stone implements still survives. The Khasis of the Assam hills, and various tribes and castes in the peninsula, erect memorial stones in honour of the dead, which recall to mind the upstanding monolithic *menhirs*. The Mala Arayans of Travancore still keep lamps burning in structures known as cairns of Parasurama, through whom the land of Malabar or Kērala was reclaimed from the sea. They also make miniature dolmens of small

slabs of stone, within which they place a long pebble to represent the deceased. The same practice is said to prevail among certain jungle tribes of Orissa. The Irulas of the Nilgiri hills, on the occasion of a death among them, bring a long water-worn stone and place it in one of the old dolmens, some of which are piled up to the capstone with such stones, which must have been the work of many generations.

The Kurumbas, who inhabit the slopes of the Nilgiris, are said to come up annually to worship at a dolmen on the plateau, in which it is believed that one of their gods resides. The relation of the Kurumbas to the more civilized pastoral Kurubas of the plains has long been the subject of speculation. In this connexion it is noteworthy that in the open country near Kadur, in Mysore, is a shrine of Bīradēvaru, which consists of stone pillars surmounted by a capstone, within which the deity is represented by round stones. Within the Kuruba quarter of the town, the shrine of Anthargattamma is a dolmen beneath a margosā tree. Just outside the town, close to a sacred fig (*pīpal*) tree, are two small dolmen-like structures containing stones representing two Kuruba heroes who are buried there.

Recent excavations of an extensive prehistoric or proto-historic burial ground at Aditanallur, in the extreme south of the peninsula, have brought to light a splendid series of iron implements, bronzes, pottery utensils, and large burial urns of the type which is traditionally believed to have been made for the reception of the corpses of a race of pygmies. Many of these urns contain human bones and skulls, some of which are of very great interest, inasmuch as they exhibit conspicuous prognathism or projection of the lower jaw—a character which occasionally occurs in existing man in Southern India. In an urn opened some years ago in Travancore by Dr. Jägor were found a head of millet and a skull

with the teeth worn down like those of the present-day races of Indians by eating grain.

It has been assumed by many writers on Indian ethnology in recent times **The Oldest** that the oldest existing race in the **Existing Races.** peninsula is represented by the inhabitants of the Dravidian-speaking areas, who make up the bulk of the brown (not black) population of Southern India—the Deccan of some European writers—and occur with less frequency in the Central Provinces and Bengal, and even in Baluchistan (Brahui). Thus, Topinard, in describing the Hindu type, divides the population of the peninsula into three strata, *viz.*, black, Mongolian, and Aryan, of which the first are seen in the Dravidian or Tamil tribes. According to tradition, “the warlike Asuras and Daithias (Danavas), who opposed the proto-Aryan invaders of the Punjab, sent expeditions to the Deccan, where they found the semi-civilized States of Southern India and imposed their speech and culture on the aborigines.” It is these aborigines, and not the later and more civilized Dravidians, who must be regarded as constituting the primitive existing race, for which the name Pre-Dravidian has been appropriately used by Lericq, Haddon, and others, and as being the modern representatives of the Dasyus, or black-skinned, noseless, unholy savages. According to recent nomenclature, these Pre-Dravidians belong to the group of melanous dolichocephalic cymotrichi, or dark-skinned, narrow-headed people with wavy or curly (not woolly) hair, who are further differentiated from many of the Dravidian classes—Tamil, Telugu, Canarese, &c.—by shortness of stature and broad (platyrrhine) noses.

There are strong grounds for the belief that the Pre-dravidians are ethnically related to the Veddas of Ceylon, the Toalas of the Celebes, the Batin of Sumatra, the Sakais of the Malay Peninsula, and possibly the Australians. Much literature has been devoted to the theory



of the connexion between the "Dravidians" and the Australians, partly on the strength of certain characters which the Dravidian and Australian languages have in common, and the use by certain Dravidian castes (Kallan and Maravan) of a curved ivory or wooden throwing-stick called *valia tadi*, which is supposed to bear a resemblance to the Australian boomerang. Huxley even went so far as to say that an ordinary coolie, such as one can see among the sailors of any East India vessel in the London Docks, would, if stripped, pass very well for an Australian, although the skull and lower jaw are generally less coarse. According to Wallace, the Indo-Malayan Archipelago, comprising the islands of Borneo, Java, and Sumatra, was formerly connected by Malacca with the Asiatic continent, while the Austro-Malayan Archipelago, comprising Celebes the Moluccas, &c., was directly connected with Australia. An important ethnographic fact is that the method of tree-climbing by means of bamboo pegs resorted to by the Dayaks of Borneo, as given by Wallace, might have been written on the Anaimalai hills of Southern India, and would apply equally well in every detail to the pre-Dravidian Kadirs, who inhabit that mountain range. Still further affinities between these people and the inhabitants of the Malay Archipelago are illustrated by the practice of chipping the incisor teeth, and the wearing by adult females of a bamboo hair-comb, the design on which bears a striking resemblance to that on the combs worn by some Malay tribes.

Of the pre-Dravidian tribes of Southern India—the microscopic remnant of a once more numerous race—the best examples are afforded by the Kadirs, the Paniyans of Malabar, formerly slaves of the soil, by whom most of the rice cultivation in the Wynad is carried out, the Yeruvass of Coorg, the Kurumbas of the Nilgiri hills, some of whom dwelt in caves, and the Kurumbas of Mysore, who work for the Forest Department. The

Kurumbas are feared by the other tribes of the Nilgiris owing to their supposed magical powers, and, whenever sickness, death, or misfortune of any kind visits the Badagas, some Kurumba is held to be responsible for it. The Badaga dread of the Kurumbas is said to be so great that a simple threat of vengeance has proved fatal.

In Northern India, the primitive tribes, as represented by the Mundas, Bhumij, and others, are said to be descendants of a very ancient element in the population, who appear to have once inhabited the valley of the Ganges in Western Bengal, and, after many wanderings, to have settled mainly in Chota Nagpur. The Bhils, who are found along the mountains of Central India, are like the Kanikars and Chenchus of Southern India, skilled in the use of the bow and arrow. The menial Doms of Bengal officiate as executioners, and assist in the disposal of the dead. The Santals trace the origin of the tribe to a wild goose who laid two eggs, from which the parents of the tribe sprang. Like the Mundas, Oraons, Bhumij, Hos, and other tribes, the Santals are broken up into a number of exogamous totemistic septs bearing "the name of an animal, a tree, a plant, or some material object, natural or artificial, which the members of that sept are prohibited from killing, eating, cutting, burning, carrying, using, &c." The Oraons, for example, have septs named after the mouse, tortoise, pig's entrails, and tiger, and the Bhumij totems include the betel palm, pumpkin, mushroom, and snake. Among the Santals, each exogamous sept has a password, so that members of the various septs are enabled to recognize each other when they meet.

**Racial  
Survivals  
in Northern  
India.**

In writing about the jungle tribes of the Nilgiri and Anaimalai hills, M. Lapique states that there is no evidence of a race to be compared as regards purity to the Andamanese and other Negritos, and what one

**Contact  
with  
Civilization.**

finds is a *population métisse*. The ethnological characteristics of the primitive tribes are at the present day rapidly undergoing modification as the result of contact metamorphism from the opening up of the jungles for planters' estates, and association with more civilized races, brown and white, which has brought about not only a change in physical type, evidenced by increase of stature and decrease of the nasal index, but also a modification of religion, customs, and language. These tribes are by heredity animists, worshipping and seeking to conciliate "influences making for evil rather than for good, which reside in the primeval forest, in the crumbling hills, in the rushing river, in the spreading tree." Some, however, now worship Kali, visit the plains at times of Hindu festivals, and pray to any image which they chance to come across, and smear themselves with religious marks in imitation of higher castes. The Bhumij of Western Bengal are said to have lost their original language and to speak only Bengali, to worship Hindu gods, and even employ a low class of Brahmans as their family priests. The primitive method of making fire by friction with two pieces of wood or bamboo is fast disappearing before the use of lucifer matches, though, for certain ceremonial purposes, the latter are forbidden. For example, the aberrant Todas of the Nilgiris must make fire by friction with the wood of certain sacred trees within the precincts of the dairy temple, and at the cremation of males.

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|---|--|
| <b>Fig-leaves<br/>and<br/>Human<br/>Sacrifices.</b> | Some tribes— <i>e.g.</i> , the Thanda Putayans and Koragas of Southern India, and the Juangs of Eastern Bengal, afford examples of what has been called the fig-leaf stage |
|---|--|

of society, the women wearing, in accordance with a legend connected with the tribal deity, a garment of leaves sewn or strung together. But leafy garments are disappearing in favour of longcloth. Take, for example, the Juangs. A political agent, some years ago, took the

prevailing fashion in hand. "An open-air durbar, fitted out with a tent and a bonfire, was held in the Juang hills. One by one the women of the tribe filed into the tent, and were robed by a female attendant in Manchester cloth provided by the political agent. As they came out they cast their discarded garments into the bonfire." In this way picturesque survivals disappear. Female infanticide was practised until the middle of the last century by the head-hunting Nāgas of Assam, the Kondhs of Ganjam and Orissa, and the Todas, among whom males still preponderate greatly over females. The practice has been assigned to various reasons. The Naga is said to have killed his daughter lest a stronger man than he should desire her, and, in effecting her capture, should take his head as an incidental trophy. The Kondhs maintained that the Sun God, in contemplating the deplorable results produced by the creation of feminine nature, charged men to bring up only as many females as they could restrain from producing evil to society. The human, or Meriah, sacrifice among the Kondhs, as an offering to the Earth God with a view to securing an abundant harvest, has been abolished within the memory of men still living, and replaced by the slaughter of a buffalo or a sheep. In one form of the substituted ceremony, the sacrificial sheep is shaved so as to represent a human being, a Hindu sect mark is painted on its forehead, a turban stuck on its head, and a new cloth placed around its body. Belief in the efficacy of human sacrifice died hard, and, as recently as 1907, a petition was presented to the District Magistrate of Ganjam, requesting him to sanction the performance of the rite. Twenty-five descendants of persons who were reserved for sacrifice, but were rescued by Govern-

ment officers, returned themselves as Meriah at the Census in 1901.

There is strong reason to believe that Tribes which some of the primitive tribes already once Ruled. referred to, as well as the servile classes, once held a high position, and were indeed, masters of the land. Many curious vestiges of their ancient power still survive in the shape of certain privileges, which are jealously cherished, and, their origin being forgotten, are much misunderstood. These privileges are remarkable instances of survivals from an extinct stage of society—shadows of long-departed supremacy, bearing witness to a period when the present haughty high-caste races were suppliants before the ancestors of degraded classes, whose touch or approach within a certain distance is now regarded as pollution. The Bhils of the North-Western Provinces have a tradition that they were once rulers in Rohilkund, whence they were expelled by the Rajputs. As a proof that they were originally lords of the land, it has been pointed out that, when a Rajput chief is installed, it is a Bhil who puts the sign of kingship on his forehead. Further, some Bhils are priests at one of the most ancient temples in Omkar. The Raj Gonds are so called, because they are believed to have furnished families which attained to Royal power. Another division of the Gonds, claiming to be Kshatriyas (the ruling or military caste of Manu), wear the sacred thread, and are said to make great efforts to get the claim recognized by contracting marriages with needy Rajput brides. The jungle Kurumbas play an important part at the seed-sowing ceremony of the agricultural Badagas of the Niligiris. The priest pours some grain into the cloth of a Kurumba, and, yoking the bullocks to the plough, makes three furrows in the soil. The Kurumba, removing his turban, places it on the ground. He then kneels between the furrows, and scatters the grain on the soil. At another ceremony,

the procession is headed by a Kurumba, who scatters pieces of the sacred *tūd* bark and wood as he goes on his way. He brings a few sheaves of grain to the temple, and ties them to a stone set up at the main entrance thereto, before the god is worshipped by the assembled Badagas.

At times of Census, many of the "depressed classes" return themselves as Chandāla—a generic term meaning one who pollutes. It was laid down by Manu that the abode of the Chandalas must be out of the town. They must not have the use of entire vessels. Their sole wealth must be dogs and asses; their clothes must be the mantles of the deceased; their dishes for food broken pots; their ornaments rusty iron. It was recorded by Sonnerat in the eighteenth century that "if a pariah in Malabar approaches too near a Nair, and through inadvertence touches him, the Nair has a right to murder him, which is looked on as a very innocent action. It is true that the pariahs have one day in the year when all the Nairs they can touch become their slaves, but the Nairs take such precautions to keep out of the way that an accident of that kind seldom happens." So recently as 1904, a Cheruman (agrestic serf) came within polluting distance of a Nair (or Nāyar), and was struck with a stick. The Cheruman went off and fetched another, whereupon the Nair ran away. He was, however, pursued by the Cheruman. In defending himself with a spade, the Nair struck the foremost Cheruman on the head and killed him. At the present day, on the occasion of the *chāl* (furrow) ceremony in Malabar, it is a Cheruman who ploughs the first furrow, and calls on the gods to vouchsafe a good harvest. At a festival in honour of the village goddess in the Cochin State, the Cherumans (or Puliyaṅs) scatter packets of palm leaves containing grains of rice rolled up in straw among the crowd of spectators, who scramble to secure them, and hang them

up in their houses to ensure prosperity to the family.

The Koragas of South Canara are regarded as the lowest of the slave classes, and, until recent times, one section of them, called *Andē* or pot Koragas, carried suspended from their necks a pot, into which they were compelled to spit, being so utterly unclean as to be prohibited from ever spitting on the highway. It is said that, in pre-British days, an *Andē* Koraga had to take out a licence to come into the towns and villages by day. Yet Koraga slaves were, on certain occasions, presented to the temple for the service of the deity. This was done publicly by the master approaching the temple, putting some earth before its entrance into the slave's mouth, and declaring that he abjured his rights, and transferred them to the deity within. It is recorded that, if a Brahman mother's children die off when young, she sends for a Koraga woman, giving her some oil, rice, and copper coins, and places the surviving child in her arms. The woman gives the child suck, puts on it her iron bracelets, and names it Koraga or Koraputi, according to its sex. This is believed to give it a new lease of life.

At Mēlkote in Mysore, which is the chief seat of the followers of Rāmanuja Acharya, the Holeyas, though slaves of the soil, are said to have received from Rāmanuja the privilege of entering the *sanctum sanctorum* along with Brahmans and others on three days of the year. In 1799, however, the right to enter the temple was stopped at the *dhraja-stambham*, or consecrated monolithic column. It is even said that a Brahman in Mysore considers that good luck will be assured if he can manage to pass through the Holeyas' quarters of a town or village unmolested, and that, should a Brahman attempt to enter their quarter, they turn out and slipper him—in former times, it is said, to death. In like manner, a Brahman who ventures into the quarters of the Tamil

Paraiyans (or Pariahs) is said to have water, with which cow-dung has been mixed, thrown over his head, and to be driven out. Instances are on record of Brahmans worshipping at Paraiyan shrines, in order to procure children. Some Brahmans consider an abandoned Paraiya quarter (*parachēri*) an auspicious site for an *agrahāra* or Brahman settlement. At the great festival of Siva at Trivalur, the headman of the Paraiyans is mounted on the elephant with the god, and carries his *chauri* (fly-flapper).

In the City of Madras, at the annual festival of the goddess of the Black Town, when the *tālī* (marriage badge) is tied round the neck of the idol in the name of the entire community, a Paraiyan is chosen to represent the bridegroom. At a feast of the village goddess in the Trichinopoly district, a Paraiyan is honoured by being invested with the Sacred Thread, and being allowed to head the procession. Paraiyans are allowed to take part in pulling the cars of the idols at the temple festivals at Conjeeveram, Kumbakonam, and Srivilliputtur. Their touch is not reckoned to defile the ropes used, so that Hindus will pull with them.



## CHAPTER XVII.

### SOCIAL CHANGES IN INDIA.

Thirty-five years is the span of official life in India, so far as the Civil Service is concerned, and the few who escape the limitation do so by virtue of having risen to high office as provincial rulers or members of the various Executive Councils. So for purposes of comparison this period of time will well serve when considering the social changes that have taken place ; it covers the life of a generation. Those changes have been very marked. They began slowly, for the strong conservative instinct of the East was against the summary breaking down of customs and prejudices ; but there has been a quickening of the process in the new century, and now there is almost too rapid movement. European and Indian alike have shared in the transformation ; and it is unquestionable that the expansion of political ideas has brought in its train developments that could not have been foreseen only a few years ago. But the great moving impulse has come from the improvement in communication with Europe, coupled with the adoption in India itself of the modern appliances of civilization. Bombay is now less than a fortnight's journey from London, and the voyage to and from England has long ceased to be an important incident in the life of those who have sought a career in India. There is no longer the old necessity to serve for eight or nine years and then take the well-earned furlough. Leave for 90 or even 60 days has become an institution

in the Services, and the "sun-dried bureaucrat" whom the travelling member of Parliament meets on the outward voyage may have been familiar with the shady side of Pall-mall every third or fourth year of his service. He is concerned, in his humble way, with home affairs; and his interests may be divided between his district or his secretariat in India and the cool corridors of the India Office or the luxurious retreats of Clubland. He does not feel a stranger in his own country; its politics affect him and Imperial business claims his attention; his periods of exile grow shorter and shorter, and the unhappy separations from wife and family are fewer and of less concern than formerly. The blessing of "combined leave," that gracious gift from Government to its impecunious servants, has descended upon him, bringing with it a renewal of health and energy, and lightening his burden of financial and domestic cares. He is not cut off from his own kindred for indefinite periods; he need no more consider himself even an Anglo-Indian, for the very title has been transferred officially to the mixed domiciled community of European and Asiatic descent.

As with the servants of Government so with the merchants and traders; **Palanquin** and they are in close touch with home, and **Taxi-Cab**. the yearly voyage of the senior partners is a mere matter of routine. The effect of this constant journeying to and fro, whether by the civil and military officers of the State or by those who were once held to be "interlopers," is seen on every side; the old order has changed and the old landmarks of social life in India are fast disappearing. There are remote tracts still where the primitive conditions of existence continue, but the railway moves ever nearer to those and the land-locked spaces are rare, except where great jungles remain to be opened out. The Presidency towns, the provincial capitals, the big cantonments, are all easily accessible to the dwellers in the outlying districts;

and the amenities of life can be enjoyed in spite of the drawbacks of a climate that has its insidious dangers in most months of the year. It was said, in connexion with the experiences of a Viceroy years ago : " The social life of India, to one used to the cosmopolitan society of the great capitals of Europe, had a flavour of provincialism." That flavour is still there, but it is very faint, for the great towns of to-day are very different from those 35 years ago. The rows of palanquins which could be seen within a stone's throw of Government House in Calcutta have long since vanished. Electric tramcars pass in rapid succession along the streets, and motors and taxi-cabs speed through the traffic. Bombay has similarly advanced, and it has certainly a cosmopolitan society peculiarly its own. The luxuries of civilization have spread Eastwards, and as the *punkah* and the oil lamp disappear before the electric fan and the glowing bulb of light, so do the old social conditions sink back into obscurity.

The Simla of " Ali Baba " and Rudyard

**Modern**      Kipling lies deep below the modern  
**Simla.**      summer capital, with its piles of offices,  
                 its Viceregal Lodge, its luxurious Club,  
and its ever-multiplying hotels. Society, it is true, still plays as well as works ; but life is taken more seriously and the men of leisure are a microscopic minority. The softening influences of womanly tact and fascination are exercised in the natural order of things, but they are never in the ascendant. " Simla is a mere bivouac ; the house is very small and very uncomfortable, but the climate is tolerably fresh and bracing." So wrote Lord Lytton from Peterhoff to Mr. John Morley in the spring of 1876. The bivouac has become a large permanent encampment, linked with the plains by a railway, and holding within its confines an official population that is ever expanding. Peterhoff, the " very small and very uncomfortable " house, has been dwarfed by the

lodge which Lord Dufferin built; the Snowden of Sir Donald Stewart's and Lord Roberts's days was transformed by Lord Kitchener into a comfortable home; the present Lieutenant-Governor has "renovated" Barnes Court; new roads have been built; and country houses at Mashobra and Mahasu are "desirable residences." The Viceroy may bivouac at Naldira, above the golf links; in Simla his surroundings are those befitting his position. His Excellency must read with amazement the humorous description which one of his predecessors gave of the cramped space of Peterhoff. To quote Lord Lytton again:—"I cannot be for one second alone. I sit in the privatest corner of my private room, and if I look through the window, there are two sentinels standing guard over me. If I open the door, there are the *jemadars* crouching at the threshold. If I go up or down stairs, an A.D.C. and three unpronounceable beings in white and red nightgowns with dark faces rush after me. If I steal out of the house by the back door, I look round and find myself stealthily followed by a tail of fifteen persons." Things are better ordered in these days, and there is a scope for State functions and viceregal hospitality which was denied in bygone days. Simla, like Calcutta, has moved with the times; the *dandi* has vanished with the palanquin; and the motor-car climbs the hill from Kalka—though it has to resign its place to the rickshaw when it has come to its journey's end.

In this brief sketch of the changes that have come in a generation, the effect of closer contact between East and West, due to the greater facilities of travel, must be noted. In India itself the extension of the railway systems has done much to break down the barriers which separated race from race, and left the purely Indian communities almost unknown to each other. There is much more intermingling now; and, in par-

Effect of  
Travel.

ticular, the isolation of the Ruling Chiefs, who rarely moved from their own territories, has passed away. They exchange hospitality freely; and many of them have been honoured guests in Government House, Calcutta, and Viceregal Lodge, Simla. Viceregal hospitality, too, is exercised on a broader basis, and Indian gentlemen and ladies are familiar figures in all social functions. In the Presidencies and the Provinces similar conditions obtain, and the exclusiveness that once was the rule is disappearing. If the European has put himself more *en rapport* with Home interests and affairs, much more has the Indian sought with eagerness to become acquainted with the West. Even the most orthodox Hindus have ventured upon the long voyages which take them far beyond the circle of their normal existence, while the travelled Mahomedan and Parsi is met in Bombay and elsewhere in numbers that show how free inter-communication now is. One sees the results of residence in Europe in many ways—some not altogether satisfactory, as impatience and resentment are sometimes bred in the minds of the younger men when they have to take up their life's work in India. But the inborn conservatism of Oriental races saves the men of mature years from losing their mental balance; they preserve a saving sense of proportion, and benefit from their experience of Western life and customs. They have fewer illusions than the younger generation; and they can weigh advantages and disadvantages without juggling with the weights.

The question of the influx of Indian students into England, and their ultimate return to India, is not one that can be dealt with in an article of this kind. It is a problem that may take years to solve, and it has complexities that seem to increase rather than lessen. Perhaps in the more generous intercourse that has sprung up in the Clubs founded recently at

Bombay and Calcutta, in which Europeans and Indians meet on a common level of membership, a better understanding may be reached. Certainly as regards the "Calcutta Club" much has been accomplished. The gatherings there, which the Viceroy and his immediate predecessor have honoured with their presence, have been so successful that the Club has sprung into prominence in a few short years. The members of the enlarged Legislative Councils meet in friendly association; differences are forgotten; and as hosts to Society at large the members are models of courtesy and hospitality. Anglo-Indian and Indian Society are "on terms" at last, and the old asperities of social life are being smoothed down. The Indian politician of the best stamp, with a deeper sense of his responsibilities as a citizen, is shaking off his reserve, and he is being met frankly by those whom he formerly regarded as outside his social sphere. The *purdah* has been partially lifted, and it will never be dropped again.

In one way more frequent contact with the West has not been productive of good results. Certain *mésalliances* which Indian Chiefs have formed have been repugnant to the feelings of their subjects, and orthodox Hindu and Mahomedan opinion undoubtedly condemns such "marriages." At one period it seemed as if the example of one Chief would be followed by several others, young and rather irresponsible rulers of Native States, but the veiled displeasure of Government checked to a great extent the tendency that had become manifest. Public opinion in the Native States as a whole, rather than official action, must be relied upon in a matter of this kind; and the influence exercised by the Court at home can also be applied as a corrective. In ordinary society, in such large towns as Calcutta and Bombay, the relations between English and Indian ladies of position are now far more cordial than

"Mixed"  
Marriages.

a few years ago, and when the *purdah* does not intervene the *rapprochement* is evident in social functions where the two communities can meet on almost common ground. There is still much to be accomplished, it is true, as the great differences in customs and conventions cannot be immediately reconciled, but a spirit of mutual concession should surely but slowly assist to solve a once difficult problem. The charge of exclusiveness so often brought against Anglo-Indian Society cannot now be fully sustained, and though some barriers still remain they are weakening every day. A more tolerant and generous feeling is springing up, and its effect cannot fail to be seen in the course of time. Jealousies and misunderstandings among the gentler sex should give way to a truer appreciation of each other's higher qualities, and thus prevent an attitude of detachment being taken up on either side. If, occasionally, efforts are made in Indian (as distinct from European) Society to create new and exclusive circles, such movements are to be deprecated, and it is to be hoped that they will not be generally countenanced. It would, indeed, be regrettable if inner circles of this kind were to be formed at a period of social transition like the present.

It may not, perhaps, be realized how  
**Sports and Pastimes.** important a part sports and pastimes play in the social life of India. Polo and cricket have done much to excite healthy emulation between Europeans and Indians, and the mixed teams that are constantly playing make for *camaraderie* and good feeling. But cricket has declined as polo has spread from the great cantonments to the Native States, and there are now comparatively few visiting elevens with their annual tours during the cold weather. At uncertain intervals a spurt is given to cricket, and English professionals still come out to coach the players whom this or that Chief wishes to put in the field, but on only too many

stations interest in the game has flagged. If Lord Hawke would captain another team for India, following upon the visit of Indian cricketers to England this summer, we might see a revival in the fortunes of the game. There are still many keen players who would eagerly welcome the coming of a good English Eleven. Football, which owes its popularity to Sir Mortimer Durand, who started Tournament play (Association) at Simla in the eighties, has also served to bring Europeans and Indians together in friendly rivalry. The games on the Calcutta Maidan are watched by enormous crowds, and the rough-and-tumble of the Rugby "scrums" are thoroughly enjoyed. Hockey is also played with much spirit, and Indian regimental teams have greatly distinguished themselves on occasion. Lawn tennis, which was in its infancy in the latter '70's, has a firm hold as a healthy outdoor game well suited to the Indian climate, but it has now a formidable rival in golf. Certainly one of the most striking developments of late has been the growth of the Royal Game. Links have been made in scores of stations; and Calcutta especially has given itself over to the fascinations of golf. It has its annual tournament for the Championship of India; and the links on the Maidan, at Tollygunge, and in Barrackpore Park give splendid chances for play of every grade. The present Viceroy is an ardent golfer, and he rarely misses his afternoon's round. In Simla players have to seek their game 16 miles from their office desks, but there are week-ends to be enjoyed on the hill-side at Naldira, even though the greens are on precipitous slopes. In far-away Gulmarg visitors to Kashmir play golf the whole summer through amid beautiful surroundings, and this little station has now quite a reputation of its own to sustain. Golfers have discovered that the game to which they are devoted can flourish from the rolling downs of Ootacamund to the very confines of Kashmir under the shadow of snowy peaks. The enthusiasm with which racing



is followed in India is exemplified by the numerous meetings held at Calcutta and Bombay, and Indian owners figure very prominently on the Turf. If the smaller stations have suffered, there is the compensation that large prizes are open to all at the two centres of racing, and that help is given freely to country meetings by the Calcutta Turf Club. The spirit of sport brings the two communities together ; and as there is no royal road to success the competition is on equal terms.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### THE RECENT INDIAN CENSUS.

In one of his Parliamentary speeches as Secretary for India, Lord Morley dwelt on the importance of a right understanding by the British democracy of the problems of Indian government, in all their complexity and all their enormous magnitude. The basis of this right understanding must be exact knowledge of the population, not only as a whole, but in its manifold ethnographic, communal, and geographical divisions ; and this can be obtained only by a full and careful periodic enumeration such as was carried out on March 10, 1911. The British democracy and the Indian peoples are not alone concerned in watching the Indian Census. No student of affairs, whether he belongs to the British Empire or not, can regard with indifference the greatest aggregate and uniform enumeration ever undertaken. The persons counted on a single night in India and in Ceylon (where the same date is chosen for the Census on account of the constant interchange of coolie families with the Madras Presidency) constitute rather more than one-fifth of the human race, and considerably exceed in number the combined populations of America, Africa, and Australia.

The Indian Census is so great a triumph of bureaucratic organization that it is difficult to realize that experience of the operation on a uniform plan as to date, schedule, and tabulation only goes back 30 years.

Until 1881 the several provinces did the counting of the people in their own way and at their own time, and the operation did not extend to the bulk of the Native States. The first regular Census on the modern system was carried out on February 17, 1881 ; the second on February 26, 1891 ; and the third on March 1, 1901. The general reports on the first and second enumerations written by Sir William Plowden and Sir J. Athelstane Baines, the respective Commissioners, are of great statistical interest. The operations ten years ago were in charge of Sir Herbert Risley, now Secretary of the Judicial and Public Department, India Office, the distinguished ethnologist. The general report, with his chapter on "Caste and Tribe and Race" (subsequently reprinted in book form), his contributions to other sections, and Dr. George Grierson's chapter on Indian Languages, is of unequalled value in the whole range of Census literature.

The date of the last numbering of the  
**The Fourth** people, March 10, ten years and nine days  
**Census.** after the previous enumeration, was  
 chosen partly with reference to the age  
 of the moon, so that the enumerators might be able  
 to go about their work by moonlight, and partly with the  
 object of avoiding religious festivals and fairs, and the  
 dates regarded as auspicious for marriage ceremonies and  
 for bathing in the sacred rivers—for these involve much  
 temporary migration of the people. In respect to the  
 vast area covered by the operations there was much less  
 extension of the count than on the two previous occasions.  
 In 1891 Upper Burma, then recently acquired, Kashmir,  
 and Sikkim were included for the first time ; and ten years  
 later the additional area comprised the greater part of the  
 Baluchistan agency, the Bhil country in Rajputana,  
 the settlements of the wild Nicobarese and Andamanese,  
 and certain outlying tracts along both the North-West  
 and North-East borders. In some of these areas, however,

no detailed enumeration was possible, and the population was estimated with reference to the ascertained number of houses or the returns of the tribal headmen. On the last occasion the operations included the whole of Baluchistan (except Khاران), the whole of the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province, and some remote tracts in Burma which had not previously been dealt with. The operations covered altogether an area of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  million of square miles.

In a few tracts where the previous count had been non-synchronous a synchronous Census was effected, and in a few others an actual enumeration took the place of an estimate. This was the case in respect to the various tribes of the Nicobars, with the exception of the Shom Pen, irreclaimable savages dwelling in the interior of the Great Nicobar Island. By a fortunate coincidence, however, the Shom Pen themselves supplied the material on which it was possible to base a fairly reliable estimate of their numbers. Just before the Census party reached the island the tribe sent to the Nicobarese dwelling near the coast a message announcing their intention of attacking them. In a spirit of boastful threatening, they sent with the message two tally-sticks on which notches were cut to indicate the number of fighting men in each of their settlements, the different settlements being marked off by lateral notches.

The schedules distributed in this country at the beginning of April were usually filled in by the head of the family either on the previous day or the morning after Census night. But this procedure is not practicable in India, where ten years ago 278 millions of the 294 millions enumerated could not read or write even in their own vernaculars. It was necessary therefore for the schedules to be usually filled in by the enumerators, and this was done provisionally well beforehand; in fact, for the most part during February. Each enumerator

The  
Enumerating  
Agency.

was in charge of a block containing from 30 to 50 houses. Above the block came the circle, comprising ten or 15 blocks, or about 500 houses, under a supervisor, who had to carefully check the work of the enumerators. The circles, again, were grouped according to tahsils, taluks, or other administrative sub-divisions, into charges under charge superintendents. The latter were in turn responsible to the provincial superintendents, and these to the Census Commissioner, Mr. E. A. Gait. On March 10, between 7 p.m. and midnight, the enumerators again went round their blocks, and brought the entries previously made into accordance with the facts at that time, by striking out the names of people who had died or gone away, and entering the necessary particulars for fresh arrivals and newly-born infants. On the following morning the enumerators of all the blocks in a circle met the supervisor, who, after testing the figures they gave, prepared from them a summary for his circle, which he transmitted to his charge superintendent, who reported to higher authority.

The total strength of the Census staff  
**Public** was about two million, as against 1½  
**Co-operation.** million in 1901, and this agency was  
 for the most part voluntary and honorary.

The literate section of the community is so small, comparatively speaking, that the law gives power to compel the co-operation of suitable persons under penalty of a fine; but, as on former occasions, service was most willingly rendered in all parts of the Dependency. It may be pointed out that so large a measure of cheerful unpaid co-operation would not have been securable had the doctrine of passive resistance to authority, sedulously inculcated by some of the enemies of British rule, taken any real hold of the literate classes. Nor are there any indications of the slightest attempt of the extremist element to emulate the unwise and unsuccessful efforts of our own suffragettes (advertised long before

the Indian Census was taken) to dodge the record. Owing to the serious recrudescence of plague thousands of the voluntary enumerators were exposed to infection; in parts of Northern India heavy rain fell while the final Census was being taken; and in the Himalayan districts and Kashmir great snowdrifts had to be encountered. The physical discomforts and privation incidental to such operations among the wild and jungle tribes, in remote mountainous tracts, or in malarious swamps were cheerfully borne. Happily risks of physical violence at the hands of semi-civilized tribesmen diminish with each enumeration. When first brought within the Census net some of the jungle tribes have shown a spirit of recalcitrance, owing to the spread among them of extraordinary rumours as to the overt purposes of the Sirkar. Thus in 1881 troops had to be employed in one district to overawe the Sonthals, and their use in a neighbouring district was avoided only by the tact of the Collector, Mr. (now Sir Herbert) Risley, in obtaining from the headmen, by a Socratic process of questioning, an admission that the Government could not be expected to send into the district enough rice to meet the exigencies of the next famine unless they knew how many Sonthals there were to be fed. The headmen saw that after all there was a legitimate reason for the count, and gave their co-operation.

As is recognized in the Government resolution on the main results of the Census, the "diligent co-operation" of  
**Rapidity of Results.**  
 "a large number of individuals belonging to all classes of society" is a main element in enabling India to hold the world's record for the speed with which the results are published. The total population of the country was announced in 1891 by Sir Athelstane Baines within five weeks of the counting, and the provisional total differed from the corrected final figure by only  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. This record was much improved upon

ten years ago, when Sir Herbert Risley published the preliminary results, by provinces, districts, and principal towns, exactly a fortnight after the counting, the difference from the final compilation being only  $\cdot 03$  per cent. This year there has been still further advance. The main figures were officially published by Mr. Gait on March 20, or the ninth day after the collection of schedules. Moreover, in the brief interval between the two dates the newspapers had published figures for many towns and districts, and even for some States and Provinces, the first batch of such figures being given on the second day after the schedules were finally made up. Ordinary comparisons between India and this country are misleading; but in this purely administrative matter it is impossible not to contrast the unapproached rapidity of Indian work with our own leisureliness. Although here the population is homogeneous and literate, distances are insignificant compared with those of India, and the whole problem is altogether simpler, it took seven weeks, instead of nine days, for the preliminary totals for the British Isles to be known. One reason for India's pride of place in this matter from the international standpoint is that ten years ago Dr. George von Mayr's slip, or card, system was introduced, with adaptations to Indian requirements. Both then and on the last occasion slips of different colours were used for the different religions, and sex and civil conditions were indicated by the shape of, or symbols printed on, the slips. The system is inexpensive and much less complicated than the old tabulation method, the work is more easily tested, and the time spent on the compilation of statistics is greatly reduced.

The total population of India recorded

|         |   |
|---------|---|
| General | on March 10, was 315,001,099, as compared with 294,361,056 ten years ago,                     |
| Result. | 287,314,671 in 1891, and 253,896,330 at the first general Census in 1881. The new figures are |

provisional and liable to correction, but, as on the two former occasions, the difference between the early and final figures is likely to be slight. It will not affect, unless in a minute degree, the following table of variation per cent. in the Indian population since 1881 :—

| —                | 1881 to<br>1891. | 1891 to<br>1901. | 1901 to<br>1911. |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Provinces .. ..  | +11·2            | + 48·7           | +5·4             |
| Native States .. | +20·2            | — 5·1            | +12·9            |
| Total—India ..   | +13·2            | + 2·4            | +7·0             |

Indian statistics are full of pitfalls, and these percentages, like many others, cannot be taken at their face value. Regard must be had to the greater accuracy of each succeeding enumeration and to the successive inclusions of new areas within the scope of the operation already mentioned. Except in a few outlying tracts, the omissions from the record by 1901 were so few that there was little room for improvement. The population of the areas included for the first time this year is under 1½ millions. The official computation is that, after allowing for these artificial changes, the rate of growth of population in the Indian Empire during the last 30 years has been as follows :—

| —           | 1881 to<br>1891. | 1891 to<br>1901. | 1901 to<br>1911. |
|-------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| India .. .. | 9·8              | 1·5              | 6·4              |

The rate of increase in the last decennium has thus been little more than two-thirds that of the first period. The small progress made in the middle period was chiefly due to the widespread and disastrous famines of 1897 and 1900, which not only caused a heavy fall in the birth-rate, but also, with their sequelæ—cholera, fever, and other epidemics—were responsible for a mortality of about five millions in excess of



the normal, occurring chiefly in the Native States. Consequently the conditions after the 1901 Census were favourable to the rapid growth of population. The famines had chiefly carried off "bad lives," old people and young children, so that there was reason to expect, on the one hand, an abnormally low death-rate, and, on the other hand, after several years of impaired fertility, an unusually high birth-rate. This favourable start of the decennial period was reinforced by the fairly prosperous state of agriculture. There were a few local famines, but no visitation comparable to those of 1897 and 1900, and, generally speaking, at least average crops were secured. The prosperity, and therefore the health and fecundity of the people, was assisted by steady progress in industrial development, railway construction, and irrigation.

On the other hand, a serious counter-balancing factor had arisen. At the time of the 1901 Census plague had been responsible since its first appearance in Bombay City, nearly five years earlier, for half a million deaths, according to the official figures. The upward curve was maintained until the end of 1907, and the quick decline of mortality in the next two years was followed by a rapid rise in 1910, which went on in the first three months of the present year. The recorded mortality from plague in the decade was nearly  $6\frac{1}{2}$  millions; but the probability that the toll of human lives from this cause was substantially greater is indicated by the swollen figures of deaths reported from malaria in the Punjab and the United Provinces, where more than half the entire Indian mortality registered from plague occurred. The tendency of village officers to attribute any fatal disease of which high temperature is an accompaniment to "fever" is well known, and it is probable that many of the two million deaths so entered in the United Provinces in 1908 were really forerunners of the great plague

wave of the past cold weather. In the Punjab, as in the United Provinces, the malarial mortality was highest in the years immediately preceding the worst plague seasons. The result of the double scourge, together with the famine of 1908 in the United Provinces, is that Upper India has sustained a substantial decrease of population. In the Punjab the decrease is 1·8 per cent. in British districts and 4·8 per cent. in the Native States. In the United Provinces the decrease is just 1 per cent.

In both Provinces the number of males is almost exactly the same as ten years ago, the small difference being in fact on the side of augmentation. The decrease has taken place entirely among the females, who have been the chief sufferers from the unhealthy conditions of the decade. This disproportion in the toll taken by plague and malaria has, of course, affected the figures for the whole Indian Empire. The proportion of females to males, which had been rising steadily since 1881, has now fallen to what it then was—namely, 954 per millo. In India, as in Europe, there is a slight excess of males at birth, but whereas in Europe the proportion is afterwards reversed, owing partly to the greater vitality of female children, and partly to the heavier mortality among males engaged in arduous or dangerous occupations, this is not the case in India. Among the conditions unfavourable to female life are the neglect of infant girls by certain classes, early marriage and child-bearing, unskilful midwifery, and the hard manual labour of women of the lower classes.

While the increased population for India as a whole is 7 per cent., the advance in the States and Agencies is 12·9 per cent., the increase being, in round figures, from 63 millions to 71 millions. This relatively greater advance is due to the fact that the decade was one of recovery from the 1897 and 1900

**Proportion  
of Sexes.**

**Native  
States.**

famines, when many of the States suffered far more than British territory, and when there was considerable migration from them into British districts. Consequently, in the previous decennium the States sustained a decrease of 5.1 per cent., while in British territory there was an advance of 4.7 per cent. Combining the two last decennial periods, the increase in areas under native rule is from 66 millions to 71 millions, while in British districts it is from 221 millions to 244 millions. The increases of the four most important States in the last ten years in percentages are :—Haidarabad, 20.0 ; Mysore, 4.8 ; Baroda, 4.0 ; and Kashmir, 8.7.

The largest provincial increase of the decennium is in the Central Provinces and Berar (16.3), where there has been most satisfactory recovery from the famines of the previous decade and great development of trade and organized industries. Burma follows closely with an increase of 14.9, due to the continued advance under British administration of this fertile but formerly very sparsely populated country. Eastern Bengal and Assam, which has been left almost untouched by the plague endemic and is steadily prospering under "partition," takes third place with an advance of 11.4 per cent. Although affected by extensive emigration of labour to Ceylon, Burma, and the Malay States, Madras reports an increase of 8.3, largely as a result of almost entire freedom from bad seasons and from plague. The sister Presidency of Bombay, though far less fortunate in this latter respect, recorded an advance of 6 per cent. Though on the whole, apart from plague in Behar, the decade was a healthy one in Bengal, the increase there is only 3.8 per cent. In the still sparsely peopled North-West Frontier Province the growth was slightly in excess of that for India as a whole, being 7.5 per cent. It is worthy of note that the Agencies and tribal area beyond our north-west administrative border, nearly all included

for the first time in the enumeration, are estimated to have a population of 1,622,078.

Calcutta and Bombay contest each other's claim to be "the second city of the British Empire." The Indian administrative capital registers a population of 1,216,514, but this includes the suburbs and Howrah, the town of some 180,000 inhabitants on the opposite bank of the Hooghly. The population of "Calcutta proper" is 890,493, and Bombay with its total of 972,892 claims the pre-eminence, arguing that it would be as reasonable to merge Birkenhead in Liverpool or Salford in Manchester for Census purposes as it is to reckon Howrah part of Calcutta. The reply is that even excluding Howrah, but retaining the suburban areas to correspond with the Bombay suburbs in the north of the island, Calcutta still takes the lead with a population of 1,037,496. Without pronouncing on the merits of this controversy, it may be pointed out that Bombay has been unfortunate in the last two enumerations. Ten years ago the wholesale exodus of people consequent upon the plague epidemic brought down her population to little more than three-quarters of a million, and this led to an intermediate municipal Census in 1906, in which a population of 977,822 was recorded. The new figure is about 5,000 below that total, but it is stated that there has been considerable exodus of the floating industrial population of late owing to the depression of the mill industry, and that many people have taken residence outside the island to minimize the risk of plague infection. The extent to which the factory hands leave their womenfolk in their native villages is reflected in the sex proportions both of Calcutta (805,475 males and 411,039 females) and of Bombay, where the corresponding figures are 633,884 and 339,046.

This is, in fact, a striking feature of the figures for all the chief industrial centres, and of the large towns

generally. Of the 51 principal towns for which detailed figures are given, there are only three—Madura, Trichinopoly, and Salem, all in Southern India and famous for sanctity—where females are in excess of males, and in each case the preponderance is very slight. Madras ranks next to Calcutta and Bombay in populousness, with a Census roll of 517,335, and Haidarabad follows with close upon half a million, but this total includes the British cantonments of Secunderabad and Bolarum. Rangoon grew rapidly during the decade, and with a population of 289,432—an advance of 18 per cent.—has now displaced Lucknow as the fifth city of the Indian Empire, the population of the Oudh capital having declined 1·3 per cent. to 260,621. India is still a land of rural villages, and few large towns; there are only four places, other than those already named, with a population of more than 200,000—viz., Delhi, 232,859; Lahore, 228,318; Ahmedabad, 215,448; and Benares, 204,222.

The preliminary returns herein discussed take the 315 millions of India in the mass, distinguishing them only by residence and sex, and it will be some time before full details are available as to race, caste, religion, education, occupation, and civil condition. In respect to race and religion, the enumeration is more important than any of its predecessors. The relation of the outcastes to the high-caste Hindus, the extent to which they can correctly be included in the pale of Hinduism (particularly those communities among them which are seeking emancipation therefrom), the degree of Hindu absorption of Sikhs, Jains, and Animists: the progress of conversions both to Christianity (towards which there have been "mass movements" in Southern India) and to Islam—all these have become matters of direct political significance, owing to the ratio established between numbers and representation upon the enlarged

Legislatures. The rules relating to the Council elections are admittedly experimental, and their revision will be affected by the Census returns. A minor, though important, change calculated to render the returns as to the "domiciled" white or semi-white community more trustworthy is the disappearance of the term "Eurasian" from the official record and the substitution of "Anglo-Indian." It is to be regretted that in yielding to the earnest appeal of the Eurasians for this change the Government did not ordain some acceptable appellation other than "Anglo-Indian," which has hitherto always been applied in literature and in speech to English people spending many or all of their working years in India, but retaining their English domicile. Confusion must arise from this appropriation by one community of a name to which another, and distinct, community has had prescriptive right for generations. But the main interest of the completed Census returns will be in the unchallengeable evidence given of the measure of change, moral, social, and economic, wrought in the fabric of indigenous Indian society in the past eventful decade.

## CHAPTER XIX.

### THE PLAGUE IN INDIA.

[BY THE TIMES SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT REGARDING  
PLAGUE.]

The precise effect upon India of the present pandemic of bubonic plague has never been properly considered or estimated. One reason is that the plague has been overshadowed and obscured by other great natural calamities which have occurred in India since the pandemic began. The existence of plague in Bombay was first officially noted on September 23, 1896. In 1896-7 India endured a visitation of famine which caused a mortality estimated at 750,000 in British territory alone. This was followed by the greater famine of 1899-1900, in which over 1,000,000 people perished in British districts, in addition to large numbers in native States. By the side of these vast misfortunes the mortality from plague looked at the time comparatively small. Another reason is that plague has become such a commonplace matter in India that its graver consequences are apt to be disregarded. In many parts of the country it is now an incident of daily life. The people outwardly seem indifferent concerning it, though they are really anything but indifferent, as is seen at moments when the death-rate grows high. To many of the greater officials, though not to the men in "the districts," it has grown to be merely a part of the ordinary routine of administration. Its larger aspects are lost sight of, or dismissed without

much consideration in the hope that another year may bring relief.

A third reason is that the full effects of plague are not readily perceived, except perhaps in the villages and the smaller towns. The city of Bombay, where its ravages have been most frequent, is now more prosperous than ever, and shows few signs of the pestilence save in the broad new thoroughfares which have been driven through some of its worst slums. An uninformed stranger might perambulate the city without learning of the presence of the disease, unless he asked the meaning of the red circles and figures on the walls of many of the poorer houses. In the same way, a traveller might journey to-day from end to end of India, and never once realize from anything he saw that plague was prevalent. The newspapers say little about it, for after 14 years the topic of a single epidemic disease does not bear much discussion. Their readers are tired of it. One begins to understand, in the light of Indian experience, why the fluctuating epidemics which recurred again and again in Europe for nearly 300 years were so rarely noticed by contemporary historians, after the first terrible outbreak of the Black Death. Yet several millions of people have perished from plague in India in the last few years, and however unwelcome the subject may be, the pandemic has become a very grave Imperial problem. It presents momentous issues, and no measured review of Indian affairs can fail to take into account its possible future results.

Plague must be an old disease in India, though the records concerning its earlier appearances are extremely scanty. The Indian epidemics of past centuries were so completely forgotten that Hirsch notes the general belief that Persia was "the eastern limit of the area of plague upon Asiatic soil." The Bombay Sanitary Commissioner reported in 1887 that plague had never, to his

Mortality  
from  
Plague.



knowledge, existed in Bombay, and was "not in present circumstances ever likely to be there met with." The real fact is that Bombay, in common with the northern provinces of India, endured a severe visitation of plague at the end of the 17th century. It has also been said that plague existed in Bombay at the beginning of the 19th century, when it was certainly epidemic in Cutch, Kathiawar, and parts of Gujerat; but I have seen no evidence on the subject. It is clear that India shared the common experience of the rest of the world when, during the 19th century, the plague infection contracted until it only remained in a few remote and isolated areas.

The plague mortality in Bombay was not very great during the closing months of 1896. Only 2,219 deaths from plague were recorded for the whole of India during that year. There were probably many more, because in the first epidemic, from fear of rigorous sanitary measures, concealment of the cause of death was very frequent; but allowing for much misrepresentation and error, the number of deaths from plague was still small at the outset in comparison with what followed. Even in 1897 only 55,324 deaths from plague were registered. It was not until 1904, nine years after plague broke out in Bombay, that the recorded deaths from plague in the whole of India exceeded a million in a single year. The million limit was also passed in 1905, but the next year there was a great decline, though it was followed in 1907 by the heaviest plague mortality on record. In 1908 and 1909 the mortality was so greatly reduced that it was hoped the virulence of the infection was spent. Last year, however, the recorded deaths again rose to nearly half a million, and the outlook this year is not at all encouraging. The total number of recorded deaths from plague in India, counting both British provinces and

native States, since the disease was detected at Bombay in 1896, is as follows :—

| Year. |       | Deaths    | Year.                 |       | Deaths    |
|-------|-------|-----------|-----------------------|-------|-----------|
| 1896  | .. .. | 2,219     | 1905                  | .. .. | 1,069,140 |
| 1897  | .. .. | 55,324    | 1906                  | .. .. | 358,721   |
| 1898  | .. .. | 116,285   | 1907                  | .. .. | 1,315,892 |
| 1899  | .. .. | 139,009   | 1908                  | .. .. | 156,480   |
| 1900  | .. .. | 92,807    | 1909                  | .. .. | 178,808   |
| 1901  | .. .. | 282,027   | 1910                  | .. .. | 511,233   |
| 1902  | .. .. | 576,365   | 1911 (to end of June) |       | 650,690   |
| 1903  | .. .. | 883,070   |                       |       |           |
| 1904  | .. .. | 1,143,993 | Total                 | ..    | 7,530,069 |

The total for the first six months of 1911 is approximate. It will be noted that these statistics only represent the acknowledged deaths from plague. There is good reason to believe that the real total mortality from plague since the pandemic began is considerably higher than the table shows. For instance, at the time of the Census in 1901 the recorded plague mortality was under half a million, but the Census report afterwards stated that "it was known" that the true mortality was more, and it might possibly be a million. A large decrease in Bengal in 1902 was stated to be "more apparent than real," many plague deaths having been entered under "fever." Statements abound in the official reports suggesting that the real mortality is not shown in the recorded totals, owing to concealment of plague deaths, the occasional difficulty of diagnosing the obscurer forms of plague, and the defective system of registration of causes of death.

Perhaps the best way of bringing home to the people of the British Empire some conception of the enormous number of persons who have perished in India as a consequence of the present pandemic is to make a statement of comparison. The population of Greater London, including both the Metropolitan and City police districts, was estimated in 1909 to be 7,429,740. It is beyond question that the total mortality from plague in India considerably exceeds this huge figure. A number more

than equivalent to the whole vast population of Greater London has been wiped out of existence by plague.

But, we are asked, are not the people of India always dying in enormous numbers from some epidemic or other? Do not the deaths from cholera exceed those from plague? Is not fever a far more common cause of death? Why attach so much importance to plague? Has there really been any excessive mortality above the normal annual death-rate? Is it not a fact that the population is now dying of plague instead of other diseases?

These questions can be very briefly answered. As to cholera, in the five worst plague years of the last decade the deaths from plague have vastly exceeded those from cholera. It is true that "fever" causes more deaths than plague, but it has to be remembered that most normal diseases in India are loosely described as "fever." Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. Roberts, I.M.S., says that "the vast majority die without qualified medical attendance, and we have to rely on the crude impressions of the people, who attribute most fatal illnesses marked by a rise of temperature to 'fever.'" The truth about the degree of excess mortality above the normal death-rate, which is attributable to plague, is exceedingly difficult to ascertain. Registration has only been in existence in India between thirty and forty years, and the gradual improvement in the system makes comparisons over a term of years untrustworthy. Moreover, in this investigation we are again reminded that India is not one country, but a number of countries. To try to estimate the real effect of plague mortality upon the death-rate by examining the gross returns for the whole of India is an extremely misleading proceeding. It is just as though we tried to ascertain the effect upon the death-rate of Europe of severe epidemics confined to France and Russia. Such a line of inquiry would lead us nowhere. The only possible plan is to examine the mortality returns in the provinces most affected, which are Bombay,

the United Provinces, and the Punjab. Careful inspection of the figures for these provinces leads to the conclusion that the bulk of the deaths from plague represent a mortality in excess of the normal death-rate. For instance, in 1907, the worst plague year in the Punjab, the mortality from all causes was calculated at 62·10 per 1,000. No one would dream of denying that such a heavy death-rate is abnormal, and that the excess is mainly due to plague. The frequent epidemics in Bombay City have greatly increased the local death-rate. Plague is not a normal disease in India, as cholera is, and its vast ravages must be held to be an extremely abnormal factor.

We arrive, then, at the very grave inference that in India in the last 14 years a multitude equivalent to the whole population of Greater London has perished from one epidemic disease, and that this mortality for the most part represents an excess above the normal deaths. The bulk of the mortality has been confined to three provinces. In the Punjab, in the year 1907 alone, 608,685 persons were registered as having died of plague. Such an appalling visitation must have exercised a profound effect upon the people of the province, yet Government publications may be searched in vain for any satisfactory evidence of its consequences. Annually there is presented to Parliament an imposing Blue-book upon "The Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India." The volume for 1907-08 contains practically no indication whatever of the result upon "moral and material progress and condition" of this terrible and abnormal mortality. A great deal is said about a minor famine in the United Provinces; but the only disclosures regarding plague in the Punjab are that it was "so severe as to disorganize the labour market and to effect the level of wages," and that many of the police deserted their posts. No future historian—no reader of to-day—would ever dream on examining that particular Blue-book

Effect upon  
Human  
Conditions.

and its successors that in one province alone, with a population of 20 millions, over two millions had died of plague, mostly within the last eight years. This is a publication prescribed by law for the information of Parliament. For its preparation the Secretary of State in Council is by statute responsible. It purports to collate "the facts bearing upon the condition of the people." No more perfunctory production was ever foisted upon an innocent and unheeding Legislature. It almost ignores the one great salient outstanding fact of the year 1907 in India.

The example I have quoted illustrates the limitations of the attitude of official India towards the ravages of plague. The disease had been eight years epidemic in the country before it occurred to anybody to appoint a number of trained investigators to find out how it was transmitted. Preventive measures were adopted readily enough from the beginning, and money was spent like water in endeavours, to a great extent fruitless, to save human life; but the mystery of the causation of plague was never examined in a methodical, persistent, scientific manner for nearly a decade.

To this day no systematic attempt has been made to inquire into its effect upon the life of the people. Such an inquiry, if carefully conducted, should be of much political and administrative value. At present we are groping in the dark. We see a sinister array of figures, but no one, not even the officers of the Government, seems to have any adequate comprehension of all that this calamity may have meant for India. We know that in the earlier epidemics the people sought refuge in flight. It was estimated that during the first epidemic in Bombay half the population fled—and they carried the plague with them. We know by casual revelations that plague has affected the labour supply in many places. But what has been its permanent effect upon such cities as Poona, which has been repeatedly left desolate, and Bijapur, the scene of repeated epidemics?

What, above all, has been its consequences in the villages of the Punjab, which it smote far more heavily than the towns? We know vaguely that plague is at least in part responsible for the widespread discontent which appeared in India soon after the epidemic began, but there is no attempt to discern the extent of the connexion between plague and unrest. The district officers are familiar enough with the situation. Why is there not some endeavour to collect and summarize the knowledge they possess in great abundance? The only useful testimony on the subject is found in an admirable review by the Bombay Government of land revenue administration in the Bombay Presidency in 1908-09. Its purport is that the labouring classes have derived benefit from the scarcity of labour, as they did in England after the Black Death. On the other hand, the classes with small, fixed incomes suffered grievously from the rise in the price of foodstuffs, though prices are now rather easier.

It should be obvious that if plague is to be continuously present in India for an indefinite period its presence must materially affect the success, and perhaps ultimately even the stability, of British rule. The fact that more lives are now lost in the villages than in the great cities causes the terrible suffering and misery and terror which plague produces to be largely lost sight of. During an epidemic the people now seem apathetic and resigned, but no one who has witnessed the effect of plague upon an Indian village can doubt its deep influence upon social and political conditions. The difficulty is that there is a general tendency visible both within the Government and outside it, to take the continuance of plague as a matter of course. The first outbreaks created excitement and alarm. To-day, though much devoted work is still being done, there is apparently a tendency to regard plague as an insoluble, but hardly a vital, problem. It is handled carefully enough

Can More  
be Done?

when it recurs in epidemic form, but the manifest feeling appears to be that it cannot much affect either the prosperity of India or the welfare of the Administration. Careful inquiry would probably show the danger of such a placid attitude.

Can more be done for the prevention of plague and the restriction of epidemics? At present, on a broad review of existing conditions, it is difficult to furnish an explicit answer. The Bombay Government tried rigorous measures, wholesale prohibitions, interminable inspections, forcible improvement of sanitary conditions. In the end its methods were rightly deemed to have failed. The reason is obvious. You may even introduce martial law, if you like, for one brief epidemic, but you cannot permanently interfere with the liberty and free movement of millions of people on account of a pandemic which seems likely to last for the whole of their lives. Some relaxation of preventive measures became inevitable, and at present the precautions taken are more permissive than compulsory in character. The best hope for the future lies in the possibility that a curative as well as a protective remedy may be discovered by the Plague Research Commission, which is still quietly at work. Meanwhile a reasonable degree of immunity is conferred by the Haffkine prophylactic, though the people of India continue to regard the preparation with so much suspicion that its undoubted benefits are only meagrely utilized.

## CHAPTER XX.

### THE FORESTS OF INDIA.

Since the formation of the Indian Forest Department in 1864 a system of forest conservation has gradually been built up which has not only achieved remarkable financial results, but has also been of immense direct and indirect advantage to agriculture. The forest policy decided upon in 1894 was that "the sole object with which State forests are administered is the public benefit"; but the realization of a good and steadily increasing revenue is always being kept well in view. The financial success obtained was alluded to in the Indian Budget speech in 1906, when Lord Morley said concerning the forest administration:—"I cannot wonder that those who are concerned in these operations look forward with nothing short of exultation to the day when this country will realize what a splendid asset is now being built up in India in connexion with these forests."

The total annual outturn of forest produce amounts to about 250,000,000 cubic feet of timber and fuel, and 200,000,000 bamboos, with minor produce to the value of about £480,000; while the actual net income has of recent years exceeded £800,000, although the expenditure on working, maintenance, and improvement always exceeds one-half of the gross revenue. Besides that, a great deal of produce is granted free or at reduced



rates to persons living in the vicinity of the forests. The extent to which the forests directly or indirectly provide the means of livelihood for the rural population cannot even roughly be estimated. Details for the Census of 1911 are not yet out, except that the population in British India now totals 315 millions. In 1901, when the population was 294 millions, the number of persons dependent for their livelihood on wood, cane, leaves, &c., was shown as 3,790,492, while other 1,886,156 were dependent on shifting cultivation in the forests ; yet these 5½ millions represent nothing like the actual number entirely or partially dependent for their means of livelihood on the forests, on forest work, or on industries for which the woodlands furnish the raw material.

The indirect utility of the Indian forests  
**Nomadic** is, however, far more valuable to the  
**Cultivation.** State than the mere financial profit.

The grazing annually afforded to countless herds is of special value in years of drought, in saving from starvation the cattle upon which the agriculture depends. In times of deficient rainfall and scarcity of food the State forests are opened for the free collection of grass and fuel, and for the gathering of edible roots and fruits ; and the poorer classes in districts thus affected then resort in large numbers to the forests to eke out a scanty subsistence, while the agricultural classes are granted permission to graze their cattle free of cost in many of the Government forests. These concessions are now highly appreciated in dry tracts such as the Central and the United Provinces, though at the time of the formation and settlement of reserved forests the rural population usually failed to see the advantage of having their customary rights of user defined, regulated, and often diminished or even extinguished by purchase or otherwise, and almost invariably considered these innovations to be an uncalled-for attack on their past habits and customs. This feeling of being harassed was, and still is, particularly

strong with regard to the wasteful custom of shifting cultivation common in all the wooded tracts of India. This consists in felling all trees and bamboos (except some of the largest trees, if such can be killed by girdling) during January and February, and then burning them in March and April. No attempt being made to control the fires, hundreds of square miles of forest would be passed through by scorching fires in the course of every hot season. In the fertile virgin soil with rich top-dressing thus given by the ash of the burned trees and bamboos, rice crops were sown or planted for one year, and only seldom for a second year; and then a move was made to another part of the woods, to repeat the destructive process. Thus, not only were large quantities of timber of marketable value destroyed, but the damage done by the fires being allowed to spread into the surrounding woodlands in all directions also caused considerable injury to these. It was only gradually that anything like control could be exercised over this nomadic cultivation, and then practically only in the reserved forests. Some idea of the extent to which damage was formerly done in this manner may be formed from the fact that, according to the Census of 1901, over 1,886,000 persons were still dependent on such shifting cultivation for their livelihood. Steps are still being taken to limit the destructive effects of such shifting cultivation without inflicting undue hardship on the hill tribes practising it. And while the Forest Law is administered leniently, endeavours are made to get the people to understand, if possible, that forest conservation is undertaken for their ultimate advantage and not as a method of harassing them in small ways.

The influence of forests on local climate, on water storage, and on soil fertility is of special importance in India, and particularly throughout the dry regions of Central and Northern India; while in the coastal

Forest  
Fires.

regions and the mountain tracts with heavy tropical downpours the forest growth is highly beneficial in preventing disastrous erosion. The water storing capacity of the forests tends to obviate disastrous floods and to provide a regular water supply ; and even in Burma, where nearly 75 per cent. of the total area of the province is still under forest, it has been found necessary to take measures for reserving large tracts for water storage purposes and for reafforesting arid areas for climatic reasons.

The percentage of forest area in different provinces varies very greatly, and just where woodlands are most wanted there often happen to be few or no forests.

Needs of Dry Zones. Thus, in the great Gangetic Plain and north-westwards across the Punjab, a densely populated area swarming with many scores of millions of human beings, few or no forests remain, the primeval woodlands having long ago been cleared for permanent cultivation. And as the necessity for, and the main justification of, having a Forest Department in India is mainly to be found in the assistance it can give to agriculture and to grazing in the densely populated tracts fringing the dry zones where scarcity is frequent and famine often to be feared, the question may well arise if it is not a duty which Government should recognize as incumbent upon it to regularly devote a large proportion of the surplus forest revenue in each year to the enclosing and sowing or planting of poor waste lands, uncultivated and unculturable at present, situated within the dry zones in different parts of India. The reservation and reafforestation of the largest possible number of areas as fuel and fodder reserves, to be worked mainly in the interests of agriculture, is a very important work which should be undertaken to a far larger extent than has hitherto

been the case, for partially ameliorating the rural conditions during times of scarcity and famine.

Before the Forest Department was formed in 1864 only Bombay, Madras, and Burma had Conservators of Forests ; but in 1864 Conservators were appointed to the Punjab, Bengal, and Coorg, and subsequently also to the other provinces under the Government of India. In 1865 a Forest Act was passed under which rules were promulgated at different times for the various provinces. As departmental organization developed, the need of well-trained officers soon became apparent. At first the Department was recruited by appointing military officers and others who seemed fond of rough camp life or showed some aptitude for carrying out simple methods of surveying and enumerating the stock of the most valuable kinds of timber in the forests and for administering the few forest rules then in force. From 1869 onwards, however, recruitment mainly took place with young officers selected by the Secretary of State in London and especially trained in European forestry before being appointed Assistant Conservators in India. This regular annual appointment of trained men to the Department soon led to the expansion of work in all directions, and as now organized the Forest Department is a branch of the Revenue and Agricultural Department in the Government of India.

It consists of (1) an Imperial Forest Service recruited entirely with trained men from Britain ; (2) a Provincial Forest Service recruited entirely in India ; and (3) a Subordinate Forest Service recruited locally in each Province. The Imperial Forest Service embraces all the administrative and the chief executive appointments. The administrative staff includes the Inspector-General with the Government of India, two Chief Conservators in Burma and the Central Provinces, and 19 Conservators in charge of provincial departments (circles), and directly

responsible to the various local Governments through their Revenue Secretary. These 19 administrative circles consist of forest divisions and sub-divisions in charge of 130 deputy and 65 assistant Conservators acting under the Conservators' orders. The Provincial Forest Service consists of 32 extra deputy and 113 extra assistant Conservators, all of whom may be put in charge of minor divisions. The Subordinate Forest Service consists of 455 forest rangers, gazetted to ranges, and of a non-gazetted staff of over 14,000 foresters, forest guards, and others working in the forest beats into which ranges are divided. But even this large staff cannot really cope properly with all the work there is to be done.

The training of recruits for the Provincial Service and for rangers takes place at the Imperial Forest College, at Dehra Dun, in the United Provinces, with which an Imperial Forest Research Institute is also incorporated, while foresters are trained at the vernacular schools established in most of the provinces.

The first Forest Act of 1865 was soon found to be so defective as to make new legislation necessary ; but it was not until 1878 that a good and practical Indian Forest Act was passed. It is, therefore, from 1878 that the really systematic conservancy of the Indian forests may be dated ; while well regulated and proper organization of office and jungle work dates from the issue, in 1877, of the first edition of the Forest Department Code giving specific directions for the conduct of business.

The Indian Forest Act of 1878 gave  
**The Forest Acts.** power to deal with private rights in forests throughout which the State owned the chief proprietary right. But its provisions were not found suitable to Burma and Madras, for which separate Acts were passed in 1880 and 1882. These are the Acts (subsequently amended) now in force except in Burma, for which a new Act was passed in 1902—to unify the forest laws throughout both Lower and Upper Burma

(annexed in 1886, and made subject to a special Forest Regulation); and under their authority Forest Rules are promulgated according to the various circumstances and requirements of the several provinces.

The guiding principle upon which the forests are administered under these Acts and Rules is that State forests should be managed for the public benefit, and should be so worked as to afford reasonable facilities for the use of forest produce by the public while at the same time providing the necessary protection for their proper conservation with regard to the growth of timber, fuel, &c., and to the retention and storage of soil-moisture. According to the extent to which is considered necessary or active management can be undertaken, the State forests are classified as Reserved and Protected or unclassified, the latter including wooded tracts, some of which, especially in Burma, may later on be cleared for agriculture. In round numbers there are now 100,000 square miles of State reserved forests and 150,000 square miles of Protected forests; but gradual additions are being made to the former by the selection and reservation of the most important tracts to be found among the latter. In both classes of forest, however, the most important measures of conservancy are the prevention, so far as possible, of the ground fires which tend to overrun and devastate the forests, the maintenance of a due supply of seed-bearing trees, and the regeneration and improvement and cultivation of the more valuable kind of timber-trees. These 250,000 square miles of State forest represent about 24 per cent. of the total area of British India. Plantations have also been formed to a total extent of about 150,000 acres, more than one-half of which are teak and cutch plantations in Burma.

The State Reserved forests are of **The Reserved** four classes. There are, first of all, those **Forests.** reserved from climatic consideration or for physical reasons, such as preventing

the destruction of agricultural lands by hill-torrents. Then come those containing supplies of marketable timber, such as teak, sal, and deodar. In these forests reasonable facilities are given to the neighbouring rural population for the satisfaction, on easy terms, of their actual requirements as to building timber, fuel, thatching, fodder, grass, cattle-grazing, and edible roots and fruits for themselves, with respect to which considerations of income are subordinated to the satisfaction of these requirements under the imposition of whatever restrictions may be necessary. In particular, the destructive system of shifting temporary cultivation is only permitted where jungle tribes are dependent on it for their sustenance, when it must only be exercised under necessary regulations. A third class consists of minor forests producing small timber or such as has no great marketable value; and these are managed chiefly in the interests of the rural population, fuel and grazing being supplied at moderate rates, while a smaller sum is paid by those living near the forests than is levied on those coming from other localities. And, finally, there are pasture lands, which, even more than the minor forests, are managed mainly in the interests of the villagers in their vicinity.

In every province some of the more valuable timber-trees throughout the unclassified forests have been declared "reserved trees," and can only be felled under special licence, sometimes granted free, but usually on payment of fixed felling and tonnage rates. Outside the Reserved forests the rural population are generally allowed to obtain from the State forest timber, fuel, bamboos, and grass for their own use free of charge; while inside the reserve rights of user acknowledged at the time of the "settlement" previous to reservation are preserved to the privileged public, and other persons are only permitted to extract timber or

other produce on payment of fees and under special licence.

Reserved forests are only formed out of portions of the protected or unclassified State forests after careful inquiry has been made concerning customary rights or privileges long exercised by the neighbouring population. When a local Government thinks active steps for reservation are advisable, a notification of intention to reserve is published in the official *Gazette*, and a Civil officer is appointed for the "settlement" of the proposed reserve, by holding inquiry into the existence, nature, and extent of any rights to land included within the specified boundaries, or to extract produce from it. This "forest settlement officer" then publishes a similar proclamation and issues copies of it printed in the vernacular to every village in the vicinity of the land, and a period of at least three months is allowed for the receipt of petitions objecting to reservation or claiming rights of user. On a specified date he holds a formal judicial inquiry on the spot, records all the evidence offered, and investigates the claims made to proprietary rights or customary user as to grazing, produce, &c.; and in the case of shifting cultivation he must record his opinion as to whether the custom should be permitted or prohibited wholly or in part and must make a record of those to whom rights or privileges should be confirmed; or he can estimate the money value of petty rights with a view to their extinction by purchase. The proceedings are then submitted to the local Government. But any person feeling himself aggrieved can appeal within three months to the Collector or Deputy Commissioner of the district, and the local Government may, if it thinks this necessary, appoint a forest Court of three persons to consider and adjudicate on such appeals. Then the local Government, if satisfied that reservation is desirable, may, by notification

Method of  
Reservation.



in the official *Gazette*, declare the forest to be reserved from a certain date, and specify definitely the limits and boundary marks. The forest is demarcated with numbered cairns, posts, boundary boards, and blaze marks on tree-stems ; and, in the case of forests containing much valuable timber, fellings remain in abeyance until a working plan has been drawn up, and has been formally approved by the local Government. Within five years the local Government may rescind or modify any order made regarding the settlement and reservation ; but, after that, the special sanction of the Government of India is necessary to any further alterations that may be proposed.

The formation of scientific working plans for the various reserved forests was commenced in 1884, and up till now they have been prepared and approved for areas aggregating about 50,000 square miles. Their preparation necessitates a survey on the scale of two or four inches to the mile, and the employment of a special working-plans officer, with a large staff of enumerators. Their provisions usually extend for a period of 30 years, when a revision will take place. Fire protection is provided for by prescriptions laid down in the Forest Acts and Rules ; but special measures have also to be taken, which are extended to about 40,000 square miles. These measures consist chiefly in clearing and maintaining " fire-traces," which are broad paths kept as free as possible from inflammable *débris* during the hot season, and in employing watchers to check fires coming from the outside, and to prevent the entrance of persons who might cause fire either wilfully or through negligence.

The life of an Indian Forest Officer is usually very lonely, and for the most part  
 Life in the Forests. spent in malarious tracts ; for none of the forests, except those in the sub-Alpine tracts of the Himalayas, are above the fever limit. The amount of actual hardship, however, which has usually

to be borne in carrying out jungle work varies greatly in different provinces. The service is most exacting in the trying climate of the purely tropical provinces, and especially where the climate is very moist and enervating, and where there are often few or no conveniences in the shape of good tracts and paths such as have been largely opened up throughout the Northern and Central Indian forests. As regards climate, officers serving in the Himalayan tracts are much more enviably situated than those serving near wet coastal districts; and although some of the most interesting forest work is being done in Burma, it is generally admitted that service there is harder than in almost any other part of India. In all the provinces jungle life is full of interest to those having a taste for any branch of natural science, and the Forest Officer is to be pitied who does not possess a hobby in this direction or in the way of *shikar*. But the time and the opportunities Forest Officers now have for big-game shooting are now small compared to what used to be the case in the early days of the Department; though in this respect the United and Central Provinces still offer the greatest attraction as regards tiger-shooting.

The work of the forester usually commences beyond where that of other departments ends. As an explorer first, then as a pioneer, and afterwards as an employer of labour he comes in contact with forest tribes who are naturally suspicious and jealous of any interference with the habits and customs of their primitive life. To them he is often the only European officer of whom they have any personal knowledge, and the sole representative of the British *Raj* of which they have all heard; and the success of officers opening out work in such tracts depends upon their ability to gain the confidence of these jungle tribes. The policy of government is to permit no sudden imposition of restrictions that may alter the accustomed mode of tribal life, but rather to win

Forest  
Tribes.

their confidence by kindness and gradually convert them into self-supporting communities, so that forest departmental work commences with their acquiescence, often only reluctant, and progresses with their assistance. Thus, in Burma it was hard to get the Karen hill tribes to begin planting, fire protection, and other work proposed by the Forest Department about 20 to 30 years ago, but now they would think it a great hardship if deprived of these substantial additions to their means of livelihood.

While most forest tribes are nomadic and more or less dependent on shifting cultivation, hunting, fishing, and the collection of forest products usually form a very important part of their occupation, and a necessary means of livelihood. With the necessary gradual restriction of these tribes to limited areas, especially demarcated within reserved forests, there must in course of time, and with natural increase of tribal population, be a diminution in the food supply that the forests can afford; hence it is more than probable that the tribal organization must in course of time become altered and transformed into village communities practising permanent cultivation. Under a harsh rule many of the smallest of such tribes would long since have disappeared; and now their protection and maintenance are only possible by carefully managing the forests in their interests.

The achievements of the Indian Forest Department form a splendid object-lesson for the other parts of the British Empire having extensive woodlands. In nearly all the Crown Colonies, as also in Cyprus, Egypt, Siam, forest conservancy has been, or is being, introduced under the guidance of officers who have served in India. And if our two largest Oversea Dominions—Canada and Australia—desire quickly to introduce a sound scheme of forest conservancy, they cannot possibly do better than look to Indian experience for help and guidance. Both in Australia and in Canada it should not

be difficult to draw up a general forest Act for the whole of the Dominion, under which Forest Rules could be framed to suit the special circumstances and requirements of each of the separate States. And it would also be easy to draw up for each of these two great Dominions a Forest Department Code, like the Indian one, to ensure uniformity in the conduct of departmental work.



## CHAPTER XXI.

### THE EXPANSION OF BOMBAY.

When Bombay passed into the possession of the English as part of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza, the Viceroy of Goa wrote to the King of Portugal :—" India will be lost on the same day on which the English nation is settled in Bombay." That is perhaps the most remarkable example of human prescience in Colonial history. In 1665 Bombay was a mean settlement on one of the group of seven islands which has gradually been welded into a modern city. The seat of Portuguese power was at Goa ; the English trading centre was at the ancient city of Surat ; Clarendon's ideas of the geography of the Indies were so misty that he described the Island of Bombay as being situated " within a very little distance from Brazil." It is true that the Council of English Factors at Surat had urged the purchase of Bombay from the Portuguese, and that the Directors of the East India Company had drawn the attention of Cromwell to this suggestion, laying stress on the excellence of the harbour and the isolation of the island from land attacks. Yet none, other than the Viceroy of Goa, dared anticipate the day when, broad based on the mean islands which thus passed into the possession of the Crown, would rise the power which would drive the Portuguese from India, leaving them only the figments of their former empire, and a trading centre that would strangle Goa, Surat, and Ormuz, and raise itself into the gateway of India. With

no other natural advantage than an unrivalled harbour on a coast almost destitute of havens, Bombay has grown into the second city of the Empire, with an enumerated population of 972,892, and an actual total of over a million inhabitants. Calcutta is the seat of government, and a more wealthy commercial centre; Madras is richer in historical incident; Karachi is a port of infinite promise; but Bombay stands unchallenged as the great manufacturing and commercial capital of India, pre-eminently distinguished by its enterprise, sobriety of thought, and unity of object and endeavour.

The two priceless assets of Bombay are its harbour and its people. Possessing an enormous coastline, India is most indifferently equipped with decent anchorages. The old commercial stations, Surat, Broach, and Cambay, are all situated on rivers running through alluvial plains, and these, rapidly silting up, are entirely unsuited for modern sea-borne trade. Between Karachi in the extreme north, where a modern harbour is being slowly evolved from a muddy creek, and Cape Comorin, there is but one modern port, and that is Bombay. In this magnificent haven half the fleets of the world might lie securely at anchor, protected from the battering monsoon seas by the long narrow island, which forms a natural breakwater. This haven seems to have been designed by Nature to be the port of entry and discharge for the trade of two-thirds of India. Its natural and unchallenged *Hinterland* embraces the fertile cotton fields of Gujerat, and the huge areas growing the characteristic short-stapled fibre of the Deccan and Berar. Its traffic zone stretches far south and south-east into the Madras Presidency and Hyderabad, through Central India towards the limits of the Central Provinces, and far north to Delhi and Cawnpore, where it comes into the keenest competition with Calcutta. It is the natural *entrepot* for the growing trade with the Persian Gulf

and Turkish Arabistan, with Aden and the Red Sea ports, and down East Africa as far as Beira and Durban. Whilst Karachi will naturally absorb the export of wheat from the new Canal Colonies of the Punjab and Sind, the new port which the Portuguese are struggling to improve at Mormugao will take a share of the trade of the Southern Mahratta country, and Calcutta, aided by a preferential railway policy, will always fight hard for the traffic of Northern India, no change, except a political cataclysm, can shake Bombay's centripetal attraction over the trade which now comes to the port, nor prevent her merchants from thrusting their tentacles further into the progressive north.

But transcending even these natural advantages is the asset Bombay possesses in the character of its people. In all other parts of India society is divided into watertight compartments. In Calcutta industry and commerce are entirely in the hands of English and Scotch manufacturers and merchants, whilst the retail trade is monopolized by the keen Marwaris. The Bengali loathes the office and the desk, expending all his energies in the law and journalism, and when he has money to invest he puts it in the safest four per cents. In Madras the division between business and the professions is no less sharp. But Bombay is a cosmopolitan city, its trade and industry are shared by every section of the population to a degree unparalleled in any other part of the Indian Empire. When the St. George's Cross was raised over Bombay Castle the proselytizing methods of the Jesuits and Franciscans had made European domination a hated thing. The British at once established a reign of complete religious toleration, and the keenest brains and boldest characters from all Western India flocked to an island where a security which the native rulers could not guarantee might be had with complete freedom of conscience and religious observance. The Parsis, driven from Persia by the Mahomedan conquerors centuries before, who had been allowed

to settle as hewers of wood and drawers of water in Gujerat, were amongst the first arrivals. They brought a freedom from caste prejudice and restriction, and the quickness and clannishness bred of oppression, which made them the natural channel of communication between the English and the children of the soil, and gave them a large share in the seaborne trade shunned by Hindus because of the pollution involved in voyaging across "The Black Water." The Khojas, forced converts from Hinduism, came from Cutch, the Banias from Gujerat, the Bhattias from Cutch and Gujerat, the Konkani Mahomedans from the south, and a sprinkling of Jews from Baghdad. These are amongst the keenest trading races in the world; their natural vogue is commerce; and if they have a fault it is that they are too speculative rather than ultra-conservative—the besetting sin of most of India. It is on this secure human foundation that the commercial fortunes of Bombay are firmly based.

A full appreciation of the position of the various Indian communities in the city is a Cosmopolitan essential to an understanding of the place Spirit. of Bombay in India and the Empire. In most parts of India the line of demarcation between the Englishman and the Indian is sharply drawn; in some parts it is possible for a man to pass a lifetime in the country and never come into intimate contact with an Indian gentleman. In Bombay the line is so faint that it must soon be extinguished. Englishman and Indian, Parsi and Mahomedan, Jew and Hindu, meet in daily and intimate commercial dealing. They sit side by side in the Hall of the Municipality and the Senate of the University, they foregather nightly at the Orient Club, and interdine frequently. Touch any commercial house and you find that its ramifications are so intertwined with Englishman and Indian that acute racial feeling is impossible; at any public gathering, every race and creed in the cosmopolitan



city will be represented. Whilst communal life in Bombay is strong, it is rarely bigoted; commerce, and the amenities commerce has brought in its train, has been a mighty solvent of particularism and intolerance. In all these respects Bombay is nearly a generation ahead of any other part of India. It has acquired a unique reputation for common sense and sobriety of opinion. The Bengali is generally more cultured, he is almost always a finer orator and rhetorician; Madras has carried its educational machinery to a higher pitch and produced more accomplished Brahmin administrators; but Bombay leads India in the sobriety of thought and breadth of view which comes from travel and commerce and the magic influence of property. If it cannot be said that what Bombay thinks to-day India thinks to-morrow, it may be said without exaggeration that at all times of political excitement India looks to Bombay for an informed opinion, and for the brake which will arrest runaway political thought. It is to Bombay that the Government look for the reflection of the best Indian opinion on the politics of the day, and for a lead in currency and finance.

In these circumstances the rise of  
 The Rise of Bombay. Bombay was almost uninterrupted. The  
 early English beat off the Dutch and drove  
 the Portuguese out of the adjacent islands.

They welded the seven islets into one by shutting out the sea and raising the level of the swamps. After a wearisome fight, they extirpated piracy when Watson and Clive stormed the pirate King's last stronghold, and secured permanent peace by crushing the Mahratta power on the field of Kirkee. By the sixties the population had increased to 800,000 and Bombay merchants were as well known in Hong-kong and Canton as in the City of London. But two events stand pre-eminent in the rise of Bombay into an Imperial city—the establishment of the first spinning mill in 1854 and the American

Civil War. In the middle of the last century the imports of cotton fabrics had attained such proportions that shrewd business men began to see no reason why Indian cotton should be shipped to Manchester, to be returned in the form of yarn and cloth. In 1854 a Parsi established the first spinning mill, and that was the beginning of the staple industry of Bombay, which now embraces 2,824,046 spindles and 41,931 looms, gives employment to 100,000 people, and represents an invested capital of £12,000,000 sterling. Then the outbreak of the American Civil War forced Indian cotton up to famine prices; the value of Surats, the generic name for Indian cotton, increased from 3d. to 2s. a pound, and the export from 700,000 to nearly 2,000,000 bales. It is estimated that during the period of the Civil War £92,000,000 sterling flowed into Bombay over and above the average value of her merchandise. This sudden access of easily-gotten wealth, for which there was no natural outlet, induced a burst of frantic speculation. The cotton-growers indulged in orgies of extravagance, and shod their bullocks and tyred their carts with the silver which they did not know how to spend. In the city speculation went mad. Finance companies, land companies, banks, and reclamation companies poured out in endless succession and their shares at once assumed inflated values. When the collapse of the South released the blockade the reaction came. Cotton dropped in a few weeks from 1s. 8d. to 10d. a pound, and widespread ruin followed. This period is still spoken of with horror by those who suffered as the Share Mania. But all the money was not wasted. The hour had brought the man in Bartle Frere. He threw down the old ramparts, planned the public buildings that are the glory of Bombay, drove broad boulevards through the heart of the ancient town, and laid the foundations of an Imperial city. The largest of the reclamation companies, which failed so completely that nothing was returned to the shareholders, handed over

to the Government a huge area of reclaimed land which provided space for expansion.

Now Bombay has passed into a third stage—the adaptation of the city to its assured future. After the passing of Bartle Frere the period of big ideas expired. The Municipality completed a magnificent scheme for an unlimited water supply by damming the river Tansa and carrying the water through aqueducts and iron mains for 50 miles to the city, a supply capable of yielding 40,000,000 gallons a day. It constructed an elaborate system of drainage on the Shone system, amid immense difficulties arising from the ignorance and prejudice of the mass of the population. The mill industry flourished exceedingly, owing to the large absorbing capacity of the China market, and trade grew apace. But the city expanded without design or plan, with no regard for the future. The advent of the plague in September, 1896, brought a rude awakening. The panic caused by the mortality from this strange disease set up a general exodus, and it is estimated that 400,000 people fled to their homes. Grass grew in the principal streets, business was at a standstill, and domestic servants were so scarce that delicately nurtured Englishwomen had to perform the menial offices of the kitchen. An inquiry into the causes of the epidemic placed on record what had long been a matter of common knowledge—that the city had been allowed to develop on lines which ignored the elements of sanitation and hygiene. The heavy cost of land in Bombay, owing to the narrowness of the island and the property of a migratory artisan population, has led to the evolution of the chawl, or tenement house, which is a nest of rooms. The family unit of the Indian urban poor is not the house, but the room. In some of these chawls as many as 4,000 persons were living, often with more than one family in a room, and thousands of such rooms had no independent access

to light and air. When it is understood that the Indian family cooks at an open fireplace in the family living room, and often there is a sink which serves as a bathroom as well, the condition of the worst parts of the native town may be imagined. Yet plague has not been an unmixed evil, for it forced attention to these defects, and was the stimulating factor in launching the great ameliorative works that are now in progress. They are divided into four heads—those undertaken by the Improvement Trust, the Port Trust, the Municipality, and by Government.

The first work was the sanitary regeneration of the island. In 1898 Improvement Government decided to take this out Trust. of the hands of the Municipality and to vest it in a special body, called the Improvement Trust. The Trust consists of 14 members, of whom four are elected by the Municipality and one each by the Chamber of Commerce, the Millowners' Association, and the Port Trust, and the balance are either nominated by Government or are officers of Government. It is presided over by a whole-time chairman, who is either a covenanted civilian or an officer of the Public Works Department, who is also the head of the executive. The specific duties of the Trust are to construct new streets, open out crowded localities, reclaim lands from the sea to provide room for expansion, and to construct sanitary dwellings for the poor. As all these works are bound to prove unremunerative, with the exception of reclamation, certain Government and municipal lands were vested in the Trust, the usufruct of which it enjoys, and it receives a contribution from the municipal revenues not exceeding 2 per cent. on the rateable value of the property assessed for taxation. In practice the works are financed out of four per cent. loans, which are guaranteed by the municipality and by Government, and the revenue of the Trust is used to meet interest

and Sinking Fund charges. In the 13 years of its existence the Trust has effected an enormous improvement in the city. Two broad roads, running due east and west, have been cut through the most crowded quarters, sweeping away a mass of insanitary property and admitting the healthy westerly breezes to the most densely-populated localities. Large areas of good building land, lying idle for want of development works, have been brought on the market and taken up at highly remunerative rates. Two of the most insanitary quarters have been levelled to the ground and reconstructed in accordance with hygienic principles. Sanitary chawls have been built for 14,500 persons. On these works the Trust has incurred a capital debt of £3,000,000, in addition to spending £760,000 from revenue. It is now spending £173,333 a year, in addition to some £366,000 from loans. The only remunerative work undertaken was the reclamation of a portion of the foreshore. An area of 90,000 square yards was won from the sea at a cost of £33,000, and it is illustrative of the value of land in Bombay that this has been let out on lease at rents which capitalized represent a profit of £112,000. The Trust is now engaged in rendering fit for building a large area of swampy rice land in the northern part of the island, connecting it with the older quarters by broad arterial roads, and thus providing for the inevitable expansion and diffusion of the population. But a few months ago the Trust found itself at the end of its resources. When it was constituted it was estimated that the usufruct of the public lands would represent a contribution of £640,000 from the general taxpayer; in practice this has been reduced to £286,666. With demands upon it to satisfy which would necessitate an expenditure of millions sterling, the Trust found itself with unpledged resources of only £106,666. The Government of India has come to its assistance with a cash grant of £330,000, which will be supplemented by contributions from the

general funds of the Bombay Presidency. With these resources the Trust will be able to complete a great eastern avenue, running due south and north, and thus facilitating the diffusion of the population in a northerly direction, which has hitherto been impracticable owing to the nexus of mean streets which cut the town into divisions.

The schemes of port development are of no less magnitude. The affairs of the port are controlled by a Trust comprising representatives of English commerce, Indian trade, the two railways serving Bombay, and Government, under a whole-time chairman, who is an official lent by Government. In the early eighties it constructed two fine wet docks, the Princess Dock and the Victoria Dock, and a commodious dry dock. But the conditions in which Bombay trade is now carried on are primitive in the extreme. There is direct rail access to the quayside, but it is little used. The cotton is hauled by rail to the Green in the far south of the island, and thence returned by road or water to the mills and docks in the centre and north. The grain trade is scattered over miles of streets, and carried by bullock carts to the wharves. The important traffic in coal and manganese is handled in the most wasteful fashion. Although this is the mail port for India, the passenger steamers have to lie in the stream, a mile or so from the shore, and laboriously land passengers and mails by tender. In another two years all these conditions will be revolutionized. A new dock, the Alexandra Dock, is approaching completion, and will be 50 acres in extent with quay space for 17 berths of 500ft. each. Out of this opens a dry dock 1,000ft. long, and from the entrance lock projects a mole alongside which the largest mail steamers will be able to lie at any state of the tide. Large as this dock is, it will be fully required by the expanding trade as soon as it is open.

Great New  
Docks.

The whole of the export trade will be concentrated north of the dock estate. For this purpose 596 acres of land are being reclaimed from the harbour at a cost of £1,833,333. In this work methods are being adopted new to India, though familiar in other parts of the world. Suction dredgers pump mud from the bottom of the harbour, deliver it through steel mains 4,000ft. in length to "ponds," where it rapidly dries and solidifies under the Eastern sun. The cost of reclamation by this method is only one-quarter of that by the means previously adopted. All rail-borne traffic as it comes into the north of the island will first be sorted, then delivered into the sheds in the new trade depôt, where it will be made up into whole train-loads for delivery alongside the steamer. When these works are complete, which should be in 1913, the port will be inferior in equipment to none in the world. They will increase the capital debt by some four millions sterling, but the Trustees have accumulated a revenue reserve which is expected to reach £440,000 by the time interest and sinking-fund charges on the new works have to be met, so as to tide over the period whilst they are being brought into full bearing. The actual cost of the works on which the Port Trust are now engaged—the Alexandra Dock, the Mazagon-Sewri Reclamation, with its road and grain and cotton sheds, and the railway, with its rolling stock—is £5,326,666. When these works are complete the capital value of the Dock Estate will be £9,804,066.

A New City  
Won from the  
Sea.

In the past it has been a matter of complaint that since the days of Bartle Frere the Government of Bombay have treated their capital city, from which they are absent for the greater part of the year, with step-motherly affection. But since the advent of Sir George Clarke that has been changed. Sir George Clarke, who is keenly interested in urban questions, at once bent himself to the task of evolving out of the separate schemes

for the development of the island an ordered and scientific whole. Under his ægis there has been prepared a scheme for increasing the accommodation nature has provided, titanic in its boldness. At present the southern three miles of the island consists of nothing more than a narrow promontory. It is proposed to widen this by reclamation until it represents the upper section of a bull-headed rail. The *modus operandi*, as in the case of the big reclamation by the Port Trust, will be by dredging mud from the bottom of the harbour and delivering it on the spot required through steel mains. By this agency it is estimated that in seven years 973 acres can be reclaimed at a cost of £1,873,000. The chief interest in the scheme lies in the means of financing it. It is proposed that the work shall be undertaken under the direct agency of Government, so as to secure respect for the public purposes which are to be fulfilled. Out of the total area 100 acres will be made over to the Military Department at cost price, 150 devoted to a park, 40 acres for a new Government House, 20 acres for open spaces, and 221 acres for roads. This will leave 442 acres of building land, which will have cost with interest £2,000,000, and it is assumed that this can be let at the rate of 60,000 square yards a year at rents representing an average capital value of 25 rupees a yard. On this basis, adding all interest charges to capital until the scheme is on a paying basis, the turning-point will not be reached until the forty-second year, by which time the scheme will be paying 5·96 per cent. on the total capital cost. If from that time forth all surplus revenue is devoted to the reduction of debt, in the sixty-ninth year the capital debt will be completely redeemed, and Government will enter into possession of this magnificent estate free of cost. The scheme has been sanctioned by the Bombay Government, and will go before the Government of India and the Secretary of State for approval. If this great project can be carried out it will provide for the



expansion of Bombay, as far as the upper and middle classes are concerned, for two generations. Even if Government are reluctant to undertake the task of financing it, the reclamation may be carried out by concessionaires, who are willing to execute the work on a 4 per cent. guarantee. Some great reclamation in the south of the island is an imperative necessity, for the burden of rents, which is one of the greatest drawbacks to life in the modern Indian cities, is growing, and threatens to attain crushing proportions.

It is a remarkable and significant fact **Vast Industrial Enterprises.** that this outburst of corporate activity should synchronize with a period of great depression in the staple industry. Practically every one in Bombay is interested in the mills, either as employer, employed, or bondholder, and the textile trade is passing through evil days. Many of the Bombay mills spin entirely for the China market; that has been upset by the abnormal price of cotton and the increasing competition of Japanese and Chinese mills. In India, despite two bumper seasons, the prices of cloth and yarn refuse to respond to the inflation of the staple. At the present moment twenty mills are closed, and there is no sign of better times. It is a remarkable tribute to the material wealth of the city that at such a time it should be able to finance the two largest joint stock enterprises ever launched in India. There is now rising at Sakchi, amid the jungles of the eastern districts of the Central Provinces, an Indian steel city, which will be capable of producing 87,200 tons of iron and steel a year. After the London market had been coaxed in vain, the capital of £1,545,000 was mainly subscribed in Bombay, and the foundation of the Indian iron and steel industry will be Bombay in origin, finance, and management. More recently still a second company was floated to supply the industries of the city with electrical energy. The chain of mountains running parallel with the western

coast of India arrests the sodden clouds as they are blown up in the rainy season, and constitutes a region of unfailing rainfall. The water will be stored in huge reservoirs, converted into electrical energy at the foot of the hills, 1,800ft. below, and delivered to the mills of Bombay at 0.55 of a penny a unit. The scheme launched last year provides for 40,000 horsepower at a cost of £1,166,666, and is capable of indefinite expansion. This fine enterprise, after being hawked round the London market, will now be carried through entirely with Indian capital and under Indian direction. Amid all these activities the municipality is preparing to spend a million and a half sterling on water supply and drainage, and three leading citizens have subscribed £126,000 for the establishment of a Science College. Figures are dull things; but perhaps these arid statistics will convey some idea of the wealth of Bombay and the prodigious scale on which she is preparing to fit herself for her Imperial responsibilities.

It is well-nigh impossible for the untravelled Englishman to realize the giant strides that are being made by the commercial cities of India that have sprung into existence under the influence of the *pax Britannica*. He needs to sail into Bombay Harbour, to survey its miles of deep water anchorage and drive round the wharves and quays that accommodate a sea-borne trade of four million tons a year. He must drive through the main streets of the city, where he will find roads and public buildings that would not be unworthy of Munich. Most significant of all, he should stand on some eminence looking north, and mark the scores of tall chimneys belching forth smoke, then descend into the industrial quarter, and listen to the roar of machinery that is bound some day to drive Lancashire textiles out of India. All these industrial potentialities are established in a setting of unsurpassed beauty. Alone

**Bombay's  
Beautiful  
Setting.**

amongst the modern cities of India Bombay can claim to be called beautiful, and the glories of its deep bays and noble harbour, of its wooded slopes and sapphire sea command the unstinted admiration of the visitor and cannot pall on the oldest inhabitant. And these conditions are found in a climate which, whilst enervating, is never really hot, and in the worst months of the year is tempered by a sea-sweetened breeze. Broad-based as its fortunes are on geographical position, harbour, and industry, the future of Bombay is yet more securely founded on its people. Cosmopolitan to an almost unparalleled degree, yet it owns a homogeneity unknown elsewhere in India, and a civic patriotism based on the consciousness that all are citizens of no mean city. No city could be more conscious of its future as the second city in the British Empire, or more willing to spend prodigiously in order to be worthy of that destiny, so that Bombay may truly fulfil the ideal of Gerald Aungier, one of the first and greatest of her Governors, as the city that by God's grace is destined to be built.

## CHAPTER XXII.

### THE DEVELOPMENT OF BURMA.

[BY JOHN NISBET.]

During the 50 years since Arakan and Tenasserim, annexed in 1826, and Pegu, annexed in 1852, were formed into the Chief Commissionership of Lower Burma in 1862, no other province in our Indian Empire has had such rapid and unchecked commercial development and prosperity as Burma. Various well-defined stages can easily be noted in this continuous development, the most important being the annexation of Upper Burma in 1886, the completion of the railway from Rangoon to Mandalay during the work of pacification effected by Sir Charles Bernard and Sir Charles Crosthwaite by 1890, and the formation of a Lieutenant-Governorship for the whole of Burma in 1907. It is probable that a fresh impetus towards further commercial expansion will now again have been given by the new decentralizing financial contract entered into this year by the Government of India, which will give Burma, as also the other provinces, greater financial independence and a freer hand in everything that relates to increase of revenue, public works, and commercial prosperity.

Of late years an increasing number of visitors to India have also found time to visit Burma. But they mostly do so at the end of a cold-season trip in India; and though they may be charmed with the gaiety and joyfulness of

the Burmese people, without caste and thoroughly democratic, and may enjoy the lovely river scenery, the beautiful hills, and the golden or white pagodas crowning the knolls, yet they fail to see them at their best and usually regret having put off a visit to Burma until so late in the season. The best time for seeing the country is from December to February, after which the air becomes hot and hazy and the distant hills fade out of view. The traveller who can spare about a month can spend a most enjoyable time seeing Rangoon and Mandalay, thence proceeding by railway to Myitkyna in the extreme north, then returning by steam launch through the defiles to Bhamo and descending again by the Irrawaddy right down to Rangoon in the luxurious steamers of the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company. And for the antiquary, as well as for the traveller seeking new sights and pleasing impressions, a short stay at the ancient capital Pagan, "The City of 10,000 Pagodas," will be well repaid, for the Buddhist antiquities there extend back to about the time of our Norman Conquest. If time permits, and the traveller's next move is to Penang or Singapore, the coasting steamer from Rangoon *via* Mergui will give him an opportunity of seeing the beautiful tropical island scenery of the Mergui Archipelago, which is unsurpassed in any part of the world.

The preliminary results of the Census of March, 1911, show that the total population of Burma has increased by nearly 15 per cent., from 10,490,624 in 1901 to 12,057,295 now, or an increase of 1,566,671. While the females number 5,912,942, the males total 6,144,353, this excess being due to the large number of coolies immigrating from India. The largest increase has taken place in the districts lying in or near the Delta of the Irrawaddy, where, owing to the heavy and never failing rainfall, the richest rice producing tracts are located. Curiously enough, the only district in the pro-

Growth of  
Population.

vince in which there has been any decrease during the last ten years is in Mandalay (including also the town of Mandalay), until 1886 the heart and centre of the Kingdom of Ava, where the population has been reduced by over 25,000. In 1901 about four-fifths of the total population of the province consisted of Burmese and Shans and other hill tribes, but the results of this year's Census have not yet shown to what extent the increase in population during the last 10 years has been due to immigration from different parts of India and to Chinese and others.

The population of Burma consists mostly of agriculturists, over two-thirds of the total being entirely dependent on the cultivation of crops, while less than one-fifth are artisans or are engaged in occupations needing no specialized technical knowledge. Burma being an extremely rich country with a thin population and a vast extent of good waste land still awaiting clearance and cultivation, the material condition of the people contrasts very favourably with that of those in any other Indian province. Wages are high, especially in the lower part of the province; and even in the poorer tracts of the dry zone wages generally are higher than in most parts of India. The internal trade is still mainly in the hands of the Burmese, but Indians and Chinese are gradually acquiring a large proportion of the petty business; and this is almost certain to be still more the case as immigration increases. And when once through railway communication from India to Burma is effected, by linking up the Rangoon Mandalay Railway with the terminus of the Eastern Bengal Railway at Chittagong, by means of a line traversing Arakan, there is certain to be a great increase in immigration from Bengal and Upper India, which will take place without the breaking of caste now involved by crossing the "black water" of the Bay of Bengal. Whether from the dry plains of the Punjab or the dampest tracts of

Bombay, Madras, or Bengal, the immigrants from India can find fairly similar climatic conditions in one or other part of Burma, with the advantage of there being nowhere any great extremes of heat or cold.

Though some of the foreign immigrants return to their homes either temporarily or permanently, there is very little emigration from Burma. The Burman himself rarely quits the province ; and though during the last 20 years there has been a marked movement of population from the poorer dry zone in the centre of Burma proper towards the rich, wet rice tracts in the south, yet there has been no tendency for the indigenous population to move from the rural areas into the towns. Although the women of the country are keen petty traders, yet the Burman is not in general likely to compete successfully with Indians and Chinese in industrial matters ; and he seems to have already learned that he can best hold his own in agriculture and forestal pursuits. Of domestic industries cotton weaving is the most important and widespread, for home weaving is still fairly universal among women and girls, and a loom is to be found in nearly every house ; and the chief change that has taken place in this widespread rural industry is that foreign yarns and cotton goods are slowly but surely ousting the home dyed and home made articles. Silk weaving is still an important hand industry, but this is also being undermined by foreign silk goods. Of recent years the number of mills brought under the Factories Act has increased largely, the most important being rice mills to the number of 153, and sawmills to the number of 79.

The seaboard of Burma is well provided with good ports, nearly all of which occupy favourable positions at the mouths of rivers draining large and fertile alluvial tracts. At the extreme east of the Irrawaddy Delta is Rangoon,

**Industries.**

**The Ports.**

the capital of the province, and at the extreme west Bassein; in Arakan, Akyab is at the mouth of the Koladan River; and in Tenasserim, Moulmein, at the mouth of the Salwin River, is the chief port, which was long noted for its export of teak timber before the annexation of Pegu in 1852. But now Rangoon is by far the most important of all these seaports, and over four-fifths of the total seaborne trade of the province passes through it. Originally founded by Alaungpayá about 1755 to commemorate his conquest of Pegu, Rangoon (literally "the end of strife") remained a poor and straggling town on a swampy and unhealthy tidal site; but during the 60 years since the British occupation, in 1852, it has grown to be the third seaport in India, ranking only behind Calcutta and Bombay in the extent and value of its trade. During the last 20 years the town has extended rapidly in all directions, while the value of land has increased greatly, both in the town itself and in the suburbs which have sprung up on both sides of the Rangoon River. The river banks are thickly studded with ricemills, sawmills, and foundries, whose chimneys constantly throw out long black streamers of smoke; while the residential portion of the town stretches to the north and north-west for three or four miles, and encircles the famous Shwe Dagón Pagoda—a great golden bell-shaped *stupa* as high as St. Paul's Cathedral, and looking still higher from its magnificent position on the top of a lofty knoll.

The population of Rangoon is now 289,432, which shows an increase of 44,002, or 18 per cent., on that in 1901; and the mainly industrial character of the city is very clearly shown by the remarkable fact that the males number 204,343, while the females only total 85,089, although there are 48,657 houses.

The total maritime trade of the province now aggregates close on £40,000,000, the chief exports being rice, timber,



and petroleum, and the chief imports piece-goods, cotton and silk goods, and yarns. The export of rice exceeds 2,000,000 tons a year, and amounts to over three-quarters of the total exports. The timber exports, principally of teak, vary from about 50,000 to 60,000 tons per annum.

The land tenure prevailing is peasant proprietorship, and a fixed rate of revenue is paid per acre actually cropped, in terms of an original "settlement" of the cultivated land, completed in 1901 on the basis of an accurate survey. Abundance of waste land is easily procurable on easy terms for clearance and cultivation, but of recent years there has been an increasing tendency for tenants to work old fields either upon payment of rent or on a partnership system. The tenants are usually men who have formerly been landowners, but have fallen into debt, and now only occupy their holdings as tenants.

For some years past an Agricultural Department has been doing its best to improve the methods of cultivation and to introduce new crops such as ground nuts, tobacco, wheat, Egyptian cotton, and potatoes; and Government loans can be obtained upon reasonable terms for two or three years, in order to save the agricultural community from falling into the clutches of moneylenders exacting an exorbitant rate of interest. Steps have also recently been taken to introduce a co-operative credit system among the agriculturists.

Cultivation is mainly regulated by the rainfall, rice being grown wherever there is sufficient moisture. In the central dry zone of Upper Burma the chief crops are seasmum, maize, millets, cotton, beans, wheat, and peas, but vast improvements have recently taken place throughout the dry zone by means of extensive irrigation schemes supplying water to over a million acres annually. Of recent years over £800,000 were spent on irrigation

canals and protective embankments, which are proving highly remunerative.

The forests of Burma are one of the great natural sources of wealth not yet developed to anything like the extent that will later on be the case. In their

The  
Forests.

general character as evergreen or deciduous they vary according to the rainfall of different localities; but the most remunerative hitherto have been the dry hill forests in which the most valuable kinds of timber, and especially teak, are to be found. During the last 40 years the Forest Department has been busily engaged in selecting State reserves for the maintenance of permanent timber supplies; and although there are nearly 30,000 square miles of such reserved forests, this important work is not yet near its completion. Such reserved forests are specially demarcated, protected, and surveyed, and are then only worked under definite plans forecast for 30 years, and approved by the local Government, in order to ensure proper conservation for future supplies of teak and other valuable timber. But, at the same time, plantations, chiefly of teak, have during the last 30 years been formed to the extent of 80,000 acres. In accordance with these working plans mature teak trees suitable for extraction are girdled by the forest officers, to kill the trees and season the wood for floating, while felling and extraction is now almost entirely done by European firms holding contracts, somewhat like leases, for definite forest tracts and for several years. This policy was only introduced a few years ago, in consequence of the paucity of Imperial forest officers; and now the only tracts worked by direct departmental agency, with Burmese contractors, are a comparatively small area of about 2,000 square miles, situated to the north of Rangoon and drained by the Hlaing or Rangoon River. The merchant contractors or leaseholders pay a revenue of about 35 rupees a ton of 50 cubic feet for the teak

timber, but, of course, the contract-price varies according to the locality of the forest and the expense of extraction. The forests bring in an annual revenue of usually about £400,000, after payment of all departmental expenses.

Among minerals the chief product is the petroleum obtained in the southern portion of the dry zone, the oil being raised both by boring and from wells dug by native labour. The yield of petroleum is now about 200,000,000 gallons a year, and is likely to be greatly increased in the near future. The oldest and largest of the European petroleum companies is the Burma Oil Company, formed in 1886, which has a pipe-line from the oilfields to their refineries near Rangoon, the pipe-line following the trunk railway line for the greater part of the way. Few companies indeed in the history of British commerce in any part of the world have yielded such magnificent dividends as the Burma Oil Company has distributed of recent years.

The ruby mines of Mogok have been worked by the Burmah Ruby Mines Company since 1889, but neither ruby-mining nor coal, nor gold, nor iron, have yet added much to the wealth of Burma, while even the tin and wolfram deposits in the Shan States and in South Tenasserim have not yet proved really remunerative.

Communications, upon which the commercial development of any country greatly depends, have been recently pushed on in a much more satisfactory and far more energetic manner than was formerly possible. The railway system, though only of 40 in. (metre) gauge, has proved well suited to the country and has been of immense advantage in opening up land-locked tracts. Aggregating about 1,500 miles in length, it consists of a main trunk line from Rangoon to Mandalay, and thence northwards on the other side of the Irrawaddy to Myit-kyina, 724 miles north of Rangoon and about 20 miles

below where two large streams unite to form the Irrawaddy River. Branch lines unite Moulmein, Prome, Bassein, and several other headquarters of districts with Rangoon. From Mandalay one branch proceeds for some distance up the valley of the Chindwin River, to the west, while another proceeds north-eastwards through the pleasant hill station of Maymio to Lashio, the headquarters of the Northern Shan States. Kathu, on the Irrawaddy, about 60 miles below Bhamo, is linked to the Mandalay-Myitkyina line ; and from Bhamo a small light railway has been built to the frontier, where it meets the old trade route coming through Tengueh (Momein) from Western Yunnan. The Southern Shan States are now also being opened up by a light railway, which should do much to develop an already important internal and transfrontier trade. The first and probably the only transfrontier railway likely to be made in the near future is that from the Irrawaddy through Arakan to Chittagong, which will have great administrative advantages, as well as offering a through land communication with India. Along with railways, roads have also been vigorously opened up, there being now about 2,000 miles of metalled and 10,000 miles of unmetalled roads. The rivers are still the only highways by which much of the interior produce is brought to the seaports ; but in recording the development of the province one must specially mention the splendid services performed by the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company.

Along with industrial development much has been done for education, both primary, secondary, and collegiate, although there are only two colleges, both of which are affiliated to the Calcutta University.

As regards financial arrangements with the Government of India, quinquennial financial contracts have been made periodically since 1879, but from 1911 onwards a new decentralizing policy is to be adopted.

Finances.

The principal items of the new 1911-16 arrangement are that Burma will receive five-eighths of the proceeds of the land revenue, instead of one-half as during 1906-11, and all the proceeds of the forest revenue, instead of only one-half as before ; but against this the Province will have to pay all the forest expenditure, in place of merely one-half as hitherto ; while the land revenue expenses will also have to be paid in full, as before. The immediate effect of this new contract will be a small loss at first, but a gain afterwards, the amount of the gain depending on the energy with which the Local Government can increase the revenue from land and forests. If special funds be required for urgent public works, such as railways, &c., loans will be given by the Government of India, but must be repaid. The Burma Budget for 1911-12 estimates an expenditure of £3,857,200, a gross revenue of £6,087,600, and a surplus of £2,230,400 ; but all this surplus, and £275,134 in addition, will have to be paid to the Government of India on account of loans repayable ; so that, although Burma had at the beginning of the year a credit balance of £408,467, this will at the end of the year be reduced to £133,333.

The great commercial development that has taken place and the "material progress" made in Burma during the course of the last generation have unfortunately not been without considerable effect on the Burmese as a nation. It is only near the large towns, and especially throughout the delta of the Irrawaddy, that the Burman has to any great extent changed his former simple habits and customs with regard to household furnishing, dress, &c. In the interior of the country at large the influence of Western ideas and habits has as yet effected but little change in the daily life of the Burmese. But even there the old primitive order of things is beginning to change, to a greater or less extent, commensurate with the degree to which contact with

Europeans, natives of India, and Chinese is taking place. Parental authority is no longer held in such high estimation as formerly; and slowly, but surely, Burmese Buddhism is being undermined without any other religion taking its place. Government can do little or nothing to prevent this deplorable state of affairs, which is bound to become more widespread, and more disastrous to the Burman, as the development of the Province increases, and as more immigrants arrive from India and China to settle in this rich, fertile, and prosperous country.



## CHAPTER XXIII.

### GUN AND RIFLE IN INDIA.

[BY "DECCANI."]

The attempt to bring merely the outline of so comprehensive a subject as Indian sport within the limits of a single article would be an almost impossible undertaking were it not for the fact that even the stay-at-home Englishman—he for whose eye these notes are in particular intended—already possesses at least a bowing acquaintance with it. The wild or semi-savage conditions of a large proportion of the sport obtainable in India make so strong an appeal to the hunting instinct inherent in the Anglo-Saxon race that even the most insular of Britons is likely to have felt the attraction that reaches him through the medium of the numerous books and other literature, pictorial and otherwise, dealing with the subject. He usually has some acquaintance with the long and varied list of game to be found within India and her dependencies; while, nowadays, the greatly increased intercourse between exiles in the East and their Mother Country gives him, through his home-coming relatives and friends, their yarns and their trophies, a workable idea, if not indeed a fairly respectable knowledge, of the wild beasts about which they talk.

What a number of English sportsmen, not even excepting that small minority which has killed game with the rifle in our own country, must have felt the glamour

of the glorious Indian sport of which they have learnt. How many must have itched to put to practical test the rifles which they have handled, albeit only in a gunsmith's shop! And what a delightful "feel" there is about a modern sporting rifle, with all one's sense of its wonderful powers and the scientific skill which has been applied to the refinements of its manufacture—a fascination usually greater even than that experienced in handling a high-class fishing rod or an up-to-date gun, and due no doubt to the train of fanciful mind-pictures induced by imagination of the possible circumstances of the rifle's use.

The reader for whom we write may, therefore, be considered in part already educated for our purpose, with his imagination so aroused that the task of leading him in spirit from the tropical jungles of southern and eastern India through the sun-dried forests of the vast central spaces of the continent and over the great plains of Hindustan and the Punjab up to the eternal snows, may be deemed shorn of much of its difficulty.

To take but a cursory glance at the Indian game-list, we find, first and foremost, that there are three varieties of great cats—the tiger, the panther, or leopard (these being again subdivided into three varieties), and, more rarely, the lion of Gujerat. Of the large pachyderms we have the Indian elephant and three varieties of rhinoceros. There are four kinds of bears. Wild cattle are represented by those huge specimens, the buffalo, the bison, the gayal or mithun, and the yak; while there are no less than eight varieties of deer, eight of goats—including two goat-antelopes—six different antelopes and gazelles, four wild sheep, which include the great *oves Poli* and *Ammon*, also two kinds of wild pig. The list of big or larger game may be closed without detailed reference to the "various" interesting animals, not in a strict sense "game" but which often afford a

Varieties  
of  
Game.



useful target to the rifle, and include two varieties of crocodile.

When we come to the game birds of India the list is almost too large to at once grasp readily. The vast congregation of feathered game, both indigenous and migratory, contains a bewildering variety of many kinds of pheasants, partridges, francolins, jungle fowl, quail, peafowl (two kinds), two bustards, and the floricans : while water fowl include, with swans, a mighty assemblage of many different ducks, teal, and geese, several snipes, and the woodcock ; and to add to the already swollen list there are the lesser game birds, of the wader, plover, and other orders, with hares.

This great variety of Indian game, big

Good and and small, is of course due to the very  
Bad Shooting. different types of country and climate  
to be found, be it noted, within only  
25deg. of latitude, and it is in this great diversity of her sport and its surroundings that India proves so unusually attractive. At extreme elevations in the Himalayas, the sportsman may stalk the big goats and sheep in a magnificent ultra-Alpine scenery and climate, amid everlasting snows ; while in the warm and luxuriant forests of the steamy south and east, the pursuit of its distinctive *fauna* affords no less fascination. And, again, between these extremes lies, without mentioning pig-sticking or fishing, a very large range of variety. It must not, however, be imagined that the whole of India is more or less uniformly provided with game, nor that it can usually be come at without much trouble. Like other " natural " countries, India possesses large areas which to outward appearances are quite suitable for wild life, but which probably never held any game to speak of, and most certainly do not do so now ; while other tracts, formerly affording good sport, are nowadays but sparsely inhabited by wild animals, this being due either to natural causes, or because they have happened to be within

too easily reach of civilization, and have attracted too much attention in the past.

India has been so much opened up by railways, especially by chord or branch lines, during the past 25 years, that the increased facilities for access to some of the remoter parts of the country have resulted in a greater influx of sportsmen to country previously but little shot over; and added to this is the fact that, for one reason and another, more game is, or was until quite lately, being killed off by natives. Be this, however, as it may, there are still very considerable portions of the wilder parts of the country where big game is really plentiful, and, for a variety of reasons, not much troubled by man. A noteworthy point is the fact that nearly all the best or "record" heads of horned game seem to have been secured during the last decade or so, from which one would infer that either game preservation of a sort, or else a latter-day improvement in the ethics of sport, have produced their effect.

It should not be forgotten that there is plenty of "bad" shooting in India, as well as good, nor is it the lot of everybody, not even of seasoned sportsmen who have lived long in the country and know it well, to ensure even moderately good sport. In these days, when all officers, Military and Civil, are harder worked—and the majority of sportsmen in this country fall under this head—it is only the exceptional few who are able to devote that time and leisure to the continuous search for game, and the best places in which to find it, that can make a man, personally, master of even a small portion of India from a sporting point of view. The ordinary individual, even although he may spend his life in favourable parts of India, must depend very largely on obtaining his information second-hand, gleaning it from those who may not be unwilling to part with their knowledge, or absorbing it by patient observation, inquiry, and noting of the attention that

is often automatically directed towards certain more or less well-known or famous shooting grounds.

How much more difficult, therefore, What the Visitor must it be for the man who comes to should do. India as a stranger on hunting intent, and what chance can he be expected to stand unless fortunate enough to enlist the aid of somebody who can smooth away all the peculiar difficulties which he would otherwise find insurmountable? In Kashmir, where even the stranger finds it fairly easy to get himself put in the way of sport of a kind, and where an overpaid native *shikari*—usually full of horrid “pidgin-English” expressions, griffins’ testimonials, and an irritating self-sufficiency—can soon be found to act as dry-nurse, and take him by the hand, the sportsman without introductions may buy his way, muddle through, and, with the aid of some “mug’s luck,” have a comparatively pleasant time. But elsewhere, where these facilities do not exist, the mere visitor, without credentials, as it were, will find himself helpless, and his efforts are certain to prove disappointing if not disastrous.

Let the visitor, therefore, make arrangements to place himself in the hands of some friend who is really capable of showing him something of *shikar* in the comparatively short time at his disposal; and let him see to it that his choice does not result in the blind leading the blind. Leaving aside the shooting parties given by Indian potentates, or organized by other, in this sense, influential people, the man to make friends with for this purpose is undoubtedly the District Official—either the chief civil officer of the district, or the forest officer; or, to a lesser extent, the Superintendent of Police. If these be sportsmen themselves, or really interested in the matter, so much the better—but in any case their influence is capable of going far to help their sporting *protégé* towards the realization of his hopes. These people are, in their different spheres, locally almighty—or ought to be if

they are not, as it is they who possess the greatest hold over the native, including *shikaris*; moreover, the first two named are responsible for the allotment to sportsmen of the shooting "blocks"—not by any means all equally good—into which the game-bearing portions of their charge are nowadays usually divided.

Without considerable experience of Indian conditions and the character of her inhabitants it is difficult to realize to what depths of sycophancy the native mind is capable of sinking in order to please or conciliate the *Sarkar*—or Government—which to him in rural districts is represented by the officials already indicated. But if the stranger will travel, even in these times, with an official who realizes the advantages of his position, and how to employ them, it will not be long before he obtains a good working idea of what the country must have been in the days of the "pagoda tree" of sweet and blessed memory; while the pomp and circumstance of the progresses of some of the representatives of Government—whose commands must be obeyed, whose slightest foible must be anticipated, whose words, especially when uttered in wrath, seem to possess the power of a magic wand—must be personally experienced to be quite understood.

Official  
Power.

An unfortunate aspect of this official power is seen when it is prostituted for the attainment of purely selfish ends. It is a notorious fact, and the subject of much strong feeling among those who do not wield such powers, that its use is not unknown in procuring sport for the favoured few, while putting a veto on that of all other sportsmen. In one province in particular, which thereby stinks in the nostrils of all who know of it, these malpractices have reached the high-water mark of the un-English and unsportsmanlike unwholesomeness. It is well, therefore, that the intending visitor should have some idea of these matters before accepting invitations to shooting parties

exploited on such lines, and thus branding himself as an associate of the morally deficient people who get up such shoots for reasons very well known to everybody.

But there is the right way as well as the wrong ; and as a visitor, either in the camp of some official or non-official friend, the stranger sportsman is certain to live in comfort, if not in luxury ; and likely to find his way greatly smoothed with regard to shooting. In the company of a friend possessing local influence there will, of course, be none of the exasperating difficulties and disappointments which might beset his pursuit of sport in the camp of even the most knowledgeable of people not so blessed ; and he will be spared contact with the many minor worries connected with the " outsider's " transport, supply, information, and local aid. Moreover, at a single stroke, he is likely to secure the privileged *entrée* to the best sport that the district can command, or even to jealously reserved jungles. Whether there will be as much true sport in this sort of thing as might fall to his lot in the more independent company of some roving friend, who ploughs his own furrow and patiently follows a less carefully lubricated line, is a matter of opinion, and open to question.

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| <p>Life in<br/>Camp.</p> | <p>For the visitor, however, the question is one of time, and for this reason he must make up his mind to accept what may perhaps be a modified form of sport,</p> |
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for the sake of compensations in another direction. In any case, he will find that the conditions of Indian sport afford a peculiarly delightful blend of civilization and wild life. Except in the more remote regions of the Himalayas and a few other places where somewhat similar difficulties of transport may prevail, there is not the slightest reason for " roughing " it to any great extent. A comfortable camp and equipage can be made part and parcel of the humblest shooting expedition in India, and the sportsman will find his comfort right well catered for

in every reasonable respect. Branches of that wonderful institution, the Post Office of India, and even, in the larger country towns, telegraph offices, are seldom out of reach. Indian servants seem to cook their best and certainly please master most under camp conditions, which are, of course, natural conditions to them; and it is certainly fortunate that there are some creature comforts to compensate one for hard work under a tropical sun. At the close of the day a refreshing hot bath and change of clothing prepares the Indian sportsman for an excellent evening meal, served at table with every comfort; after which disgraceful and sybaritical backsliding he may smoke the pipe of peace and listen to the sounds of the untamed forest around him, noting the cries of its denizens, into whose sanctuary he, with his microcosm of a foreign civilization, has intruded his way. Unfettered by petty worries, or by the necessity of "doing" for himself in camp—a species of amusement that only appeals to griffins or to a few people of misplaced activities whose lives are cast in the brick and mortar of over-civilized countries—and that not usually for any great length of time—the sportsman in India is free to devote his entire time and energy to the quest of hunting, fortified against exertion and failure by the amenities which have been referred to.

Unless he contemplates spending at least a year in the country, shooting hard all the time, and experiencing the best Game Districts. extraordinarily good fortune, the visitor will be quite unable to secure anything like even one specimen each of all Indian game. But, in order to give some slight notion of what to expect in various parts of the country—which idea can be expanded into more detailed knowledge by reading some of the numerous books on Indian sport—the best method will be to remind the reader once more of those portions of India in which he is likely to get the best of each type of sport, and at what time of year it may be obtained. These observa-

tions are necessarily confined, by considerations of space, to merely a general view of the question.

Some of the best country for tiger-shooting is included in the United Provinces and contiguous districts, in the middle and southern portions of the Central Provinces, in the Central Indian States, and in Hyderabad, Deccan. There are also the Terai, and parts of Bengal, particularly, perhaps, Eastern Bengal. The easiest form of tiger-shooting—that is to say, except shooting from elephants—is in the Central Provinces, Central India, and Hyderabad, where the vegetation is scantier and shooting nominally “on foot” can be indulged in. Leopards and panthers—except the snow leopard, which is purely a Himalayan species, and the hunting leopard, or “cheetah,” which is too rare for separate consideration—are very widely distributed; and it is difficult to say where the “best places” may be. The Indian lion is too precious to shoot, as a rule; he is very local, as already indicated, and carefully preserved.

Elephants have enormously increased in Southern India, their habitat lying in Coorg, Mysore, and Travancore, owing to what is probably over-preservation; but, in spite of this fact, it is not easy to obtain permission to shoot one of these animals, which remarks also apply to the sub-Himalayan tracts and Assam, where the elephant is also found. Keddah operations account for a certain number every year, and comparatively few are shot. Rhinos are limited to Assam and to the country lying between the Brahmaputra River and the Himalayan foothills. The black and red (or brown) Himalayan bears are fairly common in Kashmir and the Himalayas generally—the latter not east of Nepal, the former through the entire length of the range. Throughout the so-called “plains” of India, from the extreme north to the south, is distributed, chiefly in hilly forest country, the black and rough-haired “sloth” bear—this title being

quite a misnomer, as some people have painfully discovered. The small Malay type of bear is found in the Chittagong hill-tracts.

The buffalo is confined to the more easterly portions of India, its western limit being the Godavari River. It is not found north of about the 24th degree of latitude, except in Kooch Behar and the Brahmaputra Valley. In the Central Provinces it inhabits the more level southern and eastern portions of the country; in Assam, the Sunderbunds, &c., it is found in dense swamps, and in such country has developed most truculent manners. The Indian bison—or gaur—is essentially a hill animal, and exists in most of the hilly tracts of the continent, from Central India southwards, also in the Terai and Assam. The best bison grounds are perhaps in Southern India—Mysore, Coorg, and Travancore—and in Assam, but there are certain other astonishing localities where it is perhaps even more abundant, but which, for obvious reasons, are not mentioned here. The gayal, allied and somewhat similar to the gaur, but smaller and with straighter horns, is found in Assam and the countries bordering that part of India, including the Chittagong hills. The yak is trans-Himalayan in habitat, and does not usually afford sport to be compared with the pursuit of its above-mentioned congeners.

To take the deer of India, and to begin  
**Deer, Goats, and Sheep.** with the largest of them, the sambar, this grand beast is fairly widely distributed in the lower Himalayas and throughout the continent in hilly and jungly country. But the best heads, and heads of this species vary enormously, come from Central India and the Central Provinces, perhaps in particular from their north-western portions, and from Berar. The Barasingh or Kashmir stag is, curiously enough, entirely limited to the valley of Kashmir and its immediate neighbourhood; while the swamp-deer—also called “bara-singha,” or “twelve-



tinued"—is at his best in the Himalayan Terai, the east of the Central Provinces, and Assam. The chital, spotted deer, or axis, probably the most beautiful of all deer throughout the world, is very widely distributed, in the more level, well-watered forest tracts. The finest heads are found in the Central Provinces and Berar. The hog-deer, or para, to come to the smaller deer, is found in thick grass and tamarisk coverts along the lower Indus Valley; it occurs again in the United Provinces; and thence eastward, to and throughout the lower-lying portions of Assam. The musk-deer, a peculiar creature, now rarer than it used to be, on account of the value of its pod of musk, is entirely Himalayan. The little Khakar, or barking deer, is fairly common throughout the whole of India—in hilly jungles—while the list of the *cervidae* is closed by the tiny mouse-deer, little larger than a big hare, a shy and rather solitary little sprite that haunts the great forests of Southern India, the Western Ghats, and the Central Provinces, and the countries lying immediately south and east of the latter.

The wild goats—excepting the "Nilgiri Ibex"—are all found in the Himalayas and other frontier hills, as are their weird congeners the serow and the takin; the last-named in the extreme Eastern Himalayas. The goats range from the lordly markhor (four varieties of horn), through the ibexes (two kinds), and thurs, down to the diminutive goral—the chamois, so to speak, of the Himalayas. The sheep are confined to the Higher Himalayan ranges—and beyond; excepting that the oorial, which is practically identical with the shapoo, is also found in the Punjab Salt Ranges, and in the Western and North-western frontier hills. To shoot the grand *oves Poli* and *Ammon* one has to travel far afield, into the more remote trans-Himalayan regions of the Pamirs, Tibet, and Ladak. The burshel

inhabits extremely high ground, seldom below 10,000ft.

The antelopes and gazelles form a large and familiar class, and the commoner types are familiar features of the Indian plains. The well-known black-buck and the chinkara, or Indian gazelle, are to be found throughout most parts of the country where there may be cultivated plains or level fields bordering on broken ground. The best heads of both these species come from North-West India, especially from the country lying to the north of the great desert wastes of Rajputana. The nilgae, or "blue-bull," a large ungainly creature, in appearance akin to the big African *bubalis* antelopes, hartebeestes, &c., but with most insignificant horns, is to be found as a rule in country where low jungle, hilly or flat, alternates with rough cultivation. It is not greatly sought after, and in certain parts of Northern, and especially in "Hindu," India is practically sacred, and seldom molested. The Tibetan antelope and Tibetan gazelle are found at great elevations in Tibet, Ladak, and to the north of Sikkim. The four-horned antelope, another little jungle denizen, is common to most parts of India lower than the Himalayan ranges, and is a rather solitary inhabitant of wooded country, usually preferring the less thickly-jungled places.

For a more detailed but still concise description of the big game of India, the reader is recommended to peruse an admirable little "Shikar Book," published by the leading Indian sporting weekly. This contains very full information of all kinds, including the game rules and close seasons which are observed in this country for many of her game animals and indigenous birds.

The cold and hot seasons, from about October to March and March to June respectively, are, as an average, the time for shooting. During the "rains," which last from about July to September or October,

Antelopes  
and Gazelles.

The  
Best Seasons.

most sport is at a standstill—that is to say, as regards the “plains.” This is due to the fact that vegetation and water are too plentiful at this time of year, concealing animals to too great an extent, and increasing their wanderings, which are not then restricted to any particular locality. Bison shooting, however, in the at other times too malarious hills of Southern India, is now at its best. Tiger shooting—as in fact most other “jungle” shooting—is most successful in the earlier part of the hot weather, from about the middle of March and until well on in May, when the jungles are most leafless and water scarce; but all depends on local conditions, and a few days of unseasonable rain may prove ruinous to sport.

Most Indian deer are in full horn and shootable during the winter months—November to March or a little later—but the chital or spotted deer, and to a lesser extent the swamp deer, are at their best after that season, as most of these two species shed their horns in the cold weather. Himalayan shooting—excepting the Kashmir stag—usually begins in March and April, when the snow begins to melt. Visitors are then able to reach the previously snowbound country and penetrate to the best shooting grounds, if the passes leading to them are negotiable. From November 15 to March 15 the shooting of ibex, the wild sheep, and most of the markhor is closed. A certain proportion of the other game may, however, be killed in Kashmir during winter, when the country is snow-bound. Most of the hollow-horned ruminants of the continent are shootable all the year round.

Regarding small game, the season *par excellence* is the “winter,” during which time the influx of migratory birds adds to the variety of the bag. Feathered game, both indigenous and visitant, is so largely distributed that it is difficult to particularize as to the most favourable localities. The pheasants are restricted to the

Himalayas and Assam, and are scattered in their habits, and not easy to bring to bag. These, together with peafowl, junglefowl, the fruit pigeons, bustards, and floricans afford sport of the more "pottering" order. Partridges and francolins are to be bagged in rather greater numbers, and provide good shooting of the "rough" type. Quail, of which very large bags can be made, are extremely plentiful—especially the grey quail—during their annual migrations in Northern India. Sand-grouse shooting is best in Rajputana and the desert borders of North-West India, where they are shot in large numbers on flighting to water.

For snipe the best-known country is perhaps included in the rice fields of the Madras Presidency and Lower Bengal, but splendid bags are made in many other parts of the country, in the United Provinces and the Eastern Punjab. There is a very sporting form of shooting driven snipe from boats, which is practised on the great marshes near Srinagar, in Kashmir, which may not result in "record bags," but is a high test of skill with the scatter-gun, and has a great fascination. Kashmir also provides wonderful sport with duck and geese in the winter and adjacent months.

Huge bags of duck are made in Sind, which is a veritable paradise for the wild-fowl shooter in the cold weather. These and the famous *jheels* of the Lower Punjab and the United Provinces are the more well-known wildfowl grounds; but the enormous flights of duck and snipe that yearly cross the Himalayas from their breeding grounds in Central Asia spread themselves fairly even over the better-watered parts of the whole country, and will be found to be as partial to the "tank" or reservoir-studded districts of the Central Provinces, South Deccan, and Madras, as to the natural *jheels* or marshes of the northern portions of the country. Most excellent mixed sport is to be had in the eastern parts of Gujerat, where an unusually pleasing variety of fur

and feather, including an odd antelope or gazelle, is to be had in a day's rough shooting.

As to the various methods of sport.  
**Methods of Sport.** Tiger shooting is carried out from elephant back in Northern India and the

high grass of the Terai, while less thick jungles are driven by beaters. Tigers are also awaited on returning to their kills. The whole system of tiger shooting consists in first locating the animal, usually by means of picketing out live baits, and then hunting him out with elephants or beaters. Leopards and panthers are more usually waited for over natural kills or over baits; or, more frequently, are happened on by accident. Elephants and "rhinos" are stalked and followed up on foot. The red Himalayan bears are stalked, the others are usually beaten out, or watched for on their feeding grounds. Buffalo and bison are stalked; the former is sometimes "driven" or shot off elephant back in the dense grass and reed jungles of the Terai and Assam.

Many of the deer are stalked—principally the Kashmir stag, swamp deer, and chital—and to a lesser extent the sambar; but a large proportion of Indian deer are nocturnal in habit, and have to be "driven" out of their day retreats, from which they rarely move, naturally, much before nightfall. The goats and sheep, antelopes, and gazelles are all stalked. Small game is shot over a line of beaters or coolies, and shooting over dogs is very uncommon for climatic reasons. Duck are shot in the orthodox way, or, in big shoots, are driven, or kept on the move by beaters in boats or otherwise.

A knotty point is reached when we  
**Weapons.** come to discuss the question of the weapons most suitable for Indian sport.

The gunsmiths' catalogues now afford a bewildering list of sporting rifles, and opinions concerning them are quite as diverse. There is no doubt, how-

ever, that the high velocity nitro rifle has now fairly ousted the "express" and other black powder weapons from the field. The writer, despite the hard-dying old-fashioned prejudice against it, has for long been in favour of magazine rifles—moderately used—and has found them, morally and actually, a greater stand by than the double-barrel in the case of dangerous game. After an experience of Indian conditions amounting to the quarter of a century he has no hesitation in saying that, with a simple battery of but two weapons, all Indian game, big and small, may be satisfactorily bagged, and that, while opinions may vary as to the types of weapons best suited to various conditions, when it comes to a question of the simplest all-round battery, he plumps for a 12-bore ball-and-shot gun and a medium-bore high-velocity magazine rifle not less powerful than the .350 Rigby-Mausier taking 43 grains of cordite and a 310 grain bullet.

In cases where the sportsman feels the need of greater moral support, for exceptionally dangerous work at very close quarters in dense jungle, he has the choice of somewhat similar weapons of .400 bore and over—while his fancy may range up to the various double-barrelled weapons of .476 and .500 bore. In the .350 of the above type, however, which is an extraordinarily handy weapon, a most efficient combination has been arrived at, its ballistics and its killing power are particularly well adjusted, and all that is left to the user is to be careful to adapt the proper type of bullet to the work required of it.

A good ball-and-shot gun is a perfectly satisfactory performer with shot for any Indian conditions; while up to about 100 yards (which is a long range in the jungle) it is, with its heavy conical bullet propelled by M.D. cordite, a deadly and reliable weapon against soft-skinned big game. Care should however be taken, in choosing the ball-and-shot gun for India, that its

shooting powers with shot have not been unduly subordinated to its performance with ball—but *vice versa*. Certain heavy and unhandy weapons, in which everything is sacrificed to unnecessarily high-class effect with ball at unnecessarily long non-sporting ranges, should be carefully shunned as this is not in the least the true rôle of the ball-and-shot gun.

Starting with these two weapons as about the best irreducible *minimum*, the sportsman may exercise his taste in increasing the size of his battery. For Himalayan shooting, where long shots and distance-judging may introduce special difficulties, he may find one of the very latest small-bore rifles possessing about 3,000 f.s.m.v. an irresistible attraction. A miniature rifle is also often very useful for pottering about; and anxiety to excel his fellows in some big duck or sand grouse shoot may induce him to bring out his favourite guns.

Ammunition, and, for the matter of that, even the weapons themselves, are easily obtainable in India, at some increase over home prices. The choice of camp outfit, &c., had much better be left until after arrival in the country, when some friend may be obtained to act as mentor; and the same may be said with regard to the multifarious extras connected with camp life.

The visitor who leaves the still comparatively narrow lines of civilization and travels into the unspoiled wild tracts will find himself in a better India, not greatly altered from the attractive country which laid so firm a hold on the affections of a bygone generation of "Anglo-Indians." He will find the inhabitants of this happier India living in ignorance of the present-day follies of their miseducated countrymen, and as ready as of yore to respond with faithful devotion and sympathy to the *sahib* whose heart is with them and their simple ways. It has been said, not without good reason,

that the Forest Officer is, nowadays, the only Englishman over whom India continues to exercise her old charm.

In the minds of those fortunate enough to realize the meaning of these words many a half-forgotten scene will again materialize, with all its old intensity of feeling. The unutterable charm of the "jungle," be its particular location where it may. That great and glorious moment of the tiger's thrilling approach. The feverish expectation of the last few steps in the stalking of the huge bison. The tingling tension when, after those all too few seconds for breath, the rifle barrel is pushed slowly round the side of the snow-crueted rock. The angry rush of the bear. The sudden apparition of the biggest stag ever seen. Or sunrise on the calm jheel, with its myriad delightful sounds of hidden fowl—and all the quieter joys bound up in the pursuit of lesser "shikar"; all these must continue to draw us again and again, in the flesh or in the spirit, to that wonderful country which still has such claims on the interest and sympathy of our race.



## CHAPTER XXIV

### TOURING IN INDIA.

A visit to India is no longer a formidable undertaking. The mail steamers run with the punctuality, if not with the rapidity, of railway expresses. The journey across France may be made in a comfortable special train. The hotels in India are not luxurious, but they are steadily improving. On the main tourist routes the trains are fairly fast, and the sleeping accommodation is roomy. India has begun to cater for the traveller for pleasure, though its organization is still far below that of Egypt. It is quite possible now, in an absence of two months from London, to see a good deal of India, with a delightful sea voyage thrown in. Some ardent spirits have even been known to crowd the whole journey into six weeks, including a glimpse of the Himalayas beyond Darjeeling. In a very short visit, too much should not be attempted. It is infinitely better to see a few places well than to alternate days of hard sight-seeing with restless nights in the train.

The  
Steamship  
Lines.      The line which carries most passengers on the Indian run is the Peninsular and Oriental. A certain proportion of passengers, especially those in poor health, embark in the Thames, but the majority go by rail to Marseilles, in "the Bombay express." The Marseilles passengers leave London on Thursday mornings. Those who elect to travel by the

Brindisi route need not start until Friday evening. The Brindisi route, though the best for mails, has never been very popular with passengers, for two reasons. One is that the long railway journey down the Adriatic coast on Sunday afternoon is regarded as rather wearisome, and the other is that the small swift steamers running between Brindisi and Port Said are rather uncomfortable in rough weather. On the other hand, a certain number of people are devoted to the Brindisi route, and it is much appreciated by Anglo-Indian passengers on short leave, who gain two extra days in town by taking it.

The P. and O. Company no longer possess a monopoly of the Indian traffic, but now have to face several keen competitors. The City Line, the Anchor Line, and Ellerman's Hall Line have become so popular that their steamers are generally booked up far in advance. The newest steamers on these lines are admirably equipped, the catering is excellent, and there is little difference in the duration of the voyage. The Bibby Line is much used for Burma and Southern India. Among foreign lines the Messageries Maritimes Company send a monthly steamer to Bombay, and the Austrian Lloyd steamers, sailing from Trieste and Fiume, have a high reputation among Anglo-Indians, while the Rubattino Line from Genoa receives a constant share of patronage.

It may be laid down almost as an axiom that every man who goes to India for the first time takes twice as much baggage as he really requires.

**Clothing  
for Men.**

His clothes will probably be too thick for really hot climates, and not thick enough for the cold of Northern India. Those London tailors who have a large number of Anglo-Indian patrons fully understand how to make up tropical semi-lined suits of light weight, and their advice may be taken without reserve. Others of less experience are liable to mislead the untravelled man, for their tropical suits are rarely as light as they should be. The

very first requirements for the traveller in India are a dress coat and a dinner jacket, and he should never part from these even if he starts to climb Kinchenjunga. The jacket should not be lined in the back. The next most serviceable garb is a thin blue serge suit, smooth in texture. It should be noted that the Anglo-Indian remains more faithful to the double-breasted coat than his countryman at home, because it can be worn on occasion without a waistcoat. Light cashmere suits are more useful in some respects than flannel suits, because, if well chosen, they are rather cooler, and they show the dust less. Visitors to the Delhi Durbar will find a frock-coat imperative at the great functions. A light grey frock-coat is far more suitable for India than a black one, and it has been officially announced that a grey frock-coat and a grey or white helmet will be considered full dress during the daytime at Delhi. A frock-coat is also useful for any visitor likely to be attending important public gatherings during his tour.

Riding breeches should be fairly thick, but many men prefer to get a pair of the comfortable Jodhpur breeches on arrival, though they are now obtainable in London. White duck clothes have long ceased to be worn in India in the big cities except in the very hot weather, when white trousers are sometimes donned. The favourite wear for the hot weather is a coarse yellow silk, Chinese or Indian. Silk suits, if they are likely to be required, are better bought in India. There are excellent English tailors in Bombay and Calcutta, as well as in the chief military centres. It is perhaps necessary to remind travellers that Englishmen in India are not accustomed to go about collarless and coatless. That is a practice only observed by tramps and a certain type of travelling M.P. English residents in the tropics have long realized that if they wish to preserve their self-respect they will observe formalities of attire rather more rigidly than at

home. The man who forsakes his collar in the East will very soon be dining in pyjamas.

A sun hat is a very necessary acquisition, and the landing at Bombay should not be attempted without one. The very best type of helmet is the "Curzon" Sun Hats and  
Other Details.

shape, grey or white, made of pith, and with a silk *pagri* bound around it. The man who perambulates India with his tails of his *pagri* streaming down his back will probably be regarded as akin to Rip Van Winkle. The harder white or brown "Ellwood" *topi* is useful for general wear, particularly for riding, and has saved the life of many a man when pig-sticking or playing polo. It should never be worn without a *pagri*. For shooting and jungle work the larger "Cawnpore Tent Club" *topi*, covered with a khaki quilted material, is best. It is peculiarly affected by missionaries. People purchasing helmets in London should seek, if possible, the advice of an Anglo-Indian friend, and they should certainly not buy them at Port Said.

Silk hats are frequently worn at garden parties, and will probably be required at Delhi. Grey top hats are very popular among Lieutenant-Governors, Members of Council, and other dignitaries, but for some occult reason humbler persons rarely wear them. One might almost imagine that a Civil servant buys a grey top hat on high promotion. Brown boots and shoes are best for general wear. India is the only country where a man may wear brown boots with a frock coat without exciting remark, though it is inadvisable to do so. India is also a land where the silk hat of five years ago is never out of fashion. In fact, astute native dealers make a pretty penny by letting silk hats on hire for State occasions. On the other hand, the morning coat has never replaced the frock coat to the extent it has done in England. The

worst crime in the matter of dress of which a "globe-trotter" can be guilty is to wear a sun hat in the evening, when the sun is setting or has vanished. A straw hat should then be worn, and even a cap is quite permissible on informal occasions. "Bowlers" are not often seen in India. The sturdy Anglo-Indian, who is usually rather an active person, scorns the use of a sun umbrella. Most men forget to take a light motor "duster," though nothing is often more needed. Delhi with its swarm of taxicabs will be a dusty place. The question of under-clothing must be settled by inclination. Some form of woollen garment is preferable. The only thing that need be said is that double the quantity required in England should be taken, for frequent changes are necessary, and shirts and collars soon grow limp.

One of the best pieces of advice that  
**Clothing for Women.** can be given to ladies about to visit India is to take easy-fitting gloves and shoes. At least six washing skirts and blouses should be included, as well as a good tailor-made dress, and half-a-dozen hats for various occasions. No woman unused to the sun should go ashore at Bombay without a sun hat. On the other hand, if she clings to her sun hat at tea time she will mark herself down as new to the country. Women's *topis* are rather less varied in design than those of men, but much of what has been said regarding men's helmets applies to the requirements of women also. Fashion now scouts "the Port Said *topi*," and it is best to seek advice. A stout sun umbrella with a green lining is useful, particularly when sight-seeing. It is a great mistake to take many elaborate dresses, but three or four good afternoon and evening dresses are required. In the big cities, particularly in Bombay and Calcutta, most women in society dress well, and there will no doubt be a brilliant array of frocks at Delhi. For those feminine visitors who have plenty of time the native

*darzi* will be found a valuable auxiliary, as he can make excellent washing skirts and blouses from a good pattern. A pair of easy-fitting house shoes and a pretty washing dressing-gown are a great comfort when travelling by train all day in hot weather. On board ship, washing dresses are generally worn in the day time after Port Said is passed and at dinner a simple evening gown is customary. The woman who dressed very elaborately on an India-bound ship, or who made constant changes, or who tried to appear in a different dress every day, would be regarded as either inexperienced or vulgar. The Anglo-Indian *mem-sahib* prefers sensible simplicity at sea. A golf skirt is very useful, particularly in camp, and a very light motor cloak may sometimes be required. Plenty of underclothing will be needed, both thick and thin, a good supply of wraps, and a light cloak for evening wear. The night winds are often chilly, even in the south.

Everybody goes to India prepared for the heat, and few people understand that it is even more necessary to guard against the cold. Northern India can be bitterly cold at night in winter. The moment the sun sets it is time to take precautions. Oddly enough, visitors from England appear to feel the cold more than Anglo-Indians. Some visitors to the last Delhi Durbar missed nearly all the ceremonies. They caught chills as soon as they arrived, and did not recover for many days. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that visitors to the north of India—and particularly ladies—should be specially careful to be prepared for the cold weather. It is quite easy to alter the attire when it is hot, but more visits to India have been utterly spoilt by lack of preparation for the cold than from any other cause. Delhi will be by no means so cold as it was at the last Durbar, because the King's visit is to be paid on an earlier date ; but it will be quite cold enough in camp. Every woman should take her furs, especially if a tour further

The Cold of  
India.

north is contemplated, and a thick ulster or big motor coat is an essential part of a man's equipment. A Thermos flask to carry hot tea is worth having when travelling. The great need at Delhi will not be gauze underclothing, but rugs; yet in the day-time, in the sun, the weather will be tolerably hot.

Men going into camp at Delhi will find the new form of travelling trunk, in which clothes can be hung as in a wardrobe, a great convenience. Nowhere do

men's clothes get more crushed and creased than in camp. and though the tents provided are usually comfortable, they rarely contain either wardrobes or chests of drawers. For women either a wardrobe trunk or trunks with drawers are desirable. Cabin trunks of compressed cane are preferred by many to leather.

Inquiries are always being made about tips. On the Indian run there is a regular though unwritten scale, to which most Anglo-Indians adhere. A first-class passenger embarking at Marseilles will usually give, on arriving in Bombay, £1 to his cabin steward, 10s. to the waiter at table, and small gratuities to the deck steward, smoking-room steward, and bath steward. On the Austrian-Lloyd Line all tips are pooled. It is a great mistake to give large tips ashore in India. The native porter or table waiter probably receives considerably less than 1s. a day in wages, and thinks himself in comfortable circumstances. Four annas goes a long way in India; eight annas at a railway station is a princely tip; two annas suffices for most small services. An anna is the equivalent of a penny. The tip to a hackney carriage driver should not exceed four annas, unless he has been engaged for a long time.

A native servant is indispensable when travelling in India. Not only does the stranger lose dignity if he has no servant, but he will find himself

in frequent difficulties owing to his lack of knowledge of the language. On the other hand, the servant will probably lose his baggage, which is more disconcerting than the loss of dignity. A servant is best engaged through one of the tourist agencies, and the men who hang about hotels with sheaves of certificates should be avoided. It is a good plan—almost imperative this year—to arrange for a servant through an agency some weeks in advance. The correct wages for a travelling servant are from £2 to £2 10s. per month, and a small gratuity may be added at the end of the journey if he has given satisfaction. He will also expect eight annas a day for his food. It is usual, on commencing a long trip, to give a servant a round sum to purchase clothing and bedding. This sum should under no circumstances exceed £2; the man should be made to produce receipts and to show the articles purchased, which should include a thick coat. Tourists must remember that bedding is not provided on Indian railways. As soon as they arrive they should purchase a quilt (*rezai*), sheets, blankets, and a couple of pillows, all of which can be obtained quite cheaply in the shops attached to the leading hotels. Straps should be bought, and the bedding strapped up in the *rezai*, though a Wolseley valise is worth taking, because it will carry rugs and overcoat as well.

The very best rule of health for the stranger in India is to consult an English doctor the moment he feels unwell. That piece of advice is worth many handbooks, and if everybody followed it many lives would be saved. It is easy to keep well in India if ordinary precautions are taken, if the visitor avoids excess, and, above all, if he does not regard slight ailments as trivial. The greatest danger to health in India is the danger of thinking that small derangements are of no account. They can be regarded with indifference in England, but in India they may have grave results.

Care of  
Health.



When there is any abnormal rise of temperature, or any disturbance of the stomach or bowels, a doctor should at once be sought. For most travellers in India cold baths are inadvisable. A cholera belt should be worn as a precaution against chills. Never drink milk or water at railway stations, and never partake even of aerated waters at wayside shops. It is as well to avoid tinned food as far as possible, though tinned comestibles are largely eaten in India. Never sleep without mosquito curtains except in very cold climates. Always be prepared for extremes of temperature. Remember that in the tropics constipation is as dangerous as the other extreme. Fruit is best eaten in the early morning, and should only be taken sparingly at the evening meal. A rough but safe rule is to eat only fruits which have skins. Alcohol, if drunk at all, should only be taken after sunset.

## CHAPTER XXV.

### THE ATTRACTIONS OF CEYLON.

The unusual variety to be met with in an island the area of which is not so great as that of Ireland—variety of scenery, of climate, of race, of religions, and of civilizations—is the peculiarity which, beyond all others perhaps, lends to Ceylon its chief attraction; but the earliest and strongest impression made upon the mind of the visitor from the West is the novelty of his surroundings. To him all things are new—the beauty and colour of the landscapes; the intense blueness of sea and sky; the undreamed-of luxuriance of the vegetation; the brilliant sunshine which gives to the eye a fuller power of vision; the transparent atmosphere, through which the hills stand forth incredibly blue and near; the veiled distances draped by fairy films of haze; the miracles wrought everywhere by the contrasts of light and shadow; the kaleidoscopic pageant of the Oriental populace, the very traffic on the roads—lumbering bullock-carts, rickshaws, with their trotting coolies, knots of picturesque wayfarers, and an occasional elephant snorting his protest at the approaching motor-car—to no one of these does memory supply a counterpart. Yet, though these things be new to him—so new that there is felt to be something of wonder and mystery in the very air—he is aware that they are the setting of a civilization older than any to-day existing in Europe, less broken in its continuity, less touched by time. In

the brown Sinhalese and the swarthier Tamil, between whom he learns presently to differentiate, he sees respectively the representatives of the Aryan and Dravidian races, of Buddhism and Hinduism—peoples living together now in peace and amity who of old made Ceylon their chosen battleground.

The stranger may view with interest and curiosity the Roman Catholic The Ceylon churches spattered about the island of Antiquity, and most thickly along its western coast, which are the one enduring monument of the Portuguese occupation of Ceylon, though the buildings themselves are mostly of modern origin. He may examine with profit the characteristically solid forts and buildings which, surviving to our day, mark the period of Dutch dominion. He may be grateful to the British Government for the roads and railways which render even the most remote districts of the island accessible, and for a hill-station such as Nuwara Eliya where in climate, scenery, and surroundings there is little to impress upon him the fact that he has strayed out of Europe. But the Ceylon which will hold for him most attraction is not the Ceylon of the 20th century, with its hotels and racecourses, its clubs and golf links, its extensive estates and plantations, its crowded law Courts, its thriving business houses, its prosaic and methodical system of administration; nor the Ceylon of the Dutch East India Company; nor yet that of the priest-ridden Portuguese adventurers. Instead, he will be irresistibly drawn to the ancient, pre-European Ceylon, which, he will instinctively feel, still exists, essentially untouched by the successive strata of alien civilizations which have sought to impose themselves upon it. Little by little, it is true, a class has come into being among the receptive people of the land which, with European learning, has embraced European ways of life and of thought, and therewith many Western and social and political ideals; but the

bulk of the native population is still, in most essentials, what it has always been, interested chiefly, so far as earthly things are concerned, in the daily problems of the cultivator, the bread-winner, the father of a family, and for the rest inspired by a sublime faith in their ancient religion such as can find few counterparts to-day, even among the peasantry of Europe. These are the custodians of an old-world civilization, the perpetuators of the traditions of a bygone age; and it is among the ruins and shrines—mute witnesses of their former greatness—among the white-clad villagers streaming, at each phase of the moon, to lay floral offerings at the feet of the images of Gotama, and in the wake of the immense crowds of pilgrims flocking to the holy places, that the visitor to Ceylon may expect to find that best calculated to excite his interest and his admiration.

His own pilgrimage should have its  
**Anuradhapura.** beginning at Mahintale—the little hill,  
seven miles to the eastward of Anuradha-  
pura, scaled by rugged, granite stairways  
and crowned by sacred buildings—which is reputed to  
have been the dwelling-place of Mahinda, the Royal  
ascetic from Magadha, who in the third century B.C. first  
brought to Ceylon the light of Buddhism. Tissa, the  
Sinhalese monarch, converted by Mahinda, together  
with his queen and all his Court, is said to have driven  
the golden plough with his own hand round the 20 square  
miles within his capital which his piety dedicated to the  
use of the new religion; and on this area presently arose  
the sacred buildings which so long formed the chief  
glory of the ancient city of Anuradhapura. It is Tissa,  
too, who is reputed to have built the Thuparama dagoba  
to enshrine a collarbone of the Buddha, and the beautiful  
little Temple of Isurumuniya in which so much of the  
living rock is utilized. It was this King also who obtained  
from Asoka, King of Magadha, the branch of the sacred

botree, seated beneath which Gotama attained to Buddhahood. This, planted at Anuradhapura, flourishes to this day, and is reputed to be the oldest historical tree in existence. The Loha Pasada, or Brazen Palace, of which nothing remains to-day save a confused up-crop of erect monoliths, was built during the second century B.C. by King Dutthagamani, after his victory over the Tamil adventurer who for 40 years had usurped the Throne of Ceylon. It has been the victim of many vicissitudes, demolitions, and reconstructions, and to-day its ruins suggest but faintly the reputed glories of its past. The Ruanweli dagoba also dates from the second century B.C. It is a huge conical hill, built throughout of brick, and springing from a basic platform of stone, where traces are still to be seen of the shrines, images, and delicate carvings which once decked it. An even greater monument, built by King Valagam Bahu, who like his predecessor had first to devote his energies to the expulsion of a Tamil usurper, is the Abhayagiriya dagoba, crowned by a curious broken column of hollow masonry. It is said to have been originally 450ft. in height, and though now much overgrown by vegetation, it too is built solidly of brick from a basic, much-ornamented platform of stone. The Jetawanarama dagoba, yet another of these artificial, hill-like monuments, was begun by King Maha Sen during the closing years of the third century of our era, and completed after his death during the succeeding century.

These are among the principal ruins of Anuradhapura; but the chief charm of the place lies in the wide distribution of its ancient relics—vast tanks whence water was supplied to a once populous city; the scattered, barely recognizable remains of palaces, of pavilions, temples half hidden in shrubberies; beautiful, ruinous bathing tanks; and fragments of carved stone cropping up in unexpected places. Roads running in and out among the ruins have made all, or nearly all, readily accessible;

but the stranger should shake himself free from guides and wander alone and at hazard among the less frequented parts of the ancient precincts if he would enjoy the full effect of their spell. They tell so little, and hint at so much. There are many things here to delight the eye ; much to excite the interest and quicken the intelligence ; but it is to the imagination that Anuradhapura makes its strongest and most stimulating appeal. There are surely few spots on earth more suggestive or more full of memories than this.

The ancient capital is situated at a distance of 126 miles from Colombo, the journey by train occupying six hours. It can also be performed in a day by motor either from Colombo or Kandy ; but cars have to be specially hired for the purpose, the usual charge being about five guineas *per diem*. There is a fairly good hotel at Anuradhapura, but the accommodation is limited, and rooms must be booked in advance—a remark which applies to all hotels in Ceylon. A motor-bus runs daily from Anuradhapura to Trinkomali, on the east coast, which until recently was a fortified naval base and garrison town. The journey is chiefly of interest because, for the greater part of its course, it runs through sparsely inhabited forest and because Trinkomali is one of the most beautiful coastal towns in Ceylon. Accommodation can here be found in the rest house.

The next point of interest which the visitor should include in his itinerary is Sigiriyagala, commonly called Sigiri. This picturesque natural rock-fortress is situated some three miles to the eastward of the main road from Kandy to Trinkomali, midway between Dambulla and Habarana, at both of which places there are rest-houses. Of the two the accommodation at Dambulla is by far the more commodious ; but, if room can be obtained, Habarana affords the more convenient *pied-à-terre* from which to visit, not only Sigiriya, but also Polannaruwa, the

A Rock  
Fortress.

second of the two ancient capitals of old Ceylon. There is also a small rest-house at Sigiriya itself, and the road leading to it from the highway is fairly good and passable for motor-cars.

Sigiriya is an imposing rock, roughly cylindrical in shape, which rises in abrupt isolation from the jungle-covered plain to a height of between five and six hundred feet. It was at once the eyrie, the refuge, and the stool of repentance of the Sinhalese King Kassapa I., who reigned from 479 to 497 A.D., and who retired thither after the cold-blooded murder of his father, whom he had caused to be bricked up in a wall and starved to death. On its summit he built a palace and treasure-houses, of which to-day only a few ruins survive ; but the great galleries, by means of which the ascent of this almost inaccessible rock was facilitated, in part remain, as also do traces of the fortifications which of old rendered it impregnable. In our time the last 100 feet or more of the climb is effected by means of ladders and steps hewn in the sloping sides of the rock by its former occupants, the latter being protected by strong handrails. The climb, which is sometimes rendered embarrassing by swarms of bees, should not be attempted by any one who is subject to giddiness ; but once accomplished the labour entailed will be found to have been well expended.

Another Ancient Capital. The road from Habarana to Polannaruwa is indifferent, though motor-cars are frequently taken over it. It passes close to the beautiful " tank " of Minneriya, one of the most typical and lovely of the ancient Sinhalese irrigation works. Once long ago this spot must have been the centre of a thriving and thickly populated region, but now, like the ancient capital of Polannaruwa, it is set in the heart of a jungle-covered wilderness, sparsely inhabited, whereof the wildness of the scenery lends an added charm and mystery to these relics of an ancient civilization. It was not until the eighth century that the Sinhalese

Kings removed their chief city to Polannaruwa; but though they here wrought less greatly than their forbears at Anuradhapura the ruins of their sacred edifices, as we see them to-day, are in a superior state of preservation, and accordingly render it more easy for the imagination to conjure up an image of their past grandeur. Though they are upon a scale infinitely less magnificent than the temples of approximately the same epoch constructed in Kambodia by Brahmans from India, the ruins at Polannaruwa are somewhat reminiscent of those greater works, and would seem to indicate that at this period the influence of Hindu art upon Sinhalese architecture was making itself strongly felt. Though far from being the most ancient or the most revered of the ruined temples of Ceylon, the architectural remains at Polannaruwa are, in some senses, the most impressive; and no visit to the so-called "buried cities" can be considered complete which does not include an inspection of this the second of the ancient capitals of the island.

From Polannaruwa and Sigiriya the traveller should return to Dambulla. Rock  
Temples.  
Here upon the summit of a rocky hill, the eastern slope of which is skirted by the high road, are to be seen five rock temples of intrinsic and historical interest. These caves, in their pristine condition, are said to have afforded a hiding place to the Sinhalese King Vatta Gamani Abhaya, better known as Valagam Bahu, during part of the 15 years, from 103 to 88 B.C., which he spent as a fugitive, his Throne having been usurped by five successive Tamil invaders. When in the fulness of time he regained his kingdom his gratitude prompted him to dedicate these caverns to the service of his religion. The rows of sedent Buddhas, carved out of the rock and gaudily painted, the picturesque dwelling places of the monks, and the dim, religious light of the holy places lend a special attraction to these ancient temples.



From Dambulla to Matale is a distance of nine and twenty miles along the high road to Kandy. Near the 27th mile, and at a short distance from the main road, stands the rock temple of Aluvihare, a place famous not only in Sinhalese but in Buddhist history, for here, during the first century B.C., Valagam Bahu caused to be assembled the conclave of learned monks who reduced to writing the sayings of Gotama, hitherto preserved only by means of oral tradition. The situation and surroundings of this temple are more than ordinarily romantic and picturesque.

From Matale, which is distant 16 miles from Kandy, a branch line of railway runs to the latter place; but the journey should by preference be performed by road, for the view obtainable from the summit of the Matale Pass will give the visitor his first exquisite taste of the glories of Ceylon upland scenery. At Katugastota, not quite three miles from Kandy, the Mahawela-Ganga—the largest and most important river in the island—is crossed, and here daily a number of tame elephants enjoy their evening bath in the sight of many spectators.

Kandy itself has undergone many changes since the provinces over which the Sinhalese monarchy maintained to the last its rule were ceded to the British

Crown by a conclave of Kandyan chiefs in 1815. The place possesses three hotels, one of the principal residences of the Governor, several Christian churches, a secondary school of considerable repute, the hall in which the Planters' Association of Ceylon holds its meetings, a Town Hall, a club, numerous European bungalows, a large number of native, and a few European shops. The provincial Government of the Central Province has here its headquarters, and the Government Agent resides in all that remains of the old palace of the Kandyan Kings. A private company provides the town with electric light, and its welfare is watched over by a Municipal Council.

Yet, in spite of all these modern innovations, the visitor will feel that here, as elsewhere, he is standing upon ground hallowed by historical traditions and sanctified by religious associations.

On a hill which dominates the old palace and the present Government Offices may be traced the trenches of a fort, once the stronghold of Portuguese invaders during their short and none too glorious occupation of the Sinhalese capital. A ride of some three miles through the lovely woodlands to the east of the town leads to the hill, on the banks of the Mahawela-Ganga, which in 1803 was the scene of the surrender and the subsequent massacre by the Kandyan of the British force under Major Davie which, after an occupation of even greater futility, was endeavouring to make its way to Trinkomali. In the very shadow of the public offices stands the Hall of Audience, now used for the sittings of a high court of justice, in which assembled the Chiefs who ceded the Kandyan provinces to the British Crown in 1815. A little below it, fronting the high road, is the Dalada Maligava, or Temple of the Tooth Relic, to which pious pilgrimage is made from all parts of the Buddhist world. The Tooth, which is about an inch in length, is preserved in a special shrine, and is encased in a number of small gold dagobas, loaded with an immense collection of gems. From time to time it is exposed for the adoration of the populace, and on great feast days it is carried in procession on the howdah of an elephant through certain streets of the town. Similar processions take place annually in the month of August to celebrate the recovery of his kingdom by the Sinhalese monarch Parakkame Bahu, who was crowned sole king of Lanka in the 12th century of our era. Close to the Temple of the Tooth are situated the Maha Devale and the Nata Devale, dedicated respectively to Bishnu and Siva, deities whose veneration by Buddhists, though often made the subject of learned explanations, represents a compromise with the older

Creed of Hinduism comparable to that which induced the early Christian Church to transfer the date upon which the birth of Christ was to be celebrated from March to December 25, the winter solstice upon which the Feast of the Sun was annually observed by the pagan world. The so-called "devil dancing" or *bali* ceremonies, now given as a spectacular exhibition at Kandy, but still used very universally by the Sinhalese peasants to cure illnesses, are also to be regarded as a survival of a popular leaning to an older faith which Buddhism has been powerless to eradicate. In some devale in Ceylon offerings are made to powers or demons which undoubtedly have no place within the pale of orthodox Buddhism. Of these perhaps the most famous is the devale at Alutnuwara, some five and a half miles on the Colombo side of Kadugannawa, the village at the head of the pass on the main road from Colombo to Kandy, sacred to Bandara, the chief of all the demons of Ceylon.

The celebrated botanical gardens of Peradeniya, the finest collection of tropical plants in existence, with the possible exception of that at Buitenzorg in Java, are within three miles of Kandy and can be reached either by rail or road. They are picturesquely situated upon a promontory round two sides of which flows the Mahaweli-Ganga, and the lover of beauty no less than the botanical student, will find a visit to them well repaid. Experimental gardens across the river at Gangaruwa contain many object-lessons of special interest to tropical agriculturists.

The above is by no means an exhaustive account of the "lions" of Kandy, which in addition enjoys the advantages of a tropical climate whereof the heat is rarely excessive and the wealth of vegetation, variety of scenery, and vivid colour with which the tropics are associated. From Kandy too a number of trips can be made with ease to various points of interest—for instance, to Lanka-

tilake, perhaps the most beautiful of all extant Ceylon temples ; to Galadeniva, a smaller edifice perched upon a rock, which is in some sort typical of the minor temples of the island ; or into the hills beyond Campola where the visitor may see some representative tea plantations. Nuwara Eliya, too, can be reached from Kandy by a journey of less than six and a half hours by train, and in approximately the same time by motor ; and here the traveller will find some of the best golf links in the East, and much that will remind him of his Western home. If instead of following the branch line from Nanu Oya to Nuwara Eliya he pursues his journey along the main line for two hours and a quarter to Haputale, he will find himself among rolling, grass-covered uplands, wholly different in appearance and climate from anything for which his wanderings in Ceylon have so far prepared him ; and half an hour later, after passing Diyatalawa—once the place of incarceration of the Boer prisoners of war, and now a camp of exercise for the Regular and Volunteer forces—he will reach rail-head at Bandarawela, where a comfortable hotel awaits him. Below him is spread the garden land of Uva, much of which bears a strong resemblance to the country around Kandy, but beyond that to the sea on the east and south the dry and dusty plains of northern Ceylon are repeated. In this quarter of the island, however, is to be found the sportsman's paradise. Accommodation can be obtained at one of several rest-houses in localities where game is fairly plentiful ; but if big game shooting of a serious character is desired, it is best to make arrangements in advance for a camp and trackers with one of the professional shikaris in Colombo. A licence to kill game costs £3, but special licences costing £5 and £20 respectively have to be obtained for the right to "shoot at or kill" a buffalo or an elephant. Tuskers are rare in Ceylon and may not be shot, the penalty for a breach of this regulation being a fine of Rs.1,000.

Thus, within the comparatively small area of 25,000 square miles, Ceylon provides many attractions likely to appeal to visitors of many tastes; for, as we said at the beginning of this chapter, its most striking characteristic is its variety, whereof space has made it impossible here to give more than the vaguest general impression.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

### EUROPE'S RELATIONS WITH ASIA.

[BY LOVAT FRASER.]

The man who, after years of absence, suddenly finds himself whirled along on the roaring tides of London, feels dazed and disconcerted. He is conscious of change, but cannot rightly tell whether the change lies in his own outlook or in the environment to which he has returned. He sees with astonishment great cars of Jagannath hurtling through the contracted streets; he drops down a shaft, and is whisked headlong beneath the very foundations of the giant city; he emerges into the pale daylight breathless and amazed, and gazes with new wonder upon the surging traffic, upon the palaces, the new and strange hotels, the swift and costly motor-cars, all the evidences of luxury, extravagance, and poverty that pass incessantly before his unaccustomed eyes. He feels like a man in a dream; the rushing, preoccupied throngs become for a time a haunting obsession that banishes sleep; but presently, after contact with his fellows, he asks himself whether he is really the dreamer, or whether it is not rather these eager, restless people who are busy with fond illusions. They seem complacent and satisfied; they laugh when asked to look outward over distant horizons; even those who dimly realize are acquiescent. The strident newspapers are full of outcry about what seems nothing to the stranger. He is told that he is in

the midst of a tremendous crisis ; but to him it seems utterly unreal—a battle of puppets about shadows. He hears reverberant sentiments of Empire ; but he knows it is an Empire held together by mere handfuls of trained men. He listens to marvellous schemes for making work easy and thrift obsolete, which seem to imply that the country has some inexhaustible mine of hidden wealth. He hears of the coming days when the burden of life is to be lightened and all men are to be leisured and happy. No one, he thinks at last, seems to see for a moment that the struggle for existence in the West may grow keener ; but he knows they would see it if they would but look with eyes uplifted to the East.

“ Is it the East or the West that is  
 A Vision of dreaming ? ” the wanderer asks himself  
 the East. as he watches the fog drifting through

the cheerless streets, blotting out the sky and wrapping the city in a brown pall, lit by glimmering lamps. He broods over memories of things seen, not dimly, like these vague swift shapes that flit through the gloom, but clear-cut beneath the morning light of the East. Forests of smoking factory chimneys, owned by brown men, managed by brown men, with swarms of workers who will readily toil 12 or 14 hours a day for a pittance of a few coppers ; vast arsenals, where are made all weapons from great guns to rifles, without any Western supervision ; dread battleships, manned and armed and controlled and fought without the aid of any white man ; the multitudinous cities of Asia, rich and prosperous and growing—and awake. Broad plains of waving wheat, illimitable stretches of green rice fields, dense and inexhaustible forests, wide brimming rivers. The locomotive, piercing jungles, crossing chasms, speeding across immeasurable distances, binding the oldest of continents in a network of steel rails with the willing approval of the people. Incalculable stores of coal and iron and gold, still almost unscratched, waiting the advent of the men of

the new age. Races in myriads who learned the secret of work when our forefathers were still clad in skins, who dream of no Millennium, but ask for nothing more than to continue their patient tireless industry. Men with brains more subtle than ours, with wills more tenacious than ours, who have never felt the Western fear of death. More than eight hundred millions of people who have watched the white races overrun and dominate their territories for 300 years, and have at last been quickened into a new spirit of resistance, a widespread determination to have and to hold their own lands in undisputed possession. An Asia savage, resentful, stirring, implacable. No, it is not Asia that is dreaming—it is Europe.

There are certain beliefs about Asia which it is the fashion in the West to accept without question. One of these is contained in the popular phrase “the changeless East.” There is no more exemption from the fundamental laws of change in the East than in the West. Some human and racial characteristics endure, as they do everywhere ; but Asia has been one constant phantasmagoria of change from the beginning of time. She is covered with the ruins of mighty cities which grew, flourished, decayed, and were abandoned. Time after time she has thrown up conquering hordes which have marched forward to overwhelming victory in the East, the West, and the South. Men say that in the dim night in her desert spaces you may still hear the tramp of ghostly armies, and the faint wild strains of barbaric music. Innumerable conquerors have arisen and spread destruction and death far and wide in her broad lands, and founded dynasties—and been forgotten. The whole nature of the Asiatic peoples is imbued with the idea of change. They have the nomadic instinct as the Teutonic races never had it. The caravans you meet in Mongolia and Persia, the pilgrims who cross dizzy mountain passes in pursuit of an ideal, the roving mendicants who pass



from city to city and country to country—all those drifting mysterious strangers who wander from end to end of Asia are the embodiments of the craving for change.

It was Western science that gave Europe its transient dominion over Asia. We have forced our science upon nations at first unwilling, but now eager to receive it. We have forged and placed in their hands the weapons that may some day be turned against us. Asia is only changeless in that beneath the thin garments of Western influence she has remained true to her own spirit. But for the rest, the last ten years have witnessed mightier changes in the psychological outlook of Asia than the continent has known for centuries. We must not be lulled into comfortable confidence by these delusions about "the changeless East."

Another popular belief, which is largely fallacious, is the prevalent idea that Asia not a Mystery. "there is no greater difference in the world than the difference between East and West." Whenever people talk about Asia, they at once assume the existence of inscrutable mysteries. They think nothing of tearing her most esoteric secrets from the bosom of Nature, but they speak as though an Asiatic is a being from another world. The idea is partly a survival from the days of Prester John, when the East was mysterious indeed; and partly it is due to the inveterate tendency of the Western man to regard people as weird and strange and abnormal who do not think and act precisely as he does. That there are wide differences between East and West is true enough; but the fundamental human emotions, the mainsprings of human thought and action, are probably very much the same all over the world. Joy and sorrow, motherly love, ambition, avarice, lust, hospitality, chivalry, honour, hatred, faithfulness, courage, unselfishness, all these varying qualities are found just as frequently,

and manifested in very similar fashions, in the East as in the West.

It is customary to believe the morals of the East to be dark and hideous and unspeakable ; yet the women of India probably have the instinct of chastity more strongly than any women in the world, and the stranger may go throughout the country without once encountering the leer that would greet him in the streets of any European city. Novelists are fond of depicting the courts of Indian Maharajahs as the abodes of intrigue and excess ; but the truth is that the private lives of most princes of India would bear very creditable comparison with those of past rulers of Europe. Allowing in some instances for the relative degrees of civilization, there is hardly any curious or quaint or unusual aspect of life in Asia that could not be matched in Europe. The mystery of Asia is largely our own creation. Such variations as exist do not materially affect the attitude of the Asiatic peoples towards the problems that lie before them. We shall learn to discern the probable future of Asia more clearly if we break away from the romantic habit of regarding the Asiatic nations as impossible to understand, if we count upon their broad course of action as being likely to be very much that which European nations would follow under similar circumstances.

The new era in Asia really began on the day when China told Italy to keep clear of Samsun Bay ; but for history it will always date from the memorable night when the Japanese torpedo-boats were slipped from their leash, and dashed amid the Russian battle-ships beneath the shadow of Golden Hill. The unfurling of the flag of the Rising Sun over Port Arthur meant far more than a Japanese victory. It was hailed as an omen and a portent by all Asia. It was an emblem of the turn of the tide that had carried the white races to the shores of the Pacific. The outward movement that began when

The  
New Era.

Vasco da Gama sighted the green palms and golden sands of Calicut, and Yermak led his hardy band of warriors across the Urals into the trackless forests of Siberia, was stayed for the first time. The peoples of Asia knew full well that their day was dawning at last. When the Japanese burst open the barred doors of Manchuria, and drove the Russians headlong back towards the Sungari, they let loose a surging flood of vague but potent aspirations that quickly spread over the whole continent. From Stamboul to Canton, from Kabul to Madras, from Tokio to Hail, the peoples of Asia were quickly resurgent. We cheered our gallant allies when they stormed the blood-red slopes of Nanshan, but did we realize all that their triumph may mean some day to us and to Europe, and to all the Western world ?

The victory of Japan was not a new phenomenon. If the Western world contemplated it with stupefied surprise, it was only because, flushed with the memories of long and dazzling successes, it had forgotten history. The whole of human history in the Eastern hemisphere has been one long record of the ebb and flow of encounters between Europe and Asia. The alternation is as persistent, and almost as regular, as the recurrence of winter and summer, of night and day. It is one of the great perennial phenomena of human existence. It began with the dawn of civilization at the head of the Persian Gulf, whence migratory races carried the arts of writing and agriculture eastward and westward, to the Mediterranean and the Yangtse, and the Godavari, through Europe and through Asia. Then came the rise of the Aryans, which was probably also a movement both eastward and westward, though in its most marked result it was an invasion of Southern Asia from the direction of Europe. Followed, after a long interval, the westward sweep of the Persians, stopped in an heroic age at Marathon and Salamis. The tide of conflict

rushed eastward again when Alexander made his marvellous raid through the Hindu Kush into India, and marched back trailing the spoils of Asia in his train. The long struggle between Carthage and Rome, though it had its real inception in migrations which happened when Greece was young, was essentially, in its later stages, an episode in the ancient antagonism between Asia and Europe.

The eagles of Rome were carried to the Euphrates, and the Roman legions were long a bulwark against Asiatic aggression, but Rome sought few conquests in the East. The decay of the Roman Empire weakened the barriers, and again the star of Asia rose as the Huns poured like a torrent into Europe, carrying death and devastation far and wide under the ruthless guidance of Attila. The rise of Islam brought fresh Asiatic incursions, though the Arabs clung to the shores of the Mediterranean and left the real heart of Europe unmenaced. The retaliation of the Crusades was far more feeble and unproductive than the armed and restrained vigilance of Rome. It left the energy of Asia unabated. The meteoric appearance of Jenghiz Khan generated a new flood of invasion which carried the Golden Horde across the Volga and placed Russia under a long and bitter domination. The Ottoman Turks crossed the Bosphorus and even thundered at last at the gates of Vienna. But the tide turned once again. The West had learned the secret of the sea, and science and superior organization had given it the keys of Asia. It had, too, caught the passion for trade from the East, in an inferior degree but not less keenly. The dramatic appearance of Vasco da Gama off the Malabar coast was followed by a rush of Spanish and Dutch and British and French and Russian forces, some of which founded Empires far greater than Asia in Europe had ever dreamed of. The last pulsations of the outward tide brought Dewey to the shores of Manila

\* Bay and Germany to Kiaochau. Then the guns of Japan spoke, and the tide was turned and a new era began. Yet it had already, perhaps, had a beginning in the final results of that mysterious dispersal of the Jewish race, which after many centuries of suffering and repression had given an indomitable people a master-hold upon the strings of European policy.

There are three great problems which, British Control in their gradual development, are likely of India. to determine the character of the relations between Europe and Asia in the present century. The first, and the greatest, because it will most directly influence the moral attitude of Europe towards the East, is that of the course which will be shaped by Great Britain in her control of India. Upon the outcome of the tremendous experiment in racial regeneration to which Great Britain is committed the fate of Europe in Asia chiefly turns. It is of vital moment to Europe that British dominion in India should be maintained, and there is little doubt that its stability cannot be gravely menaced by internal revolt. But the British people is about to have its sincerity of purpose in India challenged as it has never yet been. Great Britain has never made up its mind about its aim in India, but it will have to do so soon. Neither the Royal visit nor any other adventitious expedient can deflect the new and fundamental tendencies now at work. The coming issue in India, upon which the continued acceptance of British rule depends, will be found in the demand, already rising, for fiscal and financial liberty. If the demand is conceded, and in whatever form, it must inevitably involve some abatement of the control from England, which is essentially financial. The impending agitation will test to the utmost the professed unselfishness of British motives in holding India, and will be fraught with destinies as great as those which lay concealed in the Declaratory Act

when it was passed by the Rockingham Ministry.

The second problem is that of the future of China. It is the problem which must in its solution ultimately have the greatest material effect upon Europe, because of the vast natural resources of China and the industry and capacity of her teeming inhabitants. Many believe that the Chinese are destined to become again, as they were ages ago, the greatest Power in Asia. The awakening of China has been, and will continue to be, a slow process, its stages marked by many apparent failures and even losses, but it will be the more enduring because it is slow. The late Lord Salisbury cared little about Asiatic questions, but he had a way of getting at the heart of things in a few vigorous words. When he growled out that he declined to believe that 400 millions of people could ever become moribund, he touched the root of the matter. No Western Power will now be able permanently to place those myriads of yellow men in subjection. An expedition to Peking, the seizure of a port or two or an outlying province, the slaughter of a few thousand Chinese—these things leave the essential China almost untouched; and the Chinese are beginning to know it. The spirit of China is not aggressive, though the memory of a thousand wrongs may rankle and produce grave results. The danger from the Chinese is that of industrial competition, and it is still so little visible that the menace is hardly realized in Europe. Every year adds strength to the position of China, and behind the medley of corruption and weakness which still constitutes her administration a new spirit of cohesion and ambition is at work.

The third great problem is that of the countries of the Middle East, and it has the most immediate interest, because it will probably be the first to come to a head. The Middle East is the real cockpit of the world.

It is the abiding battleground between East and West, the arena of those mighty conflicts which have brought empires to the dust. It begins at Adrianople and ends at Jellalabad. There is no country lying between those two cities which can hope to preserve its present methods of control without great modifications. Turkey has not yet found salvation; its remoter provinces grow more rebellious, and the new system of government has so far failed to work smoothly. Persia is groping in the dark. its Parliamentary experiment drifts nearer a complete deadlock, and there can be no growth of strength while the mutually jealous southern tribes hold the balance of power. Afghanistan cannot expect for ever to maintain its sullen isolation, though it is to the interest of Great Britain that it should remain so. The weakness of the races of the Middle East is a danger to Europe, because it may at any time produce quarrels and an explosion. The quarrels of Europe are the opportunities of Asia. Though Turkey absorbs European attention, Persia and the Persian Gulf probably present greater risks of international disputes. The troubles of Persia are ultimately due to her changed climate, for she has shared to some extent in the process of desiccation visible in parts of Asia, and she has no great rivers to retrieve the balance. To that extent, therefore, they are insoluble. The Persian Gulf is a danger, because Great Britain rightly holds that she must control it in the interests of India, and the claim may some day be called in question. The Middle East offers no present menace to Europe, save that by its very weakness it produces jealous aspirations which may breed war.

There are three great factors which must exercise a preponderating influence in the determination of these problems. The first is the development of land communications, which is completely revolutionizing the Asiatic question. The last rails had scarcely been bolted

in the line which Russia carried to an ice-free port on the Pacific when some of the greatest battles the world has ever seen were fought as a direct result. Yet the railway has opened up the potential riches of Manchuria; and the great railway system now being constructed in China must presently introduce the Chinese to unexampled prosperity. The growth of India's wealth is chiefly due to railway development, which has incidentally greatly strengthened British control. The Baghdad Railway will assuredly be built, and Persia will not long remain without railway lines, though she probably needs good roads more. The chief railway question of Asia is now the connexion of India with Europe on the one hand and with China on the other, and both these schemes are no longer wild dreams. No one can foresee all the changes which the locomotive may produce, but its steady advance must profoundly modify the existing situation.

The second factor is the rejuvenation of the Asiatic peoples, prompted by Japan. The Unity of Asia. There can be no mistake about the new spirit abroad in the East. The dry bones have stirred. Behind the mysterious activities of the Young Turks, the muddled wrangles of the Persians, the insistent aspirations of the Indians, the new craving for education among the Chinese, the mailed efficiency of the Japanese, there lives and moves a spirit which, however varied its expression, is essentially the same in every Eastern land. It has everywhere a common origin, for at the back of all things else it is a revolt against the domination of Europe. It is a manifestation of the new Pan-Asiatic ideal, and though it does not involve unity of action, it implies a common purpose. A new world-movement is beginning, which is nevertheless as old as humanity itself. The pulsating heart of Asia has begun



another diastole, and the expansion must produce a renewal of the ancient conflict with the West.

**The  
Coming  
Conflict.**

But for a period, the duration of which cannot be discerned, it will be a conflict in a new form. Though the principles which govern human history are eternal, the manner of their reappearance varies. No signs are visible which portend the recurrence of gigantic wars between the two continents, one reason being that climatic changes have made the Middle East far less populous. There may be occasional terrible encounters on the battlefield—we have recently witnessed a very great one—but no horde of conquering Asiatics is likely to overrun Europe. The third factor now coming into play is that of the industrial development of Asia, and the coming conflict between Europe and Asia will be, in its most permanent form, a war of industrial competition. When the factories and mines of Asia have heaped up fresh riches for the East, the character of the conflict may change and become more violently militant, but the intermediate process must be a long one. Yet the results will not be less tangible because the weapons will be bales of piece-goods rather than ironclads. In the south and east of Asia are these swarming peoples with their illimitable resources, their faculty of patient labour, their realization of the great truth which the West is forgetting—that true happiness lies in unhurried work and not in aimless leisure. They have not lost the joy of fatherhood or the secret of maternity. They dwell in the lands made fruitful by the monsoons, and the desiccation of much of the rest of Asia leaves them untouched. They have been preoccupied with agriculture for unnumbered ages, but now they are learning the uses of machinery. Why should they continue to buy from the West the products which they can make for themselves? China has always made most of the clothing her people require. In time she will probably make all she wants,

and then China and Japan and India will ask themselves—as indeed they are already doing—why they should not compete in the rest of the markets of the world. That is why the renaissance of Asia means so much to the workmen of Europe. That is why the West should awaken from its dreams. It has pictured the docile millions buying its merchandise with meek acquiescence, but the East is no longer docile, and is clamouring for its rightful share of prosperity.

It remains to point out that all these conclusions are liable to be modified by the appearance of some quite unforeseen phenomenon. In the East, far more than in any other part of the world, it is the unexpected that happens. The dominating factor in Asia is religion, and its mutations are less easy to discern than the growth of new tendencies in the materialistic West. The recent subtle intrusion of Pan-Islamism into China, which has passed almost unnoticed, may, for instance, contain the germ of great events of dire import to the world. There are already 30,000,000 Mahomedans in China. They have been frequently in revolt, and the more ancient faiths are weakening. The fear that other parts of the world are likely to receive floods of yellow and brown men is, on the other hand, probably quite unfounded. The small overspill of the Eastern races which has reached other countries has been carried thither far less by pressure of population than by the genuine demand for cheap manual labour and a natural desire to make the most of existent opportunities. Both China and India can support far more than their present population. The sole exception is Japan, which needs room for expansion, though the need is more likely to bring her again into violent contact with Russia than with any other Power. Nevertheless, it is not surprising that America watches the outward tendencies of the Asiatic peoples with a somewhat tremulous anxiety, and that

Some  
Further  
Possibilities.

Australia should begin to realize that her vast empty tropical lands will not for ever be allowed to remain untilled and unpeopled. Too much has been made of the colour question. This article has been written in vain if it has not shown that the processes at work lie far deeper than the mere antagonism of colour, though that is admittedly a potent surface influence. The economic factor is the mainspring of the complex relations between East and West, and in its new form it makes the Asiatic question the greatest question of the 20th century.



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
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